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Over the  rst ten years of its existence, the euro has proved to be more than a powerful symbol of collective identity. It 
has provided price stability to previously in ation-prone countries; it has o ered a shelter against currency crises; and 
it has by and large been conducive to budgetary discipline. The eurozone has attracted  ve new members in addition 
to the initial eleven, and many countries in Europe wish to adopt it. The euro has also been successful internationally. 
Even though research presented in this volume con rms that it has not rivaled the dollar’s world currency status, it has 
certainly become a strong regional currency in Europe and the Mediterranean region. Some countries in the region 
have de facto adopted it, several peg to it, and many have become at least partially euroized.
However, the euro’s impressive  rst decade is likely to be followed by a much more di cult period. The present  nancial 
crisis is posing at least two important challenges: real economic adjustment within the euro area and maintenance 
of  scal and  nancial stability without a central government authority capable of taking appropriate  nancial and 
 scal decisions in di cult times. The papers and remarks in this volume demonstrate that the euro has proved to 
be attractive as a fair weather currency for countries and investors well beyond its borders. But it remains to be seen 
whether it is equipped to also succeed as a stormy weather currency.  
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The euro has now celebrated the tenth anniversary of its successful launch 
on January 1, 1999. In the midst of the greatest ﬁnancial crisis of the last 
70 years, the world’s only transnational major currency has delivered 
price stability to the people of the euro area, retained its value in interna-
tional markets, and proven capable of weathering the storm—which at 
present came from both internal as well as external asset price busts and 
imbalances. While a few increasingly shrill and lonely naysayers remain, 
the euro has amply demonstrated its sustainability. Also euro-denomi-
nated assets, particularly corporate bond issues, and euro-invoiced trade 
have come to make up an increasingly large share of the global total in 
real and ﬁnancial commerce. 
The global role of the euro, however, remains much more uncertain. 
Many would argue that the current crisis is the euro’s moment: With the 
US economy at least perceived in many quarters to have brought on the 
crisis, and with that crisis attributed in part to global imbalances associ-
ated with excess consumption by the United States, it would seem time for 
markets in general and governments holding reserves to look anew at the 
euro as the one viable dollar alternative. Prospects for sustained budget 
deﬁcits and inﬂation in the United States when the crisis abates, as well 
as recently and sharply expressed concerns about dollar stability by such 
major US debt holders as the Chinese government, would seem to add 
momentum to this possibility for the euro to emerge as codominant with 
the dollar on the global scene. Historical echoes of the British pound’s 
loss of world role to the dollar before the Second World War, and of the 
dollar seemingly saving in its role in the 1970s and 1980s only through the 
absence of an alternative currency, are ringing loudly. Many eastern Euro-vi 
pean members hit hard by the crisis have expressed a wish to accelerate 
their euro entry.
Yet the current crisis has produced to date a ﬂight to the dollar as a 
safe haven and an extended appreciation of the dollar against the euro. In 
addition, even those governments voicing concerns about the dollar’s me-
dium-term value are not advocating a shift into the euro as a new reserve; 
those market participants who vote with their feet are not shifting port-
folios into euro assets either. The monetary stability of the euro has nei-
ther solved the problems of coordination on ﬁnancial stability within the 
euro area nor increased the willingness of euro area members to extend 
that monetary stability to other EU members. If anything, the response of 
the euro area governments to the crisis has been to move in a defensive 
direction regarding the euro’s global role by complaining of competitive 
depreciations by near neighbors, refusing to adjust the euro area entry 
criteria or accelerate consideration of new members, making no effort to 
extend euro swap lines on the scale that the Federal Reserve has offered 
in dollars, and asking the IMF to administer conditional loans to crisis-hit 
Eastern European economies.
In  October  2008  the  Institute  and  our  European  sister  Bruegel 
held  a  joint  high-level  conference  to  examine  the  euro’s  potential  to 
move beyond its success as a currency for a large region into a broader 
global role. This book, edited by Bruegel Director Jean Pisani-Ferry and 
PIIE Deputy Director Adam S. Posen, comprises the papers and panel 
discussion presented at that conference. European ofﬁcials representing 
the  Commission,  the  European  Central  Bank,  and  a  major  euro  area 
central bank assess the current use of the euro as a global currency, and 
the willingness and requirements to have the euro’s role expand. In more 
speciﬁc studies, contributing authors from around the world assess the 
progress of the euro project after ten years, the fundamental drivers of 
global currency usage and how the euro performs on these criteria, and 
the perspective of other major regions on usage of the euro. A panel of 
current and former senior policymakers examines the implications for 
the global monetary system and for transatlantic relations of the euro’s 
potential to rise in importance at a time of dollar vulnerability. 
One important objective of the book is to identify areas of common 
interest and of common vulnerability between American and European 
policymakers, as the euro evolves and as the crisis continues. A second 
objective is to better inform policymakers and the American public about 
the euro and thereby dispel unrealistic concerns on the US side of the 
Atlantic about whether the euro “can survive.” The authors make clear that 
this question has long since been settled in the afﬁrmative. The questions 
at hand are: What is required for the euro to attain codominance with the 
dollar globally? Does the ﬁnancial crisis make this more likely or reveal 
relative weaknesses in the euro’s position as well? What might occur if the 
euro does not take on a leading monetary role at this time?vii
The development of the euro and its implications for the international 
ﬁnancial system have been of major interest to the Institute since the ﬁrst 
pre-Maastricht proposals were made. Adam S. Posen edited a conference 
volume on The Euro at Five: Ready for a Global Role? (2005) that took an 
earlier look at this issue, and provides a benchmark for comparison with 
this volume’s assessment of the euro’s progress since then. C. Randall 
Henning’s  Cooperating  with  Europe’s  Monetary  Union  (1997)  and  the 
Institute’s earlier conference volume on Reviving the European Union (1994) 
foreshadowed  these  questions  of  a  bipolar  monetary  world.  My  own 
article “The Dollar and the Euro” in Foreign Affairs in 1997 was one of the 
ﬁrst by a US economist to suggest that not only would the euro succeed 
but also that it would challenge the dollar. This research was part of the 
Institute’s continuing agenda on the leadership of the global economic 
system and on international monetary regimes.
The Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics is a pri-
vate, nonproﬁt institution for the study and discussion of international 
economic policy. Its purpose is to analyze important issues in that area 
and to develop and communicate practical new approaches for dealing 
with them. The Institute is completely nonpartisan.
The Institute is funded by a highly diversiﬁed group of philanthropic 
foundations,  private  corporations,  and  interested  individuals.  About 
22  percent  of  the  Institute’s  resources  in  our  latest  ﬁscal  year  were 
provided  by  contributors  outside  the  United  States.  We  gratefully 
acknowledge funding from the European Commission’s Economic and 
Financial Affairs Directorate and External Relations Directorate for the 
October 2008 conference and this volume, as well as its support for our 
ongoing work with Bruegel researching transatlantic approaches and 
cooperation  in  macroeconomic  policy  (Grant  No  C1/2008/TD  under 
grant agreement n°SI2.507359). The views expressed in this publication 
are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect 
the views of the European Commission, of the Institute, or of Bruegel, or 
any of their respective ofﬁcers.
The Institute’s Board of Directors bears overall responsibilities for the 
Institute and gives general guidance and approval to its research program, 
including the identiﬁcation of topics that are likely to become important 
over the medium run (one to three years) and that should be addressed 
by the Institute. The director, working closely with the staff and outside 
Advisory Committee, is responsible for the development of particular 
projects and makes the ﬁnal decision to publish an individual study. 
The Institute hopes that its studies and other activities will contribute 
to building a stronger foundation for international economic policy around 
the world. We invite readers of these publications to let us know how they 




The Euro at 10—Successful,  
but Regional 
JEAN PISANI FERRY AND ADAM S. POSEN
The euro is now in its tenth year of usage, successfully performing all the 
functions of a currency for European citizens using it and providing price 
stability to the euro area.
1 The monetary union and its central bank are in 
the process of passing the test of a major ﬁnancial crisis and have held up 
well so far. In spite of market commentaries and spreads contemplating 
the euro area’s breakup, one result of the crisis has been that more coun-
tries want to join the euro area than before, not fewer. 
Given its success to date, however, the euro could be more than an 
anchor for some participating countries and an aspiration for others. At 
a time when voices in China and other emerging countries advocate a 
multipolar monetary regime, the euro could become a currency for all 
of Europe or even a global currency. At a time when investors wonder 
about ﬁscal sustainability in the United States and ponder the risks of 
monetization, it could represent a partial alternative to the US dollar as a 
store of value. The papers in this volume address this issue of the euro’s 
impact on the international monetary system so far and its potential role 
beyond the euro area over the next decade. 
All authors started from two questions. The ﬁrst was: Is the euro 
1. A general assessment of the impact of the euro on the euro area’s and the European Union’s 
own economic performance is given in Pisani-Ferry et al. (2008), DG ECFIN (2008), and ECB 
(2008). An earlier assessment predicting that the euro would be successful on its own terms, 
but without important global role, is in Posen (2005).
1
Jean Pisani-Ferry is the director of Bruegel. Adam S. Posen is deputy director and senior fellow at the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics. The papers in this volume are based on a conference 
at the Peterson Institute on October 10, 2008, jointly organized by Bruegel and the Peterson Institute 
with the support of the European Commission.2  THE EURO AT TEN
en route to becoming a global currency and thus to either challenging 
or equalling the dollar in its reserve and leadership role? Their largely 
common answer is that it has already become a dominant regional cur-
rency, whose role extends to areas bordering the euro area or the Euro-
pean Union, but it is very far from rivalling the US dollar on a number of 
fundamental criteria. One can consider this as a success or a failure but, 
more importantly, it is a fact: By all standards the euro is an overwhelming 
success in the European Union and its neighborhood, and by all standards 
it is junior to the US dollar in international monetary affairs. 
The second question for all authors was: What has the global ﬁnancial 
crisis, and the euro area policy response to it, revealed about the resilience 
of the euro and its international prospects? Again the largely common 
answer is that the existence of the euro contributed to macroeconomic 
stability within the euro area, and thus to stability globally, but that the 
crisis  revealed  weaknesses  in  the  governance  and  crisis  management 
capabilities of the euro area. Doubts about the euro area’s ability to respond 
to cross-border banking system problems also persist. Furthermore, the 
euro did little to improve the crisis response of neighboring countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
Responses to these two questions together highlight the gap between 
the euro’s current reality and its potential. But they also highlight the re-
gional role and responsibilities of the euro area. The euro, as a successful 
regional currency but not a global currency, provides stability to its current 
members and helps some of them ward off the effects of the crisis—and 
this should be a primary policy objective for euro area decision-makers. 
At the same time, the Eastern and Southeastern European countries tied 
to the euro area include some of the emerging markets worst hit by the 
crisis (some of which belong to the European Union and are among its 
major trading partners). Even if the formal mandates of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the Eurogroup (where the ministers of ﬁnance of 
the area meet) do not formally include it, broader stability in the region 
should be a major economic and political objective as well. Inability to 
provide it (beyond the provision of balance-of-payment assistance within 
the framework of the International Monetary Fund [IMF] programs) must 
accordingly be seen as a failure of euro area policymaking and needs to be 
rectiﬁed. In essence, while the crisis promoted the attractiveness of euro 
area membership for those within it, the euro area’s limited crisis response 
demonstrated the defensive crouch in which European policymakers con-
tinue to treat shocks to the euro area—and thus undercut its regional im-
portance, not to mention its positive inﬂuence. 
As with many other aspects widely discussed—such as the Stability 
and Growth Pact on ﬁscal policy, the criteria for enlargement, or the in-
sistence on ERM2
2 membership prior to euro area entry—the European 
2. ERM2 is the exchange rate mechanism that links the euro and EU countries in a formal INTRODUCTION 3
Union’s approach to monetary arrangements appears to be bound by a 
narrow and exceedingly formal deﬁnition of its objectives, be it monetary 
stability within its borders or equal treatment across candidates whatev-
er the circumstances. This is at the potential expense of broader stabil-
ity, political and economic, over the long term as well as at the expense 
of Europe’s ability to address strategic challenges. The analogous focus 
on national responses to banking crises, when there are major two-way 
spillovers between the euro area and Eastern European ﬁnancial systems, 
reinforces this trade-off—and the air of defensiveness as though the euro’s 
viability indeed were deemed fragile by its very guardians.
Similar concerns arise as regards the euro area’s role in global mon-
etary  arrangements  and  their  likely  evolution.  The  facts  that  ﬂight  to 
safety by investors during the current crisis has been primarily to dol-
lar-denominated assets and that calls by Chinese and other governments 
for post–dollar dominated reserve currency arrangements have primarily 
focused on non-euro alternatives underscore the limitations on the global 
role of the euro to date. But as one of us quotes the sage Hillel in the open-
ing of his paper regarding the euro’s geopolitical limitations (Adam Posen 
in chapter 2), “If I am not for myself, who will be for me? Yet, if I am for 
myself only, what am I? And if not now, when?” In other words, if the euro 
is neither eagerly promoted nor widely adopted as the alternative to the 
dollar at a time when US policymakers have made arguably the greatest 
postwar errors and when dollar-denominated asset values and credibility 
have suffered the greatest losses, will it ever become a global currency? 
The authors in this volume expect that there will be steady increases in the 
euro’s share in foreign exchange reserves, in ﬁnancial and trade transac-
tions, and even in exchange rate pegs and baskets in the coming years, 
where trade and ﬁnancial linkages with the euro area grow for real-side 
market-driven reasons. They do not, however, expect any sudden shift to 
the euro as a global currency, as a result of either the crisis or fundamen-
tals. And they are pessimistic for the long term as the weight of Europe in 
the world economy is set to diminish. 
Does the euro’s lack of global role really matter? Empirically, it is an 
interesting question both on its own terms of forecasting signiﬁcant capi-
tal ﬂows and as a means to testing various fundamentals as explanations 
of the euro’s (and dollar’s) relative performance. Normatively for policy, 
the importance of the issue is less self-evident. As Lawrence Summers 
puts it in the closing discussion in chapter 4, “My view is that the United 
States is best served by not conceptualizing itself as in competition with 
the euro…To have two currencies trying to be in complete equipoise risks 
substantial instability, as things rush from one direction to the other. None 
peg to it. It succeeded the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System when 
the euro was introduced in 1999. Membership in the ERM2 is a precondition for joining the 
euro. 4  THE EURO AT TEN
of this is to say that the United States should seek to thwart the euro.” 
Similarly, Erkki Liikanen states, “I think we, as European central bank-
ers, should not promote the euro [into a bipolar role with the dollar], and 
that the euro’s international role should rather reﬂect the economic devel-
opment of the euro area.” We, the editors, acknowledge this responsible 
view of senior policymakers and admire its freedom from nationalist cant 
on both sides of the Atlantic. It is no doubt correct to take the euro primar-
ily as an issue for the economic performance of the euro area and in those 
terms to view it as a success.
Yet, we believe this focus is too narrow in three senses and that under 
the present circumstances the lack of serious discussion about the poten-
tial global currency status of the euro is reason for some concern: 
  First,  the  fundamental  factors  limiting  the  euro’s  international  role 
and usage do reveal weaknesses in the European Union’s economic 
integration and performance, which need to be addressed (we sum-
marize our authors’ evidence from chapter 2 on this score in the next 
section). 
  Second, the erosion of US monetary and ﬁnancial leadership may well 
be secular and even accelerated by the current crisis, in which case 
absent a globally ready euro, a vacuum in the international economic 
system may arise and potentially cause instability.
3 We recap below the 
likely developments in regional ties to the euro and in regionalization 
of monetary arrangements (particularly but not only in Asia) as set out 
by our authors in chapter 3. 
  Third, as already noted, we view the insufﬁcient response of the euro 
area to the crisis impact in Eastern Europe, particularly among the 
European Union’s newer member states, as harmful to solidarity and 
performance within the union, if not to the European project itself.
4 We 
have the irony that at the very same time that euro area membership 
becomes all the more appealing, even for traditionally reluctant states 
like Denmark and Poland, the entry criteria are losing relevance: (1) 
the inﬂation criterion is en route to becoming too easy to fulﬁll, and 
(2) the budgetary criterion is becoming virtually impossible to reach. 
Lack of consideration for regional spillover effects of national choices 
and lack of ﬂexibility turn euro area enlargement into a mechanical 
exercise at a time Europe is confronted with a strategic choice.
Drawing on the work of our authors and our own additional research, 
we outline some practical steps to reduce these harms.
3. The classic statement of the dangers from such an absence of monetary leadership at a time 
of economic contraction is given in Kindleberger (1986).
4. See also Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2008).INTRODUCTION 5
Why Has International Success Been Limited? 
Several reasons account for the euro’s limited international success so far. 
The most obvious one is the dollar’s incumbent status. Scholars of inter-
national monetary history have often warned that inertia resulting from 
network externalities make the status of dominant international currency 
hardly contestable (Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui 1993). Some have 
also argued that shifts in dominant currency, when they occur, take place 
abruptly rather than gradually, and that policy errors in the home country 
can provide the opportunity for a switch, if an alternative currency is avail-
able (Bergsten in chapter 4). More recent historical interpretations of the 
lengthy decline of the pound’s role in the 20th century, among other cases, 
suggest however that reserve or leading currencies can coexist (Eichen-
green 2005, Eichengreen and Flandreau 2008). So the incumbent role of the 
dollar is a less compelling argument than is sometimes suggested. 
However much weight one chooses to put on the network effects and 
persistence of incumbent currency status, the gap between the euro and 
dollar in reserve portfolio holdings, in number and breadth of countries 
pegging (soft or hard) to them, in commodities priced in them, in share of 
trade invoiced in them, and in share of investment portfolios is far larger 
than one would expect based on the euro area’s economic size and price 
stability relative to the US economy (Chinn and Frankel 2007; Portes, Pa-
paioannou, and Siourounis 2006). Furthermore, all but one of the coun-
tries pegged to the euro are major trading partners of Europe whereas a 
large number of countries whose currency is pegged to the dollar trade 
with Europe as much as with the United States—if not much more as in 
the case of Ukraine. This is evidence of strong asymmetry. 
On one measure—that of private-sector ﬁnancial depth in some as-
sets, particularly regarding international bond issuance—the euro area 
has roughly caught up with the United States (see Kristin Forbes’ paper 
in chapter 2).
5 This if anything emphasizes the difﬁculty in explaining the 
gap between the euro’s and dollar’s global role by network externalities: 
If market preferences have been revealed and changes have happened on 
international bond markets, why not for other markets? Similarly, if bipo-
lar monetary systems have been known to exist in the recent past, and the 
US relative economic performance, or at least relative policy credibility, 
has been damaged by the current ﬁnancial crisis, then it is all the more 
difﬁcult to understand why there has not been greater shift to the euro in 
various channels than has been seen over the past two years.
Thus, both the euro’s relatively limited global role versus what some 
5. The usual Bank for International Settlements data on the relative role of the dollar and 
the euro in international bond markets gives a distorted image of reality as it counts intra-
euro area cross-border holdings as international. Corrected data put euro bond outstanding 
second to dollar outstanding, but by a narrow margin. 6  THE EURO AT TEN
simple economic factors would indicate and its limited take-up as a result 
of the US-initiated ﬁnancial crisis (and arguably US global imbalances, 
at least as widely perceived) instead argue that we need a better under-
standing of the sources of global currency adoption. The papers in this 
volume provide speciﬁc reasons why the euro has not yet achieved world 
currency status:
  Limited economic base. The euro area is somewhat smaller in economic 
weight than the US economy (16.1 percent of world GDP at purchasing 
power parity exchange rates rather than 21.4 percent in 2007, accord-
ing to the IMF) but more importantly, it does not have a strong growth 
potential. Medium-term projections indicate that absent signiﬁcant en-
largement or revolutionary increase in productivity trend, its weight in 
the world economy will shrink continuously (Posen 2004; Forbes and 
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir in chapter 2).
  Financial fragmentation. It was initially assumed that monetary integra-
tion would trigger ﬁnancial integration within the euro area. In the 
event,  Europe’s  ﬁnancial  center  is  London,  not  Frankfurt  or  Paris, 
there are several euro-denominated government bond markets instead 
of one, and cross-border securities trading has developed to a much 
lesser extent than anticipated.
6 In other words, monetary union has not 
driven full ﬁnancial integration. This has proved workable in normal 
times, but the sustainability of this combination of offshore markets, 
national bank oversight, and euro area–wide monetary operations is 
questionable in the long run. During the recent crisis, governments 
have  further  realized  that  whatever  comparative  advantage  some 
countries could have in the banking industry, an industrial specializa-
tion model might not be viable because it implied too large a banking 
sector for national budgets in case of the need to bail out distressed 
banks. This threat to the existing model of cross-border integration 
may lead to a return to fragmentation. 
  Uncertain governance. Although monetary policy is centralized within 
the euro area, and product and capital market regulations are to some 
extent harmonized throughout the European Union, countries within 
the euro area still have different ﬁscal, tax, and labor-market policies. 
There are no prospects of centralization, so how to combine monetary 
centralization and ﬁscal/structural/ﬁnancial decentralization should 
be a matter for consensus, but there is enduring disagreement as re-
gards the desirable degree of coordination of national policies in these 
areas. Furthermore, the crisis has exposed the degree to which ac-
6. In contrast, cross-border banking and bond issuance have blossomed but are not sufﬁcient 
to constitute full ﬁnancial integration. Forbes, Martin, Mayer, and Liikanen in this volume all 
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countability to domestic taxpayers can trigger competing or contrast-
ing reactions. Although somewhat fashionable in the United States or 
the United Kingdom, talk of a euro area breakup is mistaken, based 
at best on shallow comprehension of the functioning of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). Nevertheless, as long as the rest of the 
world sees the future of the euro area and its membership as partially 
uncertain, this will remain a limiting factor. Thomas Mayer’s market 
view in chapter 3 of this volume depicts this perception in a very rea-
soned manner, emphasizing the market impact from likely intra–euro 
area  strains  of  adjustment,  rather  than  an  infeasible  breakup—but 
these market discounts are real.
  Noneconomic limitations. The euro area is certainly not a hard power. It 
includes countries with differing stances on international affairs, and 
there is no common foreign and security policy as yet. So long as the 
United Kingdom keeps its national currency, the euro area does not 
include the country with the largest military projection capacity in the 
European Union. As one of us (Posen 2008) has argued, the few non-
neighboring countries that have pegged to the euro tend to be those 
with security ties to euro area members (notably France, the one hard 
power within the euro area), while a number of countries pegged to 
the dollar have geopolitical ties with the United States that outweigh 
their trade and ﬁnancial linkages. In chapter 2 of this volume, Posen 
further contends that this noneconomic factor is a signiﬁcant brake on 
the international development of the euro and that strictly economic 
rules–based treatment of crisis-hit Eastern European countries may 
actually weaken the euro’s global role by demonstrating the limits of 
political commitment.
  A discouraging stance toward a global role. The ECB and the European 
Union are ofﬁcially neutral as regards the international role of the euro, 
as Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (chapter 1) and Liikanen (chapter 4) state in 
this volume. However, while professing that it neither discourages nor 
encourages its development, as with the position undertaken by the 
Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan in the 1980s (Eichengreen 2005), the 
European Union has come out clearly against the de jure adoption of 
the euro by third countries.
7 During the 2008–09 crisis the ECB adopted 
a cautious approach toward the provision of euro liquidity to neigh-
bouring, de facto partially euroized countries, unlike the US Federal 
Reserve, which early on extended dollar swap lines to several central 
banks throughout the world. Clearly, the euro area does not fully see 
itself as a monetary hub and does not take action to become one. 
7. Prior to the crisis, unilateral euroization by EU members with euro currency boards in 
place was prevented. The ECOFIN Council had already formally adopted in November 2000 
the position that unilateral euroization is not compatible with the treaty and cannot be a way 
to bypass the convergence process required for euro membership.8  THE EURO AT TEN
It is not easy to delineate the role of each of these factors in the limited 
development of the international role of the euro. Our conclusion from 
the studies in this volume is that they jointly represent a signiﬁcant force 
beyond the dollar’s incumbency offsetting the euro area’s economic size 
and stability.
What Are the Consequences?
Is the euro area consciously or unconsciously squandering part of the 
potential beneﬁts—either to its members or to the world economy—that 
could be realized if the euro became a global currency? The advantages 
of issuing an international currency are often overestimated by observers 
and politicians, and an economist’s ﬁrst reaction is always to emphasize 
that the beneﬁts of monetary uniﬁcation are ﬁrst and foremost domestic. It 
should also be recognized that being a global currency has potential costs 
as well
8: As illustrated by the “conundrum” of low long-term interest rates 
prior to the crisis and the role of global imbalances in the crisis, the issu-
ance of an international currency implies that the demand for securities 
denominated in this currency partially depends on external rather than 
solely domestic developments. This can affect both the exchange rate and 
market interest rates as has been the case in the United States. Europe’s 
fragmented markets and uncertain governance in some way partially pro-
tect it from instability coming from abroad. As long as it is not equipped 
with strong enough policy institutions to respond to such shocks, this 
might be a blessing in disguise. 
However, these considerations should not lead policymakers to over-
look the potential but not always realized international beneﬁts of issuing 
a world currency. Seigniorage is a second-order issue here (and the euro 
area actually already beneﬁts from it since the euro is widely used in the 
region, including for illegal or semi-legal purposes). A much more signiﬁ-
cant gain to the issuer of a global currency is that the international role of 
the currency contributes to increasing transactions of securities denomi-
nated in it, thereby to the depth and liquidity of the markets for its gov-
ernment bonds and ultimately the demand for them. In spite of monetary 
8. Bergsten and Henning in contributions to this volume question whether the United States 
has actually beneﬁted on net from the global role of the dollar, with Bergsten claiming less 
certain dollar dominance might have led to greater discipline. We and most of our authors 
agree with Summers’ characterization of that threat as likely to do more harm than good 
and believe that having a global currency does little harm so long as it is consistent with the 
economic fundamentals. The United Kingdom trying to maintain a global role for sterling 
long after the UK economy declined was indeed harmful. The euro area presents the opposite 
situation, however, where the global currency status is far short of its economic weight and 
thus of its potential stabilizing inﬂuence on the international ﬁnancial architecture and on 
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union, government bond markets in the euro area remain fragmented and 
the largest one, that of the German Bund, is about one-fourth the size of 
the US federal bond market. For non-European residents this reduces the 
attractiveness of euro government assets and thereby the liquidity and 
depth of corresponding markets, as indicated in Kristin Forbes’ paper 
(chapter 2). The widening sovereign risk spreads of some euro area debt 
issuers over Bunds during the crisis, while far smaller than they would 
have been absent the euro, are in part also indicative of these costs. 
9 Other 
potential beneﬁts to issuing a global currency include low exchange rate 
risk and transaction costs. As indicated by Linda Goldberg (chapter 2), 
trade invoicing in euro is still limited. Even France and Germany invoice 
about a third of their exports in US dollars, and the Asian countries almost 
never use the euro. Finally, the dollar remains the dominant currency for 
the quotation of commodities. 
In the absence of the euro’s exerting itself globally, countries around the 
world are ﬁnding monetary stability harder to come by as the dollar suffers 
through a relative decline (whether temporary or lasting). Contributors to 
this volume systematically examine the role of the euro in various regions 
of the world. Unsurprisingly, C. Randall Henning (chapter 3) ﬁnds that it 
remains modest in East Asia in spite of the roughly equal weights of the 
United States and the European Union in the region’s foreign trade and of 
stated intentions to move to a more balanced international system. Instead 
of baskets involving the euro, except perhaps the special drawing rights 
(SDR), Asian monetary integration has received a boost—which, though 
unlikely to culminate soon, adds to global fragmentation. Similarly, Maria 
Celina Arraes  (chapter  3)  ﬁnds  that  despite  the  increase  in  trade  and 
investment linkages between Latin America and the euro area—and, it 
should be added, the emergence of Brazil as a G-20 member and world 
economic  player—the  strongest  monetary  relationship  in  the  region 
remains with the US dollar, even beyond Mexico. Mohsin Khan (chapter 
3) makes the assessment that Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council area are dollar zones and likely to remain 
so, in spite of trading more with Europe than with the United States. This 
reinforces and is reinforced by the pricing of oil and gas, as well as most 
commodities, in dollar terms, which may be optimizing but also increases 
the impact of dollar swings on the world economy.
György Szapary (chapter 3) shows that only in Central and Eastern 
European countries has the euro taken a dominant role, including in the 
non-EU member countries of Southeastern Europe. Even Russia has in-
cluded the euro in its reference currency basket. Real integration in trade 
as well as cross-border investment—including in the banking sector—
have driven this process. It would have been a shock not to see the euro 
9.  Part  of  the  spreads  reﬂects  solvency  concern  and  part  liquidity  premia.  There  is  no 
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emerge as dominant here. So the picture is one of clear regional success 
and global limitations. Yet that brings us back to the concern that the euro 
area’s inward orientation if not defensive insecurity is exacerbating the 
divisions within Eastern Europe in ways that will ultimately be harmful 
to the euro area economies as well, when more assumption of at least re-
gional responsibility would pay off. One of us (Posen) contends in chapter 
2 that economic disregard may turn into politically driven monetary di-
versiﬁcation or self-insurance.
Impact of the Crisis
Most of the preceding paragraphs could have been written before the 
crisis. The global ﬁnancial crisis, however, has made some of the euro’s 
strengths and weaknesses more apparent and has pointed to the need for 
immediate responses to the latter. 
On the positive side, in 2007 and 2008 the ECB reacted to episodes 
of acute liquidity shortage more decisively and forcefully than generally 
expected. The ECB’s hands-on stance was made very clear in Lorenzo Bini 
Smaghi’s presentation at the  conference, which took place at the height of 
the liquidity crisis (see chapter 1) and is also pointed out in the paper by 
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir in chapter 2. Both the Federal Reserve and the Bank 
of England played catch-up with and learned from the ECB’s actions in 
this regard, and if anything the ECB beneﬁted from being a newer central 
bank with a repo system better suited to today’s markets. 
On the less positive side, the crisis has exposed how difﬁcult it can 
be for an institutional construct like the euro area to depart from ﬁxed 
routes and explore new avenues in response to unforeseen problems. This 
was most evident in the cases of bank bailouts and the response to the 
widening of government bond spreads within the euro area. In chapter 2 
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir contrast a “fair weather” governance regime that is 
based on rules and aims at predictability with the requirements of “stormy 
weather” governance: initiative, ﬂexibility, and even when needed cen-
tralization (in chapter 3 Mayer uses parallel imagery of a happy childhood 
giving way to a troubled adolescence for the euro). At the height of the cri-
sis in October 2008 a coordinated response to the banking crisis was found 
outside the normal institutional framework, but with meltdown breathing 
down the policymakers’ neck and only through ad hoc means—includ-
ing pressure from UK actions outside the euro area. The one institution 
intended to act ﬂexibly because it was not bound by rules and procedures, 
the Eurogroup, failed to seize the initiative. This indicates the limits of 
existing institutional arrangements, despite decent crisis management in 
the worst of the crisis so far. 
In addition, the euro area’s response to the widening of bond spreads 
within it is still unclear. Country risk differentiation is natural in a union INTRODUCTION  11
where governments remain solely responsible for their own debt. Howev-
er, levels reached by the spreads in winter 2009 indicate that the possibility 
of a funding crisis for some euro area member states must be considered 
seriously. Apart from saying that they would not call the IMF, policymak-
ers in the euro area have not clearly indicated so far how they would re-
spond in the advent of such a crisis. As Mayer points out in chapter 3, 
what would happen, for example, if banks of a ﬁscally troubled country 
presented bonds dedicated to bail out this very bank to the ECB’s dis-
count window? Euro area policymakers have tried to calm markets but 
without being speciﬁc on the modalities and limits of potential assistance 
to a member government. The assumption of the Maastricht Treaty and 
the euro area’s design was that there was no need for crisis management 
because, by being part of a single currency, members would eliminate the 
risk of national ﬁnancial crisis. This may not be sufﬁcient in situations that 
could arise in the context of deteriorating public ﬁnances and persistent 
market nervousness. 
In short, the euro area has an incomplete governance problem. Among 
other things, for example, this leads to the bizarre result that EU mem-
bers that are not euro area members are eligible for ﬁnancial assistance, 
but euro area members are not because of the no-bailout restrictions. No 
European instrument could completely substitute for the IMF, especially 
given the reluctance of EU political institutions to impose conditionality 
on fellow members. But there are some alternatives short of that and these 
alternatives would be better than assuming that crises cannot occur within 
the euro area. 
A Pragmatic Agenda
Our ﬁrst conclusion from the analyses presented in this volume is that for 
the euro’s international role to develop, participants in the single currency 
need ﬁrst and foremost to act on the domestic front. Their priority should 
be to address the weaknesses exposed by the crisis. This requires strong 
action on ﬁnancial integration and clariﬁcation of cross-border bank su-
pervision, beyond that already called for in the Lisbon Agenda or in the 
May 2009 Commission communication on European banking supervision 
(European Commission 2009), neither of which will be enough to remove 
the limitations and thus the risks identiﬁed here. This also requires a re-
thinking of multilateral surveillance on the basis of lessons learned from 
the failure to spot vulnerabilities ahead of the crisis and the adoption of 
principles and procedures for crisis management—including for possible 
crises within the euro area. 
Such improvements in euro area internal governance are a prerequi-
site to the necessary consolidation of external governance. The fragment-
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international ﬁnancial institutions reveals the constraints on the euro ar-
ea’s ability to respond to global—and thus external—shocks. While some 
incumbent member states’ reluctance to give up their exaggerated roles 
is part of the reason why consolidation of external representation has not 
yet occurred, we believe that there is more to it. Internal decision-making 
is unclear, making citizens and their member states reluctant to centralize 
external representation. We fear in fact that there may be even less ap-
petite for consolidated external representation now than before the crisis. 
Awareness of fault lines in euro area governance, the natural, if unfortu-
nate, political pressures to look after one’s parochial interests in times of 
hardship and the perception by the larger member states that direct par-
ticipation in the G-20 serves their interests better than lengthy negotiation 
to deﬁne a common position among the EU-27 all contribute to reluctance. 
As Commissioner Joaquín Almunia says in his contribution to chapter 1, 
“Current events provide a strong case for deepening coordination with 
the euro area...and to present a united front in international fora to better 
inﬂuence the global decision making process.” This is indeed correct but 
also indicates that in the absence of progress toward the former objective, 
attainment of the latter may be jeopardized. 
If other factors limiting the euro’s global role, like the persistence of 
trade invoicing in dollars or the absence of hard power projection by the 
European Union (let alone the euro area), are beyond domestic inﬂuence, 
so be it. The euro area will have enough to do and sufﬁcient beneﬁts for 
itself, for the full EU membership, and arguably for the world, by being 
the best regional currency it can be.
This brings us to our second conclusion, which is that the regional 
dimension has to be taken very seriously, so the euro area can do much 
beyond the domestic agenda. If a currency is not a successful regional 
currency, it does not become a global currency and an effective inﬂuence 
for stability, let alone one of the international ﬁnancial architects. We have 
argued that a successful regional currency role comes with responsibilities 
toward countries in the region that have adopted the euro as an anchor 
or whose ﬁnancial systems are partially euroized. That requires playing 
beyond the script as envisaged by the treaty, considering the situation not 
just of members who are full club members but also that of shadow mem-
bers, honorary members, and future members. The euro area has to con-
front this reality. So far the euro area has taken some initiative to stabilize 
speciﬁc countries—mostly in support to IMF programs—but it has not 
recognized the full extent of its regional responsibilities.
In the near term, the Eurosystem needs to provide more aggressive 
support to the euroized and near-euro EU member states. This would start 
with extending swap lines in euros to a number of emerging markets, as 
the Federal Reserve has done, and as discussed by Henning has even been 
strengthened within East Asia. The euro area is now in a position of suf-
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by such measures. The Eurosystem could also begin to accept non-euro 
assets for repos, with appropriate discounts, for countries that are inte-
grated with the euro area ﬁnancial system but have been prevented from 
euroizing. There remains too great a risk of ﬁnancial crisis responses in 
euro area countries with ﬁnancial headquarters disadvantaging banking 
systems in Eastern Europe, although to date it has not been a major prob-
lem (both the Commission and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development have played constructive ad hoc roles in forestalling such 
issues). The euro area should coordinate with Eastern European govern-
ments on crisis responses concerning such things as deposit guarantees, 
lending limits that have potentially major spillovers.
An immediate agenda is for the euro area to provide a clearer and 
more sensible path to euro membership for EU members in Eastern Eu-
rope. Note that we said more sensible, not easier, path. At a minimum the 
Commission and Eurogroup should offset the ways in which the crisis has 
made euro accession more distant even for countries with good policies. 
While the Maastricht criterion on inﬂation is now interpreted to exclude 
calling for deﬂation,
10 when that is the average of the three lowest inﬂa-
tion rate economies (as it would be today), surely setting a ﬂoor for the 
inﬂation criterion at no lower than the ECB’s long-term goal of near 2 
percent harmonized index of consumer price inﬂation would be sensible. 
While some measure of exchange rate stability vis-à-vis the euro must be 
a prerequisite to euro area entry, surely it would make sense to disregard 
the sudden huge depreciation of all Eastern European currencies in fall 
2008—irrespective of their economic fundamentals—rather than resetting 
the ERM2 clock to zero (or even keeping the waiting period so long).
11 An 
analogous case can be made with regard to the debt and deﬁcit criteria, 
given (as Pisani-Ferry and Sapir point out in chapter 2) how even para-
gons of ﬁscal virtue like Ireland and Spain have seen their positions com-
pletely erode following their busts. In chapter 3 Szapary notes that many 
new member states will now have challenges meeting the ﬁscal deﬁcit and 
long-term interest rate criteria for reasons beyond their control.
10. When calculating the average inﬂation of the three best performers among the EU-27 
as called for by the treaty, countries whose inﬂation in negative are counted as having zero 
inﬂation. In a deﬂationary environment this implies that the reference inﬂation rate is zero 
instead of being negative (we are grateful to Marco Buti of DG ECFIN for clarifying this 
point). The fact of this decision, which is not explicit in the treaty, shows that there is more 
room for sensible reinterpretation and evolution than commonly acknowledged, as was seen 
already with the 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact.
11. Goldberg reminds us in her contribution to this volume that “If the periphery countries 
use the center country’s currency on their bilateral international trade transactions, they are 
more sensitive to the center country’s monetary policy, and their own national monetary 
policies are less effective at inﬂuencing prices in local markets.” In other words, euro area 
monetary policy is responsible for a meaningful share of outcomes in EU member economies 
that are “only” trade integrated, absent formal monetary arrangements.14  THE EURO AT TEN
Behind our speciﬁc policy suggestions, the euro area has a broader 
principle and approach to adopt regarding its Eastern European neighbors. 
We believe that it is harmful to European solidarity, not just to the euro’s 
global role, and eventually to European economic and political stability 
over the medium term to set member state against member state in trying 
to distinguish themselves. The Czechs insist they are not the Hungarians, 
the Estonians that they are not the Latvians, the Bulgarians that they are 
not the Romanians, and that each must be treated accordingly—and the 
euro area’s present approach encourages this behavior. In a narrow rules-
based mindset, such a separating equilibrium seems to make sense, for 
all that matters are the membership criteria. And indeed competition for 
performance has more than once been a powerful recipe for virtuous con-
vergence. As we have argued, however, in a crisis such inﬂexibility will 
lead to bad outcomes. 
In the run-up to the euro’s creation 10 years ago, southern EU mem-
ber states undertook many short-term measures to get through the hoops, 
strictly speaking, for euro area entry. The result has been that those same 
countries have continued to suffer from justiﬁed doubts about their abil-
ity to undertake real adjustment and control their ﬁscal situations, despite 
euro area membership. So the premise that enforcing rules, even under 
the guise of IMF conditionality, will force Hungary or Romania to see the 
error of their ways is empirically suspect and at best highlights the hy-
pocrisy of enforcement within euro core versus periphery. At worst, the 
euro area would be pushing a number of Eastern European member states 
down a very dangerous path economically and politically, which will hurt 
the competitiveness and stability of their neighbors as well. The euro area 
needs to step up to its regional responsibilities and can only do so by tak-
ing a long-term view of what the region needs, rather than going into a 
defensive crouch of sticking to the fair weather rules.
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The Euro at Ten and the  
Financial Crisis
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I had planned to focus on the role of the euro in the world economy, 
but I cannot ignore the exceptional events we have witnessed recently. 
Nevertheless, even in these testing times, there are still good grounds to 
celebrate  the  euro.  Despite  our  imperfect  institutional  framework,  the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has sheltered European economies 
from turbulence over the last decade, and we can be assured that the current 
crisis would be having an even more severe impact were we without the 
single currency today. I would also argue that the euro has allowed Europe 
to play its part in setting out policy actions that will strengthen the global 
ﬁnancial system in the future—something that will no doubt be a central 
concern in the months ahead.
The current events—far from pushing the euro to the background—
have highlighted the advantages of a single currency and shown the value 
of  deepening  euro  area  coordination.  The  European  Commission  has 
prepared a major report, EMU@10, on the ﬁrst 10 years of the EMU. When 
we analyzed the advantages and difﬁculties of the bold decision to create 
the euro, our assessment was, and is, very optimistic and positive. Over 
the 10 years of its existence, the euro has been an undisputed success. 
It has anchored macroeconomic stability in the euro area and brought 
historically low inﬂation and interest rates for much of the last decade. 
Despite the euro area’s lower-than-expected growth rate—due largely to 
too few structural reforms—the macroeconomic stability combined with 
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the boost to trade and investment brought by the euro has helped to create 
16 million new jobs, more than in the United States in the same period. 
The euro’s rapid rise to the status of a global currency in less than a decade 
is a reﬂection of its success.
Today the EMU is limiting the impact of the crisis in Europe and in 
the rest of the world as well. The single currency has provided stability 
in several ways. First, it has prevented the exchange rate and interest rate 
tensions among its members that used to be common during ﬁnancial 
stress. Second, as we argue in our EMU@10 report, our stability-oriented 
macroeconomic policy framework has reduced the level and volatility of 
inﬂation and interest rates, as well as output ﬂuctuations, in the euro area. 
Third, since the start of the ﬁnancial turmoil in 2007, the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) has adopted a prudent monetary stance and has skillfully 
managed liquidity. This has helped to anchor inﬂation expectations and to 
ease conditions in the interbank market. 
In short, the EMU has created a pole of relative stability in Europe 
that world economies have also beneﬁted from, especially those that have 
strong trade and monetary links with the euro area. Its balanced current 
account position has also helped reduce the risks for the world economy 
associated with large global imbalances.
A Deepening Financial Crisis
Financial markets around the world have been going through an extraor-
dinarily difﬁcult period. The upheaval that began here in the United 
States has engulfed Europe and is now spreading rapidly across the in-
ternational system. 
The crisis intensiﬁed sharply as conﬁdence in ﬁnancial markets col-
lapsed. As the ﬂow of credit ground to a halt, central banks around the 
world stepped in to provide massive injections of liquidity.
The ECB was among the ﬁrst to provide liquidity in euros and US 
dollars in coordination with the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. 
This high level of coordination was evident again on October 8, 2008, 
when the ECB together with the Federal Reserve and ﬁve other central 
banks made an emergency interest rate cut of half a percentage point. 
But the actions of central banks are not enough to restore conﬁdence 
to markets. Risk aversion has now reached extreme levels. Deleveraging 
has accelerated as market participants are forced to sell off assets that are 
rapidly losing value.
Market sentiment has plummeted, brought down by deterioration in 
the banking sector. It is difﬁcult to predict how far the crisis will go and 
when it will end. Following the spate of bank failures here in the United 
States, problems started spilling over to European banks.A CHALLENGING ANNIVERSARY  19
Urgent Measures to Contain the Crisis
In the ﬁrst year of the ﬁnancial crisis, Europe saw the failure of a few na-
tional banks, mostly in the United Kingdom and Germany. Governments’ 
swift actions were consistent with the need to rescue their own national 
banks, such as Northern Rock, IKB, and WestLB.
In September 2008, we saw for the ﬁrst time the need to support ﬁnan-
cial institutions with cross-border presence. While providing such sup-
port was expected  to be impossible, action by governments was fast and 
effective, as in the cases of Fortis and Dexia. 
Confronted  with  the  depth  of  the  crisis  and  the  acceleration  of 
national responses, the European Union then quickly moved to establish 
close cooperation at the European level. Leaders of the four EU economies 
that are members of the G-8—Germany, the United Kingdom, France, 
and  Italy—together  with  the  three  institutions  of  the  euro  area  (the 
Eurogroup,  the  ECB,  and  the  European  Commission)  met  in  Paris  in 
early October 2008 and agreed on a series of measures to stabilize the EU 
ﬁnancial system. Leaders pledged to protect individual savings and to 
take all necessary actions to guarantee the solvency and stability of the EU 
ﬁnancial system.
Subsequently, the 27 ﬁnance ministers agreed to support the recapital-
ization of systemically important ﬁnancial institutions. They agreed that 
in view of the different national situations there can be no uniform solu-
tion in the European Union but that national actions should follow eight 
commonly agreed principles. Countries now have the ﬂexibility to act at 
a national level, while not compromising the common European interest 
and avoiding negative spillovers and a beggar-thy-neighbor race. 
The Ecoﬁn ministers also agreed on a series of measures concerning 
accounting standards and retail deposit protection. The Commission will 
now urgently bring forward a proposal to promote convergence of de-
posit guarantee schemes. 
The  European  parliament  has  also  pledged  its  support  and  readi-
ness to act quickly and support necessary legislation. The heads of state 
and government of the European Union, who gathered on November 7, 
2008, in Brussels, further supported these measures and stressed the need 
for coordination. These decisions are unique and consistent with our EU 
framework. 
More recently, as our banking sector faced systemic crisis, several EU 
national governments announced broad measures. The United Kingdom 
announced in October 2008 partial nationalization of its banking sector, 
and actions have been taken by Ireland, Denmark, Germany, Spain, and 
Italy. Others may follow. Such actions are broadly in line with the prin-
ciples agreed by the Ecoﬁn ministers, and all countries have pledged to 
comply with state aid and competition rules.
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problems are a global phenomenon and that the solvency of the global 
ﬁnancial system is at stake. At the October 2008 meeting in Paris, EU lead-
ers called for a summit with international partners to devise a coordinated 
approach to the crisis and to lay the foundations for the reform of the 
global ﬁnancial system. I sincerely hope that further progress on coordina-
tion can be achieved here in Washington.
Reforms for a More Resilient EU Financial Sector 
The crisis has raised deeper questions about the ﬁnancial system and how 
it should be regulated. In this respect, the October 2007 Ecoﬁn roadmap, 
which is in line with initiatives at the global level and in particular with 
the Financial Stability Forum recommendations, remains the basis for the 
EU policy response in the medium term.
EU leaders agreed in early October 2008 to further accelerate this 
roadmap. The Commission has already put forward changes to the capital 
requirement directive to limit risk exposure and to improve supervision of 
banks operating in more than one country by creating a college of supervi-
sors. The Commission adopted a new legislative proposal for credit rating 
agencies in November 2008, providing for tighter rules. We are developing 
additional proposals covering market transparency, valuation standard of 
accounting of assets, prudential risk management and supervision, and 
further improvement of coordination.
Effects on the Real Economy 
Restoring conﬁdence and normal functioning to ﬁnancial markets is espe-
cially urgent given the mounting evidence that the crisis is beginning to 
take its toll on the real economy.  The risk that this will result in a vicious 
circle, with events in the ﬁnancial markets and in the economy feeding off 
one another, is now a very real and worrying possibility. 
Declining conﬁdence, reduced availability of credit and its increased 
costs to households and businesses, together with oil and commodity 
price hikes earlier in 2008, are all affecting growth.
Recent  indicators  point  to  further  weakening  of  the  EU  economy 
in 2008, with the revised growth forecast down to 1.4 percent and with 
growth weak and well below potential in 2009.
To support economic activity through additional ﬁnancing, EU lead-
ers have asked that the European Investment Bank increase its loan pro-
gram to small and medium-sized businesses by 30 billion euros. And we 
shall ensure that our Lisbon Agenda of reforms is vigorously pursued to 
help accelerate the adjustments and increase growth and employment. 
The crisis will clearly impact public ﬁnances, and public deﬁcits will 
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ﬁcient ﬂexibility and allows the implementation of expansionary ﬁscal 
policies in the short term, while remaining prudent in the medium term. 
However, we must prevent deﬁcits from spiralling out of control, and 
governments should strive to respect the 3 percent limit for budget deﬁcits 
and 60 percent ceiling for government debts.
Stronger International Coordination 
Current events provide a strong case for deepening coordination within 
the euro area,  both to develop solid and decisive policy action in the face 
of crisis and to present a united front in international fora to better inﬂu-
ence the global decision making process. 
The euro area’s recent actions have demonstrated that when it manages 
to swiftly agree on a coordinated position, it can be instrumental in ﬁnding 
agreement in the European Union as a whole and even internationally. It 
is vital we now build on this success, not least because beyond European 
coordination, there is now a serious need for global coordination.
The ﬁnancial crisis has revealed how interlinked the world’s econo-
mies and ﬁnancial markets are. In addition, there are signs of major shifts 
in the geopolitical balance. Apart from the current turmoil in the banking 
sectors in Europe and the United States, let me point out the weakness of 
the dollar and the fact that advanced economies are slowing down while 
emerging markets are picking up the slack.
When this crisis is over, other challenges for the global economy will 
remain. Our future international system will have to absorb ongoing ﬁnan-
cial innovation, rapid shifts in capital ﬂows, and the further unwinding of 
global imbalances. This is the main reason why we have no alternative; we 
need to pursue multilateral solutions.
I believe the European Union and the United States will lead this 
global movement together. We have long enjoyed a steady and cooperative 
relationship across the Atlantic. The situation in the 21st century demands 
that  we  build  on  our  relationship  and  together  reach  out  to  our  new 
partners.
We need to establish a global dialogue and a new framework that 
takes in the rising powers of the emerging world. International coopera-
tion needs to rise to the new challenges as it seems that our multilateral 
institutions are ﬁnding it increasingly difﬁcult to provide the answers we 
need. Our international institutions need to be made more inclusive and 
more effective. 
Within a reformed governance system, there is scope for the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) to play a more active role to steer interna-
tional ﬁnancial cooperation. The IMF may need to carry on its reforms if 
it is to exploit its full potential. Overall, I see value in continuing the IMF-
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stability. And I call on the euro area to continue to be a committed and 
active partner in this process.
Conclusion
It is clear that the international ﬁnancial system is in crisis and the stabil-
ity of the world economy is at risk. What is less clear is how to overcome 
these challenges. 
I believe that if we work together—at both European and global lev-
els—we will ﬁnd effective solutions. We need to strive for common an-
swers that will safeguard the stability of our economies and ﬁnancial 
markets for years to come.
I am convinced that a new global governance framework will emerge 
from this crisis. Within this new framework, Europe should speak with 
one voice and win a stronger political role for itself. I have already called 
for a consolidated representation for the European Union and the euro 
area in international bodies—which, incidentally, will free up room for 
emerging economies.
The EMU has made a positive contribution to world stability—and 
will continue to do so—and this implies new global responsibilities. Be-
cause the euro is now a global currency, the euro area should play an ac-
tive role in international coordination.
The unravelling ﬁnancial crisis only reinforces the need for Europe to 
move and speak as one on the world scene. We must rise to the challenge 
and promote a multilateral resolution of the global ﬁnancial crisis.The Internationalization  
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It is an honor to be here to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the euro. 
It is a privilege to represent the institution—the European Central Bank 
(ECB)—that over the past 10 years has watched over the ﬁrst steps of the 
euro and brought it up to be the second most important international 
currency in the world. The euro is now leaving behind its childhood and 
entering adolescence. As with many adolescents, it faces a common ques-
tion: “What would you like to do when you grow up?”
The ECB, like any parent, might tend to be overoptimistic about its 
child’s future. This is why we have adopted a policy of neither encour-
aging nor discouraging the international use of the euro. It should be an 
entirely demand-driven process. Like modern parents, we recognize that 
the euro does not belong to us but should develop according to its own 
ambitions. We are here to ensure that it has a few key virtues, the ﬁrst be-
ing stability.
Several people—including in the United States, where the euro’s birth 
was considered improbable a decade ago—predict a bright future for the 
euro, anticipating that it will surge to become the dominant international 
currency in the coming decades (Chinn and Frankel 2008). Others, how-
ever, think that the euro is unlikely to overtake the US dollar (Eichengreen 
and Flandreau 2008a).
I will not try to review what the euro has already achieved over the 
last decade. The ECB regularly publishes a report that can be easily con-
sulted (ECB 2008a). I will instead assess the implications, in particular 
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from a central banking point of view, of becoming an international cur-
rency. I will analyze both the advantages and the challenges. I will then try 
to assess whether the euro has the potential to further increase its role and 
examine the main obstacles to achieving such a status.
Implications of an International Currency
Even though the euro is currently not the dominant international cur-
rency, it has become an alternative to the US dollar as a reserve currency. 
Euro banknotes are a popular means of payment and store of value in the 
European Union’s neighboring countries. What are the implications for 
the ECB and the euro area as a whole? I shall try to answer this question, 
drawing on the economic literature.
Countries can obtain two well-identiﬁed advantages from having an 
international currency. First, microeconomic gains stemming from lower 
transaction costs. Whether the currency is used for international trade, 
borrowing in the international markets, or simply tourism, the costs of 
conversion to a foreign currency and the exchange rate risk attached to 
these operations are eliminated. Second, the monetary authority issuing 
an international currency has larger seigniorage revenues to the extent 
that foreigners hold that currency in the form of non-interest-bearing li-
abilities, in particular as coins and banknotes. These gains are, however, 
relatively small and are estimated at less than 0.05 percent of GDP for the 
euro area, as only a small fraction of the total cash in circulation—10 to 
15 percent—is held by non–euro area residents. International seigniorage 
gains are only slightly larger for the United States, at about 0.1 percent of 
GDP, as more than half of its stock of currency is estimated to circulate 
abroad (European Commission 2008, ECB 2007).
Other, broader implications of issuing an international currency are 
less  well  documented  and  not  as  easily  quantiﬁable.  Both  the  United 
Kingdom in the period before the First World War—from 1870 to 1913—
and the United States in the period after the Second World War enjoyed a 
so-called exorbitant privilege from being at the center of the international 
monetary system (Meissner and Taylor 2006). 
The privilege stemmed from the possibility to issue low-interest do-
mestic  currency–denominated  liabilities  to  ﬁnance  higher-yield  invest-
ments abroad. Both the United Kingdom before 1913 and the United States 
until the end of the 1980s were net creditors toward the rest of the world, 
and this exorbitant privilege may be seen as their remuneration for being 
the “bankers of the world.” Over the past 20 years, the United States has 
shifted to a relatively large debtor position vis-à-vis the rest of the world, 
but its income balance has stayed positive thanks to a positive return dif-
ferential between its external assets and its liabilities. For some economists, 
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banker to “venture capitalist” with a “leveraged” position, where ﬁxed-in-
come domestic-currency liabilities ﬁnance riskier foreign assets taking the 
form of equity and direct investment (Gourinchas and Rey 2005).
The greater ability to issue domestic-currency liabilities has another 
important implication from a macroﬁnancial stability perspective. To the 
extent that external liabilities are mainly in domestic currency, whereas ex-
ternal assets are denominated in foreign currency—as in the case of equity 
and foreign direct investment and often also debt securities—issuers of 
international currencies tend to have a “long” position in foreign currency. 
As a result, ﬂuctuations in exchange rates tend to produce countercyclical 
valuation effects on net external assets. When the exchange rate appreci-
ates, foreign-currency assets shrink in domestic-currency terms and as a 
share of GDP. Conversely, following sharp devaluations—often associated 
with economic and ﬁnancial stress—the foreign currency–denominated 
assets grow in domestic-currency terms and liabilities are unaffected, im-
proving the overall investment position when it is more needed (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2005). As an example, after the currency crises in both 1949 
and 1967, the pound sterling’s status as an international currency—with 
most of the large overseas liabilities still denominated in pounds—allowed 
the United Kingdom to cushion somewhat the impact of the devaluations 
(Cairncross and Eichengreen 2003).
The issuance of an international currency could potentially also have 
signiﬁcant implications for the implementation of monetary policy. Let’s 
consider the experience of the euro over the past 10 years in that regard.
On the one hand, it has been essential for the euro area to have its 
own monetary policy in order to face idiosyncratic shocks and focus on the 
maintenance of domestic price stability. This result would not have been 
possible without the introduction of the euro and the creation of a large 
internal economic and trade area free of exchange rate risk. On the other 
hand, the external demand for euro-denominated assets may affect do-
mestic monetary aggregates, complicating their relationship with inﬂation 
over the long run. Recent ECB staff research shows that it is necessary to 
place money demand in the context of portfolio ﬂows and international as-
set prices in order to explain euro area money supply dynamics and mea-
sure excess liquidity, which can pose risks to price stability (ECB 2008b).
In addition, successful international currencies are used as external 
anchors by a number of countries that prefer to ﬁx the exchange rate and 
relinquish their monetary independence.
Such currency pegs eliminate one channel of adjustment of external 
imbalances  for  the  anchor  currency. As  long  as  the  pegging  countries 
are smaller than the issuing country, this might not be a major problem. 
However, when the aggregate economic weight of all pegging countries 
becomes large, the margin for adjustment of the nominal effective exchange 
rate of the anchor currency becomes constrained. As a consequence, the 
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than  proportional  adjustment  of  the  bilateral  rates  of  the  remaining 
ﬂoating currencies.
Moreover, ﬂuctuations in the demand and supply of the euro among 
international investors, from both the private and public sectors, may 
have implications for the exchange rate. The increasing attractiveness of 
euro-denominated assets as a potential alternative to US dollar securities 
may generate sudden shifts in portfolio ﬂows and unwelcome volatility 
in  foreign  exchange  markets.  Another  potential  indirect  channel  of 
disturbance in the dollar-euro exchange rate is the role of the US dollar in 
the invoicing of oil and other major commodities. Over the past few years, 
the surge in oil prices and other commodities—in US dollar terms—has 
been associated with a negative relationship with the exchange rate of the 
US dollar against the euro. In the case of oil prices, this could be the result 
of policies by oil-exporting countries to try to defend the purchasing power 
of a barrel of oil in terms of a basket of international currencies, including, 
in particular, the euro. It must be acknowledged that it is difﬁcult to detect 
and isolate the direction of causality between the oil price and the US 
dollar.
Overall, for the ECB and the euro area, the international role of the 
euro offers positive opportunities and serious challenges. This explains 
the ECB’s neutral stance aimed at neither directly promoting nor hinder-
ing the international use of the euro.
Determinants of the International Use of Currencies
What conditions cause currencies to dominate international markets? Do 
these conditions favor a growing role for the euro?
There is a large body of literature on the determinants of the inter-
national use of currencies. Most studies focus either on the store of value 
function of currencies and their role in foreign exchange reserves (see 
Chinn and Frankel 2008 for a recent review) or on the unit of account and 
means of payment functions, including the invoicing of international trade 
(see Kannan 2007). In the ﬁrst case, users of an international currency are 
mainly concerned with its ability to maintain a stable purchasing power 
over time. In the second, users care about transaction costs and the econo-
mies of scale that are obtained from tapping into a large network.
In both cases, a number of economic, ﬁnancial, political, and institu-
tional factors contribute to increasing the popularity of an international 
currency. I will review these factors with particular reference to the euro.
Economic and Financial Conditions
Let me start with the economic and ﬁnancial conditions supporting the 
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trade ﬂows are crucial to promoting the international status of a currency. 
This is because there are scale economies and network externalities in us-
ing the currency that is also used by other agents in international transac-
tions. The larger the economy and its trade ﬂows, the more likely it is that 
smaller economies will adopt the currency of the larger trading partner. In 
this respect, the critical mass of the euro area, in economic terms, is large 
enough to exert gravitational attraction on the rest of the world. In 2007 
the euro area accounted for about 16 percent of world GDP, measured at 
purchasing power parity, and its external trade was equal to more than 18 
percent of world trade, at current exchange rates.
In the invoicing of international trade, however, network externalities 
tend to generate only one “winner.” For several decades, the US dollar has 
served as a medium of exchange and unit of account for homogeneous 
goods traded in organized exchanges, such as commodities and oil. In 
this case, inertia is very important, and it is very difﬁcult to dislodge the 
incumbent currency, whose use is associated with low information and 
transaction costs. Yet even in this case, it would be possible to switch to a 
parallel invoicing system, including the euro, if agents expected others to 
start using the new currency and technological progress diminished trans-
action and information costs (Mileva and Siegfried 2007).
Transaction costs are important not only in international trade but 
also in the use of currencies as ﬁnancing or investment instruments. For 
this reason, truly international currencies must be backed by large, deep, 
liquid, and efﬁcient ﬁnancial markets. In terms of size, credit quality, and 
liquidity, US dollar ﬁnancial markets still have an edge over the euro mar-
kets, although this gap seems to have narrowed since the launch of the 
euro in 1999 (Galati and Wooldridge 2006). The US Treasury bond market 
remains the most liquid segment of the global bond market, whereas sov-
ereign issuances are inevitably fragmented in the euro area. However, this 
structural problem has been mitigated by the removal of exchange rate 
risk since the introduction of the euro. Government bond yields have con-
verged across euro area countries and are increasingly driven by common 
factors, although local factors continue to play a role (ECB 2008c). Indeed, 
the bid-ask spreads of sovereign bonds denominated in euros are not 
much higher than the spreads of those denominated in US dollars (Dunne 
et al. 2006). Interestingly, the euro area bond market for “corporate” issu-
ance is quite well integrated (ECB 2008c), and effective bid-ask spreads are 
possibly even lower than in the United States (Biais et al. 2006).
I have argued so far that investors take into account liquidity and 
transaction costs when dealing with international currencies. Once these 
structural and cost differentials converge across currencies, traders and 
investors can discriminate among various alternatives on the basis of the 
return on their investment. In brief, international currencies must be able 
to preserve their external value, avoiding inﬂation and sharp nominal de-
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sterling as leading international currency was caused by a series of large 
shocks accelerating a declining trend. The First and Second World Wars 
accelerated the fading of the United Kingdom as a major political and im-
perial power. The economic decline was highlighted by at least three de-
valuations in 1931, 1949, and 1967, which progressively undermined the 
conﬁdence of international investors in the ability of the pound sterling 
to preserve its external value. Recent evidence suggests that the pound 
sterling lost its dominance already in the mid-1920s but then regained the 
lead in the second half of the 1930s (Eichengreen and Flandreau 2008b). 
The jury is still out on this case, but it is evident that inertia in the inter-
national use of currencies is much stronger in the case of the invoicing of 
trade, where network effects favor the use of only one currency. Inertia is 
somewhat less powerful when investors decide how to allocate their port-
folio, leaving greater room for currency competition.
Obviously, inﬂation and devaluations accompanying the demise of 
world currencies are not natural accidents but the result of wrong mac-
roeconomic policies and structural weaknesses. These often take a long 
time to emerge in the form of an erosion of external competitiveness and a 
rise in external imbalances, ﬁscal proﬂigacy and internal imbalances, low 
productivity, and, eventually, sluggish growth and high unemployment. 
Conversely, strong and balanced economic performances foster the inter-
national status of currencies.
Where does the euro stand in terms of policies and performance? The 
euro area fares relatively well compared with major economic partners, 
although a greater effort has to be made to raise productivity and lift the 
potential growth rate of the economy. The external position is fairly bal-
anced. The Stability and Growth Pact guards against the emergence of 
public deﬁcits and debt. Over the past 10 years, inﬂation has been kept 
relatively low in spite of large supply-side shocks. The institutional setting 
of the ECB, with its independence from political pressure and its mandate 
to preserve price stability, helped to rein in inﬂationary pressures and in-
directly fostered the conﬁdence of domestic and foreign residents in the 
capacity of the euro to preserve its value.
Political and Institutional Conditions
Let me turn to the political and institutional conditions for currencies to 
steadily take on an international role. This is clearly a more complicated 
issue.
Historically, countries with stable political systems and the capacity to 
enforce the rule of law, both inside and outside their borders, had curren-
cies that were widely traded and accepted internationally. Certainty with 
regard to property rights, which may be undermined by political instabil-
ity, and the ability of the issuer of the international currency to rule and to 
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The existence of “hard power” certainly contributes to the ability to 
enforce property rights, domestically and internationally, and thus helps in 
developing an international role for the currency. From this point of view, 
Europe cannot compete at present with other providers of hard power. On 
the other hand, the success of the Economic and Monetary Union provides 
Europe with a form of “soft power.” This power is translated in different 
ways, such as the anchoring of several currencies to the euro, the adoption 
of the independent central bank model in the Maastricht Treaty, technical 
assistance on issues related to monetary policy, payment systems, super-
vision, banknote issuance, and the like.
Good economic governance is also a fundamental ingredient of suc-
cessful international currencies. The Dutch guilder in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, the pound sterling in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the US 
dollar in the late 20th century, all were (or are) international currencies 
backed by strong empires and states but also supported by the economic 
power and success of their issuers.
Some  academics  regard  political  and  economic  governance  as  the 
“Achilles’ heel” of the euro (e.g., Cohen 2007). They claim that the delega-
tion of monetary and economic responsibilities across member states and 
EU institutions is unclear, and they lament the lack of a single unitary gov-
ernance structure, the so-called commander in chief, behind the euro. Over 
the past year, the ﬁnancial turbulence has posed a serious test for monetary 
authorities throughout the world. The reaction of the ECB has shown that 
the central bank can act rapidly and effectively to address liquidity issues.
As the crisis has evolved from a liquidity to a solvency problem, the 
challenge has moved increasingly to supervisory authorities and ﬁnance 
ministers. The ability to provide a coordinated European response is being 
tested. On speciﬁc occasions, such as the bailout of the banks Fortis and 
Dexia, the framework has functioned properly.
On the more general response to the crisis of conﬁdence in the ﬁnan-
cial system, it is paradoxical that the relatively healthier European bank-
ing system might have to suffer more because of the uncoordinated and 
piecemeal reaction of national authorities. There is also a risk of a rena-
tionalization of the single market for ﬁnancial services, as a result of dif-
ferent solutions being implemented in different countries.
The fear of many academics and observers has long been that, without 
a speciﬁc framework for crisis resolution, the European banking system 
would be unable to address major shocks. The problem might turn out 
to be a different one. The absence of a crisis resolution framework does 
not prevent effective solutions from being found and implemented. But 
since these solutions are different from country to country, they may lead 
to problems of discrimination and difference of treatment, undermining 
the functioning of the single market. This certainly would not contribute 
to the international role of the euro. And this is conﬁrmed by the recent 
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Another important institutional condition for the international success 
of currencies—closely linked to good economic governance—is trade and 
ﬁnancial liberalization. By deﬁnition, only currencies that can be freely 
converted for trade or investment purposes have the potential to achieve 
the status of international currencies. According to Barry Eichengreen, the 
US dollar owes part of its success in maintaining its position as main re-
serve currency to the absence of truly convertible competitors since the 
Second World War. In his view, the international use of potential reserve 
currencies—such as the French franc, the Japanese yen, or the Deutsche 
mark—was directly or indirectly discouraged by the respective govern-
ments (Eichengreen 2005).
Convertibility is not an issue in Europe, but protectionism, especially 
against foreign capital, might be. We are currently observing attempts in 
different countries to limit the inﬂow of capital from foreign countries, in 
particular in so-called strategic sectors. However, the deﬁnition of “strate-
gic” remains vague and can give rise to quite imaginative interpretations.
Concluding Remarks
To sum up, currencies emerge as international players thanks to a com-
bination of a number of conditions. These include geopolitical inﬂuence, 
political stability, and the enforcement of the rule of law, as well as good 
political  and  economic  governance.  Only  large  economies  generating 
meaningful network externalities possess international currencies. They 
must also be economies with deep, efﬁcient, and open ﬁnancial markets 
where it is possible to invest without the risk of incurring large transac-
tion costs or capital losses. Eventually, once all these factors have been 
accounted for, the quality of economic governance and economic institu-
tions and the ability to devise policies that support conﬁdence in the ex-
ternal value of the currency can make the difference. Obviously, inertia in 
the international use of currencies is strong, and sudden changes in their 
relative position are unlikely, barring very large shocks.
Since its introduction 10 years ago, the euro has emerged as the sec-
ond most important currency in the world. The euro area offers the op-
portunity of a large, deep, and increasingly integrated ﬁnancial market for 
foreign operators willing to hold euro-denominated assets. The monetary 
policy conducted by the ECB has certainly contributed to supporting con-
ﬁdence in the euro. We now face a different type of challenge, related to 
the integrity and sustainability of the single market in the face of a major 
ﬁnancial crisis.
Given the dimension of the current turmoil, it is not surprising that 
market participants view the ongoing developments with some concern. 
After all, the birth of the euro was followed by a substantial depreciation 
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central bank needed to be tested in good and in bad times. The premature 
death of the euro was preannounced several times. But the skeptics had 
to concede.
In light of Europe’s past experience, one element has to be taken into 
account in analyzing the current situation. Either a strong response is pro-
vided to the challenges posed by the current turmoil to the single ﬁnancial 
market within the existing institutional framework or the framework itself 
is changed in favor of a more centralized system of supervision and crisis 
resolution. After all, this is how the euro was born, as it became clear, in 
particular after the 1992–93 foreign exchange crisis, that it was not sustain-
able to run different monetary policies within a single market. The same 
logic could apply in the case of ﬁnancial regulation and supervision. And 
national authorities know it.
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We are facing a very serious situation in the ﬁnancial markets and the 
global economy. We have to make some hard choices, and we must start 
making them very soon. I will therefore spend most of my time today on 
what needs to be done to contain the crisis and on its implications for the 
global economy.
I apologize in advance if it seems like I have spoiled a birthday party 
for the euro by talking too much of the storm outside. But I want to take 
advantage of this gathering, as well as the broader gathering of the fall 
2008 World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) meetings, to dis-
cuss what we need to do. We can solve the problems in the ﬁnancial mar-
kets and the global economy so long as we act quickly, forcefully, and 
cooperatively.
In October 2008, the IMF gave its assessments of what is happening in 
the ﬁnancial markets and the global economy. Let me talk ﬁrst about the 
outlook for ﬁnancial markets and the actions we must take there because, 
as we all know, the heart of the problem is in ﬁnancial markets.
An Action Plan for the Financial Markets
First, the numbers. In the IMF’s October 2008 Global Financial Stability 
Report, we estimated that ﬁnancial-sector losses could be about $1.4 trillion, 
almost 50 percent higher than our estimates in the spring, which others 
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thought to be pessimistic. About half of these losses have been realized, 
but there are still signiﬁcant losses in the system.
But the problems in the ﬁnancial markets now go beyond the cash 
losses. We are facing a crisis of conﬁdence. The private sector cannot restore 
conﬁdence on its own. Macroeconomic policy measures by governments 
will not restore conﬁdence on their own. Piecemeal measures on ﬁnancial 
markets will not restore conﬁdence on their own. What will restore conﬁdence 
is government intervention that is clear, comprehensive, and cooperative 
between countries. A few simple principles should govern action:
  Principle 1: Government action needs to have a clear objective so that 
effective oversight of how public money is used is possible.
  Principle 2: National plans need to be comprehensive. They must con-
tain guarantees to depositors and assurances to creditors that are suf-
ﬁcient to ensure that markets function. They must deal with distressed 
assets and provide liquidity, and, most importantly, they must include 
bank recapitalization.
  Principle 3: Action should be coordinated, at the global level and at the 
regional level when appropriate, for example, in the European Union.
  Principle 4: Action should be fair, in that taxpayers, who are taking on 
the downside risks, should be able to share upside gains once the crisis 
passes.
How might this be applied in practice? I would highlight four sets of 
actions. First, as many governments have now concluded, the fragility of 
public conﬁdence has reached a point where some explicit public guaran-
tee of ﬁnancial-system liabilities is unavoidable. This means not only retail 
bank deposits but probably also interbank and money market deposits, 
so that activity may restart in these key markets. Of course, such a step 
should be temporary and include safeguards such as heightened supervi-
sion and limits on deposit rates offered.
Second,  the  government  needs  to  take  out  troubled  assets  and 
force the recognition of losses. Asset purchases should be done at fair 
value.  Why  fair  value?  Because  transparent  bank  recapitalization  and 
restructuring of balance sheets is essential to the process. If capital is to be 
attracted to banks, it is better to pay a lower price now, recognize losses, 
and give banks an upside if the implied loss turns out to be smaller than 
expected.
Third,  private  money  is  scarce  in  today’s  environment.  Therefore, 
support from the government is needed. One strategy that has worked in 
past crises is to match new private capital subscriptions with government 
capital, which imposes a market test for the use of public funds.
Fourth, a high degree of international cooperation has become urgent. 
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collapse in conﬁdence between countries. We saw a very bad trend toward 
unilateral measures taken with national interests in mind, with unintended 
beggar-thy-neighbor consequences for others.
We are beginning to see a turnaround in this. At the Ecoﬁn meeting in 
early October 2008 some principles were agreed to, and on October 8 we 
saw coordinated moves by major central banks. We need more coordina-
tion. Financial institutions now span many countries, and credible rescue 
plans must be consistent across many jurisdictions. I urge European coun-
tries especially to work together. 
There is no domestic solution to a crisis like this one. I know, having 
myself served as a minister of ﬁnance of my country, how difﬁcult it is in 
the European Union to reach consensus and make decisions. I do not un-
derestimate the problems. Nevertheless, cooperation and coordination in 
actions is the price of success at both the European and global levels. The 
weekend’s meetings will be an opportunity for ﬁnance ministers to talk 
about how to bring about the needed cooperation. All kinds of coopera-
tion have to be commended. All unilateral actions have to be avoided, if 
not condemned.
How Is the Financial-Sector Turmoil Affecting  
the Global Economy?
One of the reasons action is so important is that the turmoil in the ﬁnancial 
markets is having serious effects on the global economy. Even if strong 
and coordinated action along the lines I have been talking about is taken, 
we think the world is going to experience a serious slowdown.
We foresaw this in spring 2008. At that time, we were criticized for 
being too pessimistic. Now I am afraid that it seems we were too optimis-
tic. Our best forecast now is that world growth will be around 3 percent 
in 2009, which may not sound so bad. But the projection for advanced 
countries is worse: very close to zero until at least mid-2009, with a slow 
recovery during the rest of that year. World growth will be driven increas-
ingly by growth in emerging and developing countries. And they will 
grow at a lower rate than they have in the recent past: 7 percent in 2008 
and 6 percent in 2009. The ﬁnancial-market crisis is also going to have 
longer-term effects.
The United States
In the United States, a new generation of households, businesses, and 
banks will now have fresh and vivid memories of a ﬁnancial crisis. They 
will be more cautious and take fewer risks. This is not a bad thing. In fact 
it is part of a long-term correction that is due. Before the crisis, people—
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risk will reshape patterns of consumption and investment. We are already 
beginning to see this.
How should macroeconomic policymakers in the United States re-
spond to this? My answer is that they should not try to ﬁght the long-term 
change but that if both private investment and private consumption fall 
sharply in the short term—as private saving rises—then there may be a 
need for the government to support the economy. The options for ﬁscal 
policy will be constrained by the large addition to the federal debt caused 
by the recently passed rescue package. But ﬁscal stimulus measures may 
still be justiﬁed in the near term so long as they are balanced by longer-
term measures that promise to contain deﬁcits and debt, especially reform 
of entitlement programs.
Europe
In terms of economic impact, Western Europe has been hit at least as hard 
as the United States in 2008. This is partly because of the appreciation of 
the euro.
But let me make one point, which is very relevant to the subject of this 
conference. We have not yet seen a foreign exchange crisis. Sure, we have 
seen a couple of days when the euro-dollar rate has moved by a couple of 
percent, and we have seen some equally sharp movements of the pound 
sterling and other currencies. But none of this approaches a crisis, and we 
have certainly not seen the kind of abrupt and disruptive movements of 
exchange rates that characterized the Asian crisis.
Why is this? One reason is obviously the success of the euro. For ex-
ample, consider what 2007 might have been like if Europe had not had 
the euro. If the past is any guide, the appreciation pressure on the euro 
would have gone disproportionately into the Deutsche mark, which may 
have appreciated much more than the euro now has. In other countries, 
political and business forces would have lined up in favor of decoupling 
or devaluing against the mark.
Anticipating  the  possibility  of  exchange  rate  realignments,  market 
participants would have withdrawn capital from countries at risk of re-
alignment, driving up interest rates and risk spreads and potentially caus-
ing current account ﬁnancing problems. Higher interest rates would have 
undermined housing markets and choked growth.
As in the past, exchange rate realignments would likely have been 
needed to restore order, and these exchange rate realignments in turn 
would have caused inﬂationary pressures in countries that devalued. So 
there is no question that the euro has contributed to the stability of its 
member countries during this crisis. And for its members it has become an 
essential element of the global monetary system.
However, European countries still face major challenges in dealing 
with the current crisis, and policy options are constrained. Many Euro-A CHALLENGING ANNIVERSARY  37
pean countries have limited scope for ﬁscal stimulus because of already 
high debt and aging populations. There is more leeway in monetary pol-
icy. Indeed, the European Central Bank took appropriate action in early 
October 2008.
Emerging Economies
In 2009 almost all global growth will come from the emerging economies. 
But the effects of the turbulence are also beginning to mount in their ﬁnan-
cial markets and economies.
Emerging economies are generally in a much better position than in 
the past. They have large reserve buffers, solid current account positions, 
and healthier banks. However, there is still a large group of countries 
that are very exposed to global ﬁnancial conditions due to high external 
ﬁnancing needs and in some cases banking system fragilities.
Policy responses will need to be tailored to the circumstances of indi-
vidual countries. For those with high reserve levels, there could be room 
to draw them down to ﬁnance a temporary and sudden shortfall in capital 
ﬂows—not to defend a particular exchange rate but to mitigate adverse 
effects on banks or corporations associated with depreciation. Other coun-
tries, though, will need to raise policy interest rates in line with rising risk 
premia to stem outﬂows and bolster conﬁdence in their currencies.
Finally,  some  emerging  economies  may  need  help  and  possibly 
substantial help. For our part, the Fund is supporting member countries 
with advice, and if needed we are ready to support them with ﬁnancing. 
We have activated emergency procedures to respond quickly to urgent 
requests,  with  high-access  ﬁnancial  programs  based  on  streamlined 
conditionality that focuses on crisis response priorities. We have plenty of 
liquidity to support our members if they need ﬁnancing.
Before concluding, let me talk about two other issues.
Food and Fuel Crisis
The ﬁrst issue is the other crisis in the world economy, which is affecting 
many developing countries. High food and fuel prices continue to put 
enormous pressure on developing countries. Prices have eased in recent 
months but remain well above their levels at the onset of the recent price 
surges.
About  50  countries  are  really  hurting,  with  uncomfortably  weak 
reserve positions. National budgets are also under pressure, and inﬂation 
is on the rise. In low-income countries the average inﬂation rate is expected 
to exceed 13 percent by the end of 2008. Inﬂation hurts the poor most 
because they are least able to protect themselves, and it leads to greater 
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Developing countries can help themselves, for example, by shifting 
budget support toward subsidies for goods particularly consumed by the 
poor, or, when feasible, better-targeted social safety net programs that pro-
tect the poor in a cost-effective manner.
But developing countries also need help from others. The Fund is do-
ing its part—together with the World Bank—with advice and technical 
assistance. The Fund has also increased ﬁnancial support to 15 countries, 
and we have changed our Exogenous Shocks Facility so that we can pro-
vide assistance more quickly, in larger amounts, more ﬂexibly, and with 
more focused conditionality. Donors must also help. One complication is 
that the budgets of advanced countries will be under more strain because 
of the ﬁnancial crisis. It is very important that they not respond to the cri-
sis by cutting aid, which goes to the poorest and most vulnerable people 
in the world.
Looking Beyond the Crisis
The second issue is that even though we are still in the midst of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis, we need to draw some lessons from it.
Lessons in Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Sector
For the ﬁnancial sector we have a good start in the recommendations and 
technical work of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), much of which was 
done in collaboration with the IMF. But of course, strong as they were, the 
FSF recommendations have not been adopted in time to prevent the crisis 
from unfolding. In fact, the crisis is the result of three failures: regulatory 
and supervisory failure in advanced economies, failure in risk manage-
ment in the private ﬁnancial institutions, and failure in market discipline 
mechanisms. Now we need to go further. Let me emphasize a few points.
We need to have more ﬂexibility and less procyclicality of some of 
the Basel II norms, including on the question of “fair value.” The rating 
agencies have to adapt to the new complexity of the ﬁnancial sector, limit 
conﬂicts of interest, and accept supervision. We need to close loopholes 
and ﬁll information gaps in ﬁnancial regulation and supervision. This in-
cludes looking again at regulation for covering securitization, private eq-
uity companies, and mechanisms that increase leverage. We also need to 
give more thought to regulating hedge funds, either directly or indirectly, 
by regulating their counterparties.
How should we tackle this work? Let me be blunt. I think the IMF 
can help in coordinating this effort, drawing on the expertise of others. 
Why? Two reasons: First, the Fund—with its universal membership and 
demonstrated ﬁnancial diplomacy (for example, its work on sovereign 
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that discusses risks to global stability and policy responses, and second, 
the Fund has the machinery for follow-up through bilateral surveillance 
and Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs).
Improving the Financial Architecture
Like a forest ﬁre that leads to renewal of the soil, every crisis gives birth to 
new ideas, and especially new ideas to improve the international ﬁnancial 
architecture. Earlier in October 2008, Robert Zoellick made an inspiring 
call for a “new multilateralism.” 
Let me add a few ideas to the debate. One can trace most of the prob-
lems in the architecture to either lack of legitimacy or lack of effectiveness. 
Legitimacy must be conferred by reliance on broader groups. One very 
simple change that could be made is to extend the G-8 to at least China, 
India, and Brazil, and perhaps others.
But this needs to be accompanied by greater reliance on multilater-
al institutions with near universal membership, so that no country that 
wants to participate in the international system is left out. Of course, the 
institutions themselves have to be representative as well as universal, and 
especially we need to see an increasing role for and responsiveness to 
emerging markets. Both the reform of Fund quotas and the broader gov-
ernance reform that we are undertaking are very important for this.
As to effectiveness, I would like to see greater simplicity and more 
follow-up. To achieve more simplicity we need better coordination be-
tween  international  organizations.  It  sometimes  seems  that  you  need 
a scorecard to keep track of the players in development: development 
banks, the UN Development Program, the World Food Program, and na-
tional administrations. The roles of the different multilateral institutions 
need to be better deﬁned so that there are fewer overlaps between them.
We also need better follow-up of agreements and communiqués. There 
is a certain poignancy in reading past communiqués. They remind me of 
a discarded children’s board game. They once inspired great passion but 
are quickly forgotten. (This has not changed since I was ﬁnance minister 
in the 1990s.) One way to better follow up the work for the “Gs” would be 
to have a kind of secretariat. 
The current crisis is, if nothing else, a wake-up call. Put simply, we 
have to manage the system better than we have so far. And I believe that 
we can do better. This is a time of serious challenges, but it is also a time 
when we can think imaginatively and act boldly. 2
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Many factors determine global currency usage. This paper focuses on one 
of them: demand for a country’s ﬁnancial liabilities due to ﬁnancial deep-
ening and liquidity. This focus does not imply that ﬁnancial-market de-
velopment is the only factor determining global currency usage, but, as I 
argue in this paper, it has been one of the most important determinants of 
demand for the dollar and will play an important role in determining the 
future of the euro. This topic is closely related to the ﬁnancial crisis cur-
rently unwinding around the globe. What happens to European ﬁnancial 
markets, and especially how European policymakers support and regulate 
their markets in response to the ﬁnancial crisis, will be critical in determin-
ing the long-term demand for European investments and the euro.  
I ﬁrst describe the insatiable demand for US liabilities over the past 
few years. Second, I talk about the determinants of foreign investment in 
the United States, drawing from theoretical and empirical studies. Finally, 
I draw lessons from demand for European liabilities and the euro and link 
it to the current ﬁnancial crisis. 
Insatiable Foreign Demand for US Liabilities
It is well known that there has been an insatiable demand for US liabili-
ties over the last few years. The statistics are so astounding that they merit 
a quick review. In 2007, as the US ﬁnancial crisis was in its early stages, 
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the United States attracted $2.1 trillion of new capital ﬂows from abroad.
1 
This $2.1 trillion does not include any new sales; that is $2.1 trillion of new 
money coming into the United States. These capital inﬂows funded the US 
current account deﬁcit plus US capital outﬂows. Moreover, this was not a 
one-year event. From 2003 through 2007, $7.8 trillion of new foreign invest-
ment ﬂowed into the United States. This is over $5 billion a day of foreign 
capital purchasing US liabilities—including equities, government bonds, 
corporate bonds, foreign direct investment (FDI), and bank loans. Even af-
ter the subprime crisis started to unfold, the money  kept “rolling in” to the 
United States, albeit at a slower pace. For example, in the ﬁrst quarter of 
2008, the United States attracted $411 billion of new capital ﬂows, compared 
with $693 billion in the ﬁrst quarter of 2007. Unfortunately, data for the last 
few months of 2008, as the ﬁnancial crisis deepened, are not yet available, 
but the recent strengthening of the dollar suggests that foreign demand for 
US ﬁnancial liabilities has remained strong. This large and sustained de-
mand for US ﬁnancial liabilities has been a key support for the US dollar. 
Where is this $2.1 trillion of foreign capital ﬂows into the United States 
going? Figure 2.1 illustrates the use of foreign capital inﬂows from 2003 
to 2007. Some commentators incorrectly imply that most of these capital 
inﬂows are used to purchase US treasuries. In fact, only 16 percent of total 
capital inﬂows (including private- and ofﬁcial-sector ﬂows) are used to 
purchase US treasuries. More important is the 22 percent of capital inﬂows 
used to purchase corporate bonds and 17 percent for FDI and equities. 
Therefore, foreign capital ﬂows into the United States represent a diverse 
range of investments—not primarily US treasuries. 
Not surprisingly, these massive capital inﬂows of over $5 billion a day 
into the United States have given foreigners a substantial ownership share 
of major US ﬁnancial classes. As shown in table 2.1, foreigners now own 
11 percent of US equities, 24 percent of US corporate bonds, and 57 percent 
of marketable US treasuries. These ownership shares have increased rap-
idly over the past few years and further reﬂect the importance of foreign 
demand for US liabilities in supporting the dollar. 
Determinants of Foreign Demand for US Liabilities:  
The Evidence
Why are foreigners willing to invest over $5 billion a day in the United 
States? There are several possible explanations, and this section brieﬂy 
explores them one at a time.
2
One potential reason is that foreigners earn high returns on their US 
1.  All  statistics  in  this  paragraph  are  from  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  website,   
www.bea.gov (accessed in October 2008). 
2. See Forbes (2007 or 2008) for more details on these explanations.UNDERLYING DETERMINANTS OF GLOBAL CURRENCY STATUS  43
investments. This is one of the standard talking points of US Treasury sec-
retaries. For example, Secretary Henry Paulson Jr. argued: “We have deep 
and liquid capital markets and a growing economy that provides oppor-
tunities for foreign investors to earn an attractive return on their capital.”
3 
His predecessor, Secretary John Snow, stated: “Today we are in a situation 
where sound, growth-enhancing policies in the United States have made 
it an extremely attractive place to invest.”
4 These arguments are important 
3. Prepared remarks before the Economic Club of Washington, March 1, 2007, available at 
www.treas.gov.
4. Prepared remarks at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
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because the academic literature provides evidence that investors chase re-
turns (see Bohn and Tesar 1996, Sirri and Tufano 1998). If foreigners were 
investing in the United States and earning high returns, then combined 
with the evidence that investors chase returns, this would suggest that 
foreigners would continue to invest in the United States.
Is this the case?
5 The returns on foreign investment in the United States 
can be calculated in a number of ways, but no matter which statistics you 
calculate, the ﬁndings are similar to those in ﬁgure 2.2. The ﬁgure focuses 
only on private-sector investment—excluding “ofﬁcial-sector” investment 
(i.e., governments) as governments may place less emphasis on returns 
than the private sector when making investment decisions. For each asset 
class, the white bars are the returns that Americans earned when investing 
abroad from 2002 to 2006 (the last ﬁve years for which data are available) 
and the shaded bars are the returns that foreigners earned in the United 
States. The pattern is striking. For each asset class—FDI, equities, bonds, 
and portfolio investment (equities and bonds)—foreigners have earned 
less investing in the United States than Americans have earned abroad 
over the last ﬁve years. This pattern continues to hold if one adjusts for 
currency  movements  and  makes  rough  adjustments  for  risk.  No  mat-
5. For discussions of problems in measuring return differentials across countries and evidence 
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ter how one cuts the data, foreigners investing in the United States have 
earned substantially lower returns versus what they would have earned if 
they kept their money abroad—even within the same asset classes. There-
fore, foreigners are clearly not investing in the United States because they 
have earned high returns year after year and are chasing returns. 
A  second  reason  why  foreigners  might  be  willing  to  invest  over   
$5 billion a day in the United States is that this is a natural reduction of 
home bias that has been occurring around the world over the past decade. 
Individuals tend to be “overweight” in domestic holdings, and as they 
seek to diversify their portfolios internationally, it is not surprising that 
they would increase their investments in the largest market in the world. 
Again, is this the case? To test the validity of this theory, it is useful 
to look at whether countries are over- or underinvested in the United 
States versus what a simple portfolio allocation model would predict. 
More  speciﬁcally,  a  simple  portfolio  allocation  model  predicts  that 
countries hold US liabilities so that the share of US holdings in their 
portfolio equals the share of the US market in the global portfolio.
6 Table 
2.2 makes these comparisons.
7 The top row shows that the US share of the 
global equity market is about 36 percent, and the US share of the global 
debt market (which includes corporate, agency, and government debt) is 
about 38 percent. For investors with a well-diversiﬁed portfolio, about 
36 percent of their equity exposure should be to the US equity market 
and about 38 percent of their debt exposure to the US debt market. The 
second row of the table, however, shows that the mean exposure to US 
equity and debt markets for countries around the world is far lower. 
6. This simple framework assumes that investors care only about the mean and variance of 
the real return of their invested wealth, markets are efﬁcient, and cross-border barriers to 
investment are small.
7. See Forbes (2008) for additional details on this calculation and speciﬁc country statistics. 
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On average, foreigners hold only 4 percent of their equity investments 
and only 14 percent of their debt investments in the United States. The 
median exposures to the US markets are even lower, suggesting that most 
countries do not have nearly as much exposure to US markets as standard 
portfolio  diversiﬁcation  models  would  predict.
8  Most  countries  are 
underexposed to US equity and debt, and achieving more diversiﬁcation 
in their portfolios could be an important factor driving investment in the 
United States. In other words, countries seeking to reduce their home bias 
and diversify their portfolios may generate a natural capital ﬂow into the 
United States and support a continued strong demand for US liabilities 
(at least for a limited time).
9 
In addition to return chasing and portfolio diversiﬁcation, a third fac-
tor that could drive US capital inﬂows is differences in ﬁnancial-market 
development and the quest for more liquid and efﬁcient ﬁnancial mar-
kets. This explanation has recently received a substantial amount of atten-
tion in the academic literature (such as Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 
2008; Ju and Wei 2006; Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull 2006). Although 
the models and explanations in each of these papers are slightly differ-
ent, the main idea is that countries around the world that are generating 
huge surplus earnings and savings (such as China and the Middle East) 
need to invest these earnings somewhere. Since ﬁnancial markets in these 
countries are less developed—as measured by liquidity, efﬁciency, range 
of instruments, and the like—investors or governments choose to invest 
this money in another country that has more developed ﬁnancial markets. 
Since the United States has the world’s largest, most developed, and most 
liquid ﬁnancial market, it has been the recipient of the bulk of this surplus 
earnings and savings. (Granted, many of these perceived advantages of 
the US market before 2007 may now be perceived as liabilities after the 
ﬁnancial crisis, but these weaknesses were not widely appreciated before 
2007.) 
A fourth reason foreigners might invest in the United States is their 
trade links or other forms of “closeness.” There is some evidence that when 
a country trades more with another country, it also tends to hold more of 
its ﬁnancial liabilities (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001, Antràs and Caballero 
2007). There is also evidence that countries that are “closer” tend to buy 
more of the other country’s ﬁnancial assets, with “closeness” measured 
not only by distance but also by ties through measures such as a common 
8. It is worth noting that China is one of the few countries that is “overexposed” to the 
United States versus the predictions of these simple portfolio allocation models (with about 
50 percent of its debt exposure in the United States).
9. If foreign countries reduced their home bias against the United States, however, this would 
not necessarily generate an increase in net US capital inﬂows because US investors could 
simultaneously reduce their home bias and increase gross capital outﬂows (which could be 
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language, a colonial heritage, or a cheaper cost of communications (see 
Portes, Rey, and Oh 2001; Daude and Fratzscher 2006). Any countries 
that trade more with the United States or are “closer” based on this broad 
deﬁnition would have a stronger demand for US ﬁnancial liabilities. 
A ﬁfth and ﬁnal factor that could drive foreign investment into the 
United States is perceived strong US corporate governance. I realize that 
statement may seem rather contradictory given the recent problems in 
US ﬁnancial markets—such as in the markets for subprime housing and 
credit default swaps, to name a few. Prior to this crisis, however, there was 
a widespread belief that the United States had the gold standard of cor-
porate governance in its ﬁnancial markets, and if anything many analysts 
worried that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and recent reforms to US cor-
porate governance may have been too stringent, rather than too loose. This 
perceived strong corporate governance may have been one factor attract-
ing investment to the United States. Investors may have been willing to 
purchase US liabilities, even with the expectation of a lower return relative 
to other investment opportunities, due to the country’s strong institutions, 
perceived good accounting standards, and belief that their investments 
would not be conﬁscated by the government. 
Which of these ﬁve factors is actually important in driving foreign 
capital ﬂows into the United States? In Forbes (2008), I perform a detailed 
empirical analysis to attempt to sort out the relative importance of fac-
tors such as return differentials, diversiﬁcation, ﬁnancial-market develop-
ment, trade and closeness, and corporate governance in driving foreign 
investment  into  the  United  States.
10  The  models,  econometric  issues, 
and lengthy series of results are beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
key ﬁndings can be brieﬂy summarized. The main result of this analysis 
(which I confess was not my expectation) is that the relative development 
of US ﬁnancial markets has been the key driver of foreign capital into the 
United States. Countries with less developed ﬁnancial markets sought to 
take advantage of the more liquid and more efﬁcient ﬁnancial markets in 
the United States. 
To get a sense of the magnitude of this effect, consider the case of 
China. China held $894 billion in US bonds at the end of 2007. Then assume 
that China developed its own ﬁnancial markets, such as by increasing its 
private bond market capitalization to GDP to a size comparable to that in 
South Korea in 2006 (before the ﬁnancial turmoil hit). This development 
of China’s domestic bond market would make domestic investment more 
attractive and reduce China’s need to invest its surplus savings abroad 
in US ﬁnancial markets. Using the central estimates from Forbes (2008), 
the magnitude of this effect would be substantial; China would reduce 
10. For other analyses of the determinants of cross-border investments and capital ﬂows, see 
Bertaut and Kole (2004), Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), and 
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its holdings of US bonds by $250 billion. Although this amount is small 
relative to the size of total US bond markets, it would undoubtedly have 
some effect on US ﬁnancial markets—especially if sales of US bonds by the 
Chinese were accompanied by sales in other countries. 
Although this empirical analysis found that relative levels of ﬁnancial-
market  development  appear  to  be  the  most  important  factor  driving 
foreign investment into the United States, it also found that other factors 
were important. More speciﬁcally, the analysis found a moderate role for 
trading and closeness in driving capital ﬂows: Countries that trade more 
with the United States and are closer through cultural ties, a common 
language,  distance,  or  the  cost  of  communications  also  tend  to  invest 
signiﬁcantly more in the United States. Finally, the analysis found a small 
role  of  return  chasing  in  explaining  investment  in  US  equity  markets 
(although  not  bond  markets).  Surprisingly,  there  is  no  evidence  that 
diversiﬁcation motives are an important factor driving foreign investment 
in the United States. 
Implications for the Euro
What are the implications for the euro? The role of ﬁnancial-market de-
velopment is the key lesson from this analysis of foreign investment in 
the United States and the corresponding demand for the dollar. How do 
European bond and equity markets compare with those in the United 
States? Euro bond markets have been growing in size and liquidity and 
are closing the gap with dollar bond markets. This increase in size will cor-
respondingly make the euro bond markets more attractive and increase 
foreign investment. Equity market capitalization in the euro area, howev-
er, is still only about half of the equity market capitalization in the United 
States. As a result, in the near future European equity markets will not be 
as attractive an alternative for foreign investment that places a substantial 
importance on size and liquidity. 
The  key  factor  affecting  the  future  of  European  equity  and  bond 
markets,  however,  will  undoubtedly  be  how  they  perform  during  the 
current ﬁnancial crisis and what new structure emerges. The responses by 
European regulators and policymakers will be critical. At the time of this 
writing, the immediate response to the crisis is sending a strong signal 
that there is no “European market” and instead Europe is a collection 
of  individual  markets  with  differentiated  rules  and  governance.  Each 
regulator and each government has been responding in the interests of its 
own country. If this approach continues, it may signiﬁcantly detract from 
the attractiveness of European capital markets. Since a key factor driving 
foreign investment is the quest for large and liquid markets, the realization 
that European markets are not one large, combined, liquid, efﬁcient, and 
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In addition to ﬁnancial-market depth, the empirical analysis discussed 
earlier suggested several other factors that can affect the demand for a 
country’s ﬁnancial liabilities. One factor is trade ﬂows and “closeness.” It 
is hard to see signiﬁcant changes in these variables over the next few years 
that will affect demand for European ﬁnancial liabilities, but I will leave 
this topic to the other papers in this volume, which focus more on trade. 
Another factor driving demand for foreign investment in equity markets 
is return chasing. Over the three years from 2006 to 2008, European equity 
markets outperformed US equity markets. For example, the total return 
on the Euroﬁrst 300 over this period was 26 percent, while the return on 
the S&P 500 was 22 percent. The stronger return in European equity mar-
kets may have attracted more foreign investment over this period. Since 
the start of 2008, however, this pattern has reversed. From January 1, 2008 
to October 6, 2008, the return on the Euroﬁrst 300 was –31 percent while 
the return on the S&P 500 was –28 percent. This weaker performance of 
the European equity markets may reduce demand for European equities 
in the immediate future, but given the unprecedented turmoil in all ﬁnan-
cial markets, it is likely that any such effect would be overwhelmed by 
other factors and it is impossible to make any prediction about relative 
returns going forward. 
One result from the analysis of the drivers of foreign demand for 
US liabilities was the relatively unimportant role of diversiﬁcation and a 
reduction in home bias. Even if this was an important factor, however, it is 
unlikely to be a major factor driving future demand for European ﬁnancial 
liabilities as foreigners’ portfolios are already more exposed to Europe 
than to the United States. As shown in table 2.3 (part of which replicates 
statistics in table 2.2), US equity markets are 35.8 percent of global equity 
markets, and the average holdings of US equities by foreigners are only 
4.8 percent of their total equity portfolios. This indicates that foreigners 
hold only 13.5 percent of the optimal share of US investments in their 
equity portfolio.
11 Making a similar calculation, foreigners hold only 24.9 
percent of the optimal share of US investments in their debt portfolio. The 
same calculations for the major European markets suggest that foreigners 
are still underweight in European equity and debt versus the optimal 
portfolio shares but substantially less underweight than they are for the 
United States. For example, foreigners hold 28.3 and 33.6 percent of the 
optimal shares of French and German equities, respectively, and 41.5 and 
71.7 percent of French and German debt, respectively. This suggests that 
most countries around the world already have more exposure to European 
equity and debt markets than they do to US markets. As a result, any 
increase in diversiﬁcation and reduction in home bias by foreign investors 
11. The 13.5 percent is calculated as 35.8 percent divided by 4.8 percent. Note that these 
numbers are substantially smaller if the numerator is median foreign holdings instead of 
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would actually drive a greater increase in demand for US liabilities than 
European liabilities. 
Conclusion
Key factors driving foreign demand for US equity and debt over the past 
few years are unlikely to be replicated in a surge in demand for European 
equity and debt and the corresponding demand for the euro. A key factor 
determining future demand for the euro will be how European ﬁnancial 
markets emerge from the current crisis. If regulators and policymakers 
treat European equity and debt markets as one coherent, large, and liquid 
market, this will attract additional foreign investment in the future. 
On the other hand, if they continue to treat Europe as a collection of 
individual markets with different regulations and different backstops, this 
will make European ﬁnancial markets less attractive to foreigners in the 
future. Since foreigners place such a large premium on the size, liquidity, 
and depth of ﬁnancial markets when allocating their investment, how Eu-
ropean markets evolve in these terms will be a key factor driving future 
demand for the euro. 
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A few years ago, Andrew K. Rose of the University of California, Berkeley 
started a whole literature on the effects of common currencies on trade. 
His message was that the effect was very large, suggesting that the euro 
would also have a large effect on trade (Rose 2001). The estimated size of 
the euro’s trade effect has since been reduced from very large to modest. 
Richard E. Baldwin’s bottom line is that the “euro probably did boost 
intra-Eurozone trade by something like ﬁve to ten percent” (Baldwin 2006). 
There are good reasons to focus on the euro’s effect on trade in goods since 
as economists we believe that increasing trade has large welfare gains. 
Also, the datasets on trade ﬂows on which these effects can be estimated 
are rich and of good quality. But this is not the case for ﬁnancial ﬂows. 
Still, it is surprising that there has been little research on the effect of the 
euro on trade in ﬁnancial assets. 
The euro’s impact on trade in ﬁnancial assets should be of particular 
interest because the euro may more directly affect transaction costs on ﬁ-
nancial markets than on goods markets as it can be considered a driver of 
ﬁnancial integration. 
A second reason to study the impact of the euro on ﬁnancial integra-
tion is that, following the orthodox view, ﬁnancial integration brings wel-
fare gains. The role of ﬁnancial markets to smooth transitory asymmetric 
shocks may be all the more important in the euro area, where asymmetric 
shocks cannot be stabilized by different monetary policies.
Before I report on the large and visible effect of the euro on ﬁnancial 
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markets, it is important to question whether the orthodox view is sound. 
This view on the welfare gains of deeper, more integrated, and larger ﬁ-
nancial markets is (or was) certainly shared among many policymakers for 
whom bigger ﬁnancial markets, more ﬁnancial assets are better. There is 
an implicit or explicit assumption in this conference (and even in its title) 
that countries or groups of countries (in the case of the euro area) should 
strive to have larger ﬁnancial markets, more ﬁnancial instruments, and, 
therefore, compete with each other to attract ﬁnancial activities. Many in-
terpreted the creation of the euro as part of this competition, and indeed 
one of the coveted prizes of being a “global currency” is that it supposedly 
comes with ﬁnancial-market (or supermarket) dominance. The present ﬁ-
nancial crisis should, however, oblige us to question these assumptions. 
We know the arguments that make sense theoretically: Bigger, more 
liquid ﬁnancial markets (1) should allow more investment projects to be 
ﬁnanced and, therefore, foster long-term growth and (2) should also allow 
risk diversiﬁcation. Both arguments are linked because risk diversiﬁcation 
is the mechanism that allows publicly traded ﬁrms to specialize in their 
core business and provide higher returns. However, when one compares 
the empirical literature on the gains brought by trade integration and 
the literature on the gains brought by ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial-
market development, it is clear that the case for the latter is weaker or 
even absent. 
The present crisis is obviously raising more doubts about the assump-
tion of efﬁciency of ﬁnancial markets and the assumption that they can 
diversify rather than aggravate aggregate risk in the economy. Bigger ﬁ-
nancial markets may indeed enable ﬁnancing of more investment projects, 
but this is welfare enhancing only when ﬁnancial markets are efﬁcient. It 
is not yet clear that ﬁnancial markets enable ﬁnancing of the most efﬁcient 
investment projects when they themselves are not efﬁcient. In the pres-
ence of bubbles, the fact that more projects can be ﬁnanced is not neces-
sarily a good thing. Going even further, the competition among different 
countries to attract ﬁnancial activities may have played a role in causing 
the present crisis by pushing toward excessive laxity in the rules and regu-
lations of ﬁnancial institutions. 
In the present context, interpreting the creation of the euro as part of 
the global competition game to attract ﬁnancial activities may lead to the 
conclusion that the euro has not been an element of global ﬁnancial stability. 
The creation of the euro may have fostered more risk sharing and ﬁnancial 
stability through other more standard mechanisms, but using the euro to 
foster competition between ﬁnancial markets may be a dangerous game. 
Hence, I would not derive any strong unambiguous welfare implication 
from the empirical results suggesting that the euro has had a more visible 
and impressive effect on trade in ﬁnancial assets than on trade in goods. 
There is a small, recent literature on the euro-asset-trade link. For ex-
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etary Union (EMU) on bond portfolios. R. De Santis and B. Gerard (2006) 
analyze the impact of EMU on portfolio weights rebalancing. Another line 
of research follows the lead of Andrew Rose by analyzing the ﬁnancial 
gravity equation (see Portes and Rey 2005 or Aviat and Coeurdacier 2007). 
The ﬁrst decade of the euro has demonstrated the powerful effect of a 
single currency on ﬁnancial integration. The euro has led to a fall in trans-
action costs in cross-border trade in ﬁnancial assets and weakened, but not 
eliminated, the ﬁnancial home bias. The increase in intra–euro area hold-
ings during 1999–2006 fully explains the increase in the share of advanced 
countries in cross-border world ﬁnancial trade (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
2008). From this point of view, the euro’s effect seems to be much more vis-
ible and impressive on trade in ﬁnancial assets than on trade in goods. An 
open question is how the current crisis will affect this integration process. 
Given the national nature of supervision and guarantees, there is a risk 
that the integration brought by the euro may be partially reversed.
Nicolas Coeurdacier and I recently studied the euro’s impact on trade 
in ﬁnancial assets using a theoretically derived ﬁnancial gravity equation 
(Coeurdacier and Martin 2007). The theory is derived from a simple mod-
el (Martin and Rey 2004, 2006) of risk diversiﬁcation in which the demand 
for assets (domestic and foreign) depends on income, relative returns, and 
various transaction costs that can be inﬂuenced by the creation of the euro. 
The advantage is that the model generates simple testable implications. 
Coeurdacier and I use two datasets—a cross-country one on bilateral asset 
holdings (bonds, equity, and banking assets) and a Swedish one on both 
holdings of foreign assets and outﬂows. Sweden is interesting to study 
because it is very open for both trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows; it is a member 
of the largest and most integrated regional trade agreement, the European 
Union, but is outside the euro area.
In this paper I ﬁrst disentangle the different effects of the euro on asset 
holdings for countries both within and outside the euro area. In theory, the 
euro may have several effects on the cost of transacting assets: on transac-
tions inside the euro area, on purchases of euro assets by countries outside 
the euro area, and on purchases of non-euro assets by euro area countries. 
For example, the elimination of currency risk had several effects. It de-
creased transaction costs of trading across different ﬁnancial markets in 
the euro area. It led to more integration of national equity markets. In par-
ticular, due to local-currency mandates on many institutional investors, 
the replacement of national currencies by the euro meant that the feasible 
universe for such investors was greatly enlarged (Lane 2008).
As in trade theory, these relative changes in transaction costs may also 
result in diversion if, for euro-based investors, transaction costs to buy 
euro assets decrease more than to buy non-euro assets. From this point of 
view, the EMU is one of the drivers of ﬁnancial integration, but it is dif-
ferent from the other drivers (ﬁnancial deregulation, ﬁnancial innovation, 
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In addition, and as noted by Lane (2006), the single currency and sin-
gle monetary policy may increase the correlation between returns of euro 
assets and make them closer substitutes. This may actually have a nega-
tive effect on the holdings of euro assets by countries in the euro area. The 
reason is that the increased elasticity of substitution between euro assets 
magniﬁes the impact of any remaining transaction cost on cross-border 
holdings within the euro area.
Coeurdacier and I (2007) ﬁnd evidence that the euro affects both trans-
action costs and the elasticity of substitution, but the effect is different for 
different classes of assets and also depends on whether countries are in 
or outside the euro area. Our estimates (which depend on our estimated 
elasticity of substitution between assets) suggest that the transaction costs 
to buy assets from the euro area are lower by around 17 percent for equity 
and 14 percent for bonds. This unilateral ﬁnancial liberalization effect of 
the euro beneﬁts countries both in and outside the euro area. 
In addition to this effect that beneﬁts all countries, countries inside 
the euro area beneﬁt from a decrease in transaction costs for equities and 
bonds of around 10 and 17 percent, respectively. This is the preferential 
ﬁnancial liberalization aspect of the euro. Hence, for a country inside the 
euro area, the transaction cost of cross-border purchase of a stock or a 
eurobond is lower by around 27 and 31 percent, respectively. Overall, this 
translates into large effects on cross-border asset holdings. The euro in-
creases bilateral bond holdings between two euro area countries by 150 
percent while equity holdings rise by around 45 percent. 
However, the impact on bank assets is not signiﬁcant. The numbers for 
equities and bonds are very large, and one may think that, as for the early 
effects of the single currency on trade, they are too large to be true. But 
these numbers are not driven by the fact that euro area countries are more 
ﬁnancially developed, have better institutions, and are closer to the other 
main ﬁnancial markets (or more integrated in product markets). Coeurda-
cier and I (2007) control for these observable characteristics of euro area 
countries. One could also argue that this result is not due to the euro but 
to some empirical regularity among European countries: For some unob-
servable reasons Europe is more attractive for investors than other regions 
in the world. However, we control for regional dummies. 
Even  though  the  percentage  difference  in  transaction  costs  inside 
and outside the euro area is estimated to be quantitatively similar on 
equity and bonds, the impact is much larger on bonds. The reason is that 
different bonds are much closer substitutes than different equities, and 
this magniﬁes the quantity impact of any reduction in transaction costs on 
bond holdings. These results hold once Coeurdacier and I (2007) control for 
a relatively large set of variables that might be correlated with being part 
of the euro area (trade linkages, geography, and exchange rate volatility). 
They conﬁrm the results of Lane (2006) on the positive role of the euro on 
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estimated effect on bond holdings is smaller. The estimates also conﬁrm 
that two eurobonds are more substitutable than other bonds: The elasticity 
of substitution is around three times as much. No such difference exists for 
equity, though. 
Contrary to the literature on the euro’s effect on trade in goods (Bald-
win 2006, Flam and Nordstrom 2003), Coeurdacier and I (2007) ﬁnd no 
evidence that the euro decreases the transaction cost for euro area coun-
tries of purchasing equity outside the euro area. In fact, for equities we 
ﬁnd evidence that substantial diversion takes place, in the sense that euro 
area countries buy less equity from outside the euro area than what is pre-
dicted by ﬁnancial gravity equations. 
The diversion effect does not come from an absolute increase in trans-
action costs to buy non-euro assets but from a change in the relative cost 
of buying euro- versus non-euro-based assets. This evidence is based on 
comparing asset trade between euro area countries and the Nordic coun-
tries in (Finland) and outside (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) the euro 
area. Interestingly, no diversion effect seems to operate for bonds. This 
may be because a signiﬁcant portion of bonds in these countries is issued 
in euros.
The evidence of a diversion effect for cross-border asset trade, which 
has not been found in the case of goods trade, is also important because it 
suggests that the euro affected ﬁnancial ﬂows through a different mecha-
nism than goods trade. In the latter case, Baldwin (2006) argues that the 
absence of a diversion effect suggests that the introduction of the euro has 
in effect brought down the ﬁxed cost of trading in the euro area, not trans-
action costs. The diversion effect Coeurdacier and I (2007) ﬁnd in the case 
of ﬁnancial assets points to a transaction cost story where the relative—not 
absolute—transaction cost for a euro-based investor to buy assets from the 
rest of the world has increased with the euro. Also, we ﬁnd that the euro 
effect is larger for ﬂows than for stocks in the case of equities and loans. 
This suggests again that the euro has generated a fall in transaction costs.
I return to our empirical analysis to answer the following questions: 
Did larger ﬁnancial markets beneﬁt more from the creation of the euro? 
Did the United Kingdom, the largest ﬁnancial center of the European 
Union but outside the euro area, disproportionately beneﬁt from it? The 
answer to the ﬁrst question is yes: Larger ﬁnancial markets—in terms of 
market capitalization—both inside and outside the euro area beneﬁted 
from a more pronounced fall in transaction costs to buy euro-based assets. 
From this point of view, the euro works as any process of ﬁnancial integra-
tion in a world where economies of scale also matter for ﬁnancial markets. 
This suggests that the euro certainly reinforces the process of concentra-
tion of ﬁnancial markets. However, contrary to what is often assumed, I 
ﬁnd no particular effect on the United Kingdom: It has not beneﬁted more 
than other countries from lower transaction costs on euro-based assets. 
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countries do not need to be inside the euro area to beneﬁt from most of its 
economic gains. This has some intriguing political economy implications 
on the future dynamics of monetary integration with potential free-rider 
problems. For the ﬁnancial side of the euro story, this message does not 
hold fully, however. Outsiders do beneﬁt from lower transaction costs to 
diversify risk when purchasing euro assets, but the gain is around half 
what the insiders get. 
Even if one accepts the orthodox view that ﬁnancial integration brings 
welfare beneﬁts, the Coeurdacier-Martin (2007) results suggest that the 
welfare  implications  of  an  asymmetric  ﬁnancial  liberalization  process 
such as the EMU are complex. Our empirical results suggest that the euro 
has three main effects: (1) a unilateral ﬁnancial liberalization that makes 
it cheaper—for all countries—to buy euro area assets; (2) a diversion ef-
fect due to the fact that lower transaction costs inside the euro area lead 
investors there to purchase relatively fewer non-euro assets; and (3) an 
increase in cross-border asset holding inside the euro area, which is the 
counterpart of the diversion effect and corresponds to a preferential ﬁnan-
cial liberalization. 
In theoretical models such as Martin and Rey (2004, 2006), where the 
supply of assets is endogenous and assets are imperfect substitutes, this 
surge in the demand for euro-based assets leads to an increase in the sup-
ply of euro-based assets, which indeed has also taken place. Also, if the 
location of ﬁnancial markets is itself endogenous, these theoretical models 
predict that an asymmetric decrease in transacting ﬁnancial assets across 
borders (the way we interpret the impact of the EMU on ﬁnancial markets) 
leads to two effects. On the one hand, ﬁnancial activity of the smallest mar-
kets outside the euro area should migrate toward euro area countries. This 
is so except if the outsiders issue assets in euros, which has been the case 
with Scandinavian bonds, for example. On the other hand, the creation 
of an integrated ﬁnancial market should also lead to the concentration of 
ﬁnancial activities in the largest ﬁnancial markets of the euro area. 
In the orthodox view, the fact that the euro has led to lower transac-
tion costs in buying euro assets should beneﬁt all countries, as it implies 
that they pay less to diversify risk. The diversion effect is clearly detrimen-
tal to non-euro area countries. If assets are imperfect substitutes, the lower 
demand for non-euro equity (the only asset for which some diversion is 
suggested by the Coeurdacier-Martin [2007] empirical analysis) implies 
a lower price of non-euro assets relative to euro assets. This implies an 
increase in the cost of capital for ﬁrms outside the euro area. Overall, non-
euro area countries should beneﬁt from more and cheaper (in terms of 
transaction costs) opportunities to diversify ﬁnancial risk but with a dete-
rioration in their ﬁnancial terms of trade. 
Euro area countries beneﬁt from an improvement in their ﬁnancial 
terms of trade and from lower transaction costs to diversify risk. In a mon-
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policy, such diversiﬁcation may be all the more valuable. Of course, these 
days, one can have a less positive view of the systemic risk generated by 
the increased supply of new ﬁnancial assets that results from euro-driven 
ﬁnancial integration.
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The tenth anniversary of the euro is an excellent opportunity to explore the 
role of the euro as an international currency and some consequences of this 
role. In this paper, I address the use of euros and dollars in international 
trade transactions. Speciﬁcally, I explore the extent to which export and 
import  transactions  are  invoiced  in  dollars  and  the  reasons  for  these 
choices. I also comment on some related consequences for international 
transmission of shocks and for monetary policy effectiveness. I do not, 
however, address the value of euros or dollars, which is a very different 
concept from the role and consequences discussed in this paper; nor do 
I turn to the extensive evidence on the extent to which dollars and euros 
are used in exchange rate arrangements, central bank foreign exchange 
reserve portfolios, or a broad range of international ﬁnancial transactions. 
For  instance,  substantial  changes  have  occurred  in  corporate  bond 
issuance,  particularly  in  the  growth  of  the  euro’s  use  in  international 
bond issuance. Speciﬁcs on the role of euros and dollars in international 
ﬁnancial transactions are well exposited in an excellent report published 
by the European Central Bank (ECB), Review of the International Role of the 
Euro. The most recent issue of the report, published in July 2008, provides 
rich and extensive information on this subject.
12
12. See also the discussion by Coeurdacier and Martin (2007) and the paper by Philippe 
Martin in this volume.
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Evidence on Dollar and Euro Use in International Trade 
The dollar continues to be the dominant currency of choice in interna-
tional trade transactions. Table 2.4 presents examples of the dollar’s share 
and usage for invoicing of exports in various countries. Korea and Thai-
land use the dollar extensively, invoicing more than 80 percent of their 
exports in dollars. The United States represents only around 20 percent of 
the direct exports of these countries, while other “dollar bloc” countries 
(i.e., countries with currencies that have exchange rate arrangements vis-
à-vis the US dollar) as export destinations account for an additional 20 to 
30 percent of exports. Even beyond exports to the United States and other 
dollar bloc countries from Korea and Thailand, there is a clear residual use 
of the dollar in international transactions. France and Germany use the 
dollar to invoice roughly a third of their extra–euro area export transac-
tions. While much of this activity is likely accounted for by exports to the 
United States and to dollar bloc countries, there is still a small residual use 
of dollars on exports to other locations. This description is not the case for 
Hungary and Poland, which use the dollar less extensively.
13 Indeed, in 
Goldberg (2007) I ask whether the low share of dollars used in invoicing 
international trade is consistent with utility maximization for these coun-
tries seeking to join the euro area, given the share of commodities in their 
export baskets.
A different pattern emerges in the international trade usage of the euro. 
The euro’s role has grown over time but mainly from its inception through 
2004. Initially, the growth in the role of the euro came about through its 
replacement of euro area legacy currencies in invoicing international trade 
transactions. Later, the role of the euro expanded within countries that 
were at that point on the periphery of the euro area. Now, euro use is 
broadly observed as a European phenomenon, with widespread use of 
euros concentrated in, but not extending broadly beyond, transactions be-
tween countries with geographical proximity to the euro area.
Table 2.5 presents examples of euro use in settling or invoicing in-
ternational trade transactions, focusing on the same group of countries 
as in table 2.4. Korea and Thailand use the euro only minimally, despite 
more than 10 percent of their exports reaching euro area destinations. By 
contrast, Hungary and Poland use the euro on the majority of their export 
transactions. This use is largely accounted for by the share of the euro area 
and euro bloc countries in Hungarian and Polish exports. Interestingly, as 
suggested by the negative sign for Poland in the rightmost column of table 
2.5, some exports to these regions are not denominated in euros, perhaps 
due to the continuing role of the dollar in invoicing commodities and ref-
erence-priced international transactions. 
13. In Goldberg (2007) I explore the use of dollars and euros among the accession countries 
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Determinants of Invoice Currency Selection in Trade
What reasons underlie dollar or euro use in international trade? Cedric 
Tille and I (Goldberg and Tille, forthcoming) look carefully at data across 
countries and over time in order to answer this question, expanding on 
the insights of a range of theoretical papers and empirical case studies.
14 
Empirically, the key determinants of the use of the dollar and euro in trade 
are (1) the issuing country/region size—so the size of the United States 
in dollar use or the size of the euro area in euro use; (2) the exchange rate 
regime, which would capture the economic importance of the countries 
with currencies anchored in one way or another to dollars or euros; (3) 
transaction costs, including costs of moving in and out of currencies, for 
example, captured by bid-ask spreads, although this is not the dominant 
force at work by any means; and (4) which currency other producers use 
for export and import transactions. Two other empirical determinants are 
the industry compositions of goods exported or imported and speciﬁc as-
pects of macroeconomic volatility.
Conceptually, two key types of inﬂuences dominate which currency 
exporters choose for their transactions. One type is a “herding” or “co-
alescing” force. The second is a “hedging” force. I discuss the intuition 
behind this choice in more detail below and conclude by noting that the 
currency used for invoicing international trade transactions matters for 
a country’s susceptibility to shocks and for its monetary policy effective-
ness.
In order to understand the herding or coalescing inﬂuence, consider 
the exporter’s goal of maximizing expected proﬁts. Part of the exporter’s 
decision pertains to which currency he or she should use for invoicing 
international transactions. A very important factor is what the exporter’s 
competition is doing. In particular, an exporter may want to stay close 
to the invoicing strategies of his or her competitors. The reason is that 
the exporter sets his or her price in advance in some currency. Ideally, 
the price is set in a currency that is going to keep the demand for the 
exporter’s products relatively stable after the exchange rate realizations 
determine  future  sales.  Recognizing  that  there  will  be  exchange  rate 
ﬂuctuations, the exporter has an incentive to set a price similar to his or 
her competitors’ prices. If the exporter chooses otherwise, and if other 
producers’ products can substitute for his or her product, expected proﬁts 
will not be maximized since exchange rate movements can lead his or 
her price to be very different in the destination markets from the prices 
charged by competitors. Expected product demand will vary, leading to 
14. Theoretical antecedents include Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005), Devereux and Engel 
(2001), Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004), and Krugman (1980). Empirical contributions 
are surveyed in Goldberg and Tille (forthcoming).  More recently, Kamps (2006) also explores 
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higher average marginal costs. 
The  herding  or  coalescing  motive  in  invoice  currency  choice  is 
strongest in industries where goods for sale by various producers are close 
substitutes. Higher degrees of substitutability make it easier for purchasers 
to shift among suppliers after observing the exchange rates and ﬁnal local-
currency prices. Indeed, this idea of herding or coalescing in currency 
choice  is  consistent  with  a  common  invoicing  currency  in  commodity 
markets or in other industries where goods produced by different players 
are close substitutes. 
Hedging  motives  are  also  important  for  the  currency  invoicing 
choices of exporters. Some academic literature argues that the invoice 
currency  selected  should  be  the  currency  of  the  country  that  has  the 
most macroeconomic stability (Devereux and Engel 2001). While this is 
a reasonable rule of thumb, a more speciﬁc formulation for capturing 
the  hedging  beneﬁt  from  invoice  currency  choice  on  exporters  stems 
from an analysis of producer income and costs. The exporter observes 
his or her marginal revenues moving around with exchange rates and 
their  underlying  drivers  such  as  demand  shocks,  ﬁnancial  conditions, 
and monetary policies but also observes marginal costs ﬂuctuating. The 
exporter should choose an invoice currency so that marginal revenues and 
marginal costs move together—hedging proﬁt risks. In countries where 
the price that the exporter receives (marginal revenues) is going to be 
lower, the exporter wants to choose an invoice currency so that his or her 
marginal costs are lower as well. 
Foreign exchange transaction costs also matter. Bid-ask spreads, which 
are one proxy for transaction costs in foreign exchange markets, still often 
generally favor the dollar.
15 There are exceptions, however, where the euro 
is favored as a low transaction cost currency. These occur mostly in the 
context of some of the euro area periphery countries, reinforcing the idea 
that geographic proximity has an effect on the international reach of the 
euro. Inertial forces inﬂuence transaction costs, since currencies that are 
extensively used and have high volumes likewise have lower transaction 
costs (Rey 2001). 
Consequences of Invoice Currency Selection for Policy
Having described the motives inﬂuencing the choices of currencies for use 
in trade invoicing, it is useful to consider the policy consequences of these 
decisions by individual exporters. For this purpose, it is useful to divide 
the outcomes of individual decisions along two distinct dimensions that 
15. Goldberg and Tille (forthcoming) use bid-ask spreads observed through the mid-2000s. 
Detken and Hartmann (2002) and Goodhart, Love, and Dagﬁnn (2002) examine bid-ask 
spreads over the early years of the euro.66  THE EURO AT TEN
relate to the speciﬁc counterparties in trade. These counterparties may be 
customers in the country issuing the currency or could be located elsewhere. 
For example, consider the case of US dollars used as an invoice currency. 
Most countries use them largely in their trade transactions with the United 
States. This use in invoicing trade with the issuing country is the ﬁrst 
dimension of a currency’s role in international trade. The second dimension 
arises when a currency is used in transactions between third countries or 
transactions that do not involve the United States but nonetheless use the 
dollar. In practice, the US dollar is extensively applied in both of these roles. 
The euro, by contrast, is still mainly used by countries with geographic 
proximity to the euro area but is not extensively used elsewhere.
A well-developed literature considers the implications of invoice cur-
rency choice and pricing decisions—local-currency pricing or producer-
currency pricing—for optimal monetary policy in two trading countries, 
as in the contributions of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Devereux and En-
gel (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), and Devereux, Shi, and Xu (2007). 
These implications apply to countries directly engaged in trade with the 
issuer of the currency used for invoicing, which is the ﬁrst dimension of 
the international role of a currency. The basic message is that prices in 
the country whose currency is used are relatively stable. By contrast, in 
other markets the prices of traded goods move substantially in local-cur-
rency terms when exchange rates move. As a result, it is primarily in these 
other countries that consumption responds to the relative price changes 
induced by exchange rates. The center country will have more stable pric-
es, although this is not necessarily a good thing. It implies stable relative 
prices, which may be undesirable if the efﬁcient market response instead 
calls for a movement in the terms of trade. 
Overall, a country with high pass-through of exchange rate move-
ments into its own prices will have local inﬂation rates that are more sen-
sitive to exchange rate movements than a country that has lower exchange 
rate pass-through. There will also be more expenditure switching and 
movement in imports in response to exchange rate movements in these 
high pass-through countries.
The second dimension of the international role of a currency arises 
when countries other than the issuing country use its currency for invoic-
ing their international trade transactions. This use of a vehicle currency 
on  trade  among  “periphery”  countries  has  fundamental  implications 
for periphery policy effectiveness, welfare, and transmission of shocks 
internationally (Goldberg and Tille 2008). If the periphery countries use 
the center country’s currency on their bilateral international trade trans-
actions, they are more sensitive to the center country’s monetary policy, 
and their own national monetary policies are less effective at inﬂuencing 
prices in local markets. 
The center country’s monetary policy decisions also have externali-
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be inefﬁcient for periphery countries in their bilateral transactions. Given 
such inefﬁciencies, in some cases periphery countries could beneﬁt from 
international monetary policy cooperation with the center country. How-
ever, engaging in such cooperation would not be welfare enhancing for 
the center country, which otherwise would set policy only with its own 
welfare as criteria. 
As a ﬁnal point, suppose periphery countries use the center country 
currency on their trade transactions, and exchange rate movements be-
tween the center currency and periphery countries’ currencies inﬂuence 
economic conditions in the periphery. Would it be better for those coun-
tries to peg against the dollar or the center country’s currency? In fact, in 
the simpliﬁed example and setup of Goldberg and Tille (2008), pegged 
exchange rates do not dominate more ﬂexible currency arrangements. The 
reason is that, even if countries are using the dollar in their own trade 
transactions, they remain better off maintaining domestic monetary policy 
as a tool at their disposal. This tool still presents monetary policymak-
ers with ﬂexibility so that monetary policy might be targeted at offset-
ting some adverse consequences of domestic shocks. This beneﬁt is lost 
if the country fully abandons independent monetary policy and instead 
follows a currency peg. While certainly there may be many other reasons 
for choosing a pegged exchange rate regime, in this particular context, the 
peg is not the solution to the inefﬁciencies that arise from using vehicle 
currencies in periphery countries. 
Conclusion
The dollar still is the dominant currency in international trade transac-
tions, but the euro has gained substantial ground since its inception 10 
years ago. Key commodities and goods that are close substitutes tend to 
be invoiced in dollars even within the euro area. Overall, one question 
remains, What conditions would tip currency use from dollars to euros in 
invoicing of international trade transactions? There would have to be very 
large shocks for this to occur, but the particular conditions await more 
research from academic and policy communities. 
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The euro has been, is, and will remain a currency without a state. Ten or 
even ﬁve years ago, many in Europe would have questioned this asser-
tion, because they saw the single currency as a stepping stone toward po-
litical union. A few treaty revisions and failed referendums later, however, 
this perspective has vanished. Even if the Treaty of Lisbon, which includes 
most of the provisions of the aborted constitutional treaty, is eventually 
ratiﬁed, the momentum has been lost. For all practical purposes, the euro 
must be regarded as an orphan currency. 
The governance structure that results from this situation is complex. 
The choices made at the time of the Maastricht Treaty—a monetary union 
without a signiﬁcant federal budget, limited coordination of budgetary 
and  structural  policies,  no  integrated  ﬁnancial  supervision,  and  no 
strong political counterpart to the central bank—were regarded by many 
of its architects as temporary. Over time, it was hoped, a more federal 
governance structure would emerge. The main players in the negotiation, 
Germany and France, did not have the same views on what this structure 
would be, but they shared the same dream: Both expected the euro to 
accelerate integration.
Reforms of limited ambition are still possible and desirable, but on 
the whole the euro is bound to live with this governance structure in the 
years to come. This does not mean that it is doomed to fail. In fact it has 
thrived in its ﬁrst ten years of existence. The euro has provided price 
stability to previously inﬂation-prone countries. It has offered a shelter 
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against currency crises. It has by and large been conducive to budgetary 
discipline. It has attracted ﬁve new members in addition to the eleven 
initial ones. And many countries in Europe wish to adopt it.
16  
On the world scene, the euro has also been successful. Even though 
research presented in this volume conﬁrms that it has not rivaled the 
dollar’s world currency status, it has certainly become a strong regional 
currency in Europe and the Mediterranean region. Some countries in the 
region have de facto adopted it, several peg to it, and many have become 
at least partially euroized.
17
The question we address in this paper is whether the governance 
structure of the euro area is a handicap to further gains in international 
role and inﬂuence. Is the incomplete character of European integration 
bound to be perceived as a lingering weakness? Or is the rest of the world 
likely to accept, and adapt to, the sui generis character of the European 
currency? 
This could have remained an abstract and unsolvable question. In 
fact, while governance had long been a topic for discussion among Eu-
ropean scholars and policymakers, the rest of the world understandably 
paid limited attention to it. However, the advent of the crisis has put Euro-
pean governance to an unexpectedly demanding test. While the euro was 
introduced in the midst of the “great moderation” period and beneﬁted 
from it in the ﬁrst 8.5 years of its existence, the following 12 months were 
more agitated, and the last six months of its ﬁrst decade were especially 
stormy. This limited experience has shown that there is a sharp contrast 
between what can be expected from a governance system in fair weather 
conditions and in stormy weather conditions. At the time of writing (early 
2009), several lessons from this experience can be drawn. Many more will 
certainly come.       
To address this question, we start by brieﬂy laying out our concep-
tual framework. Section two is devoted to assessing the euro area’s fair 
weather record. Stormy weather governance is reviewed in section three. 
We draw lessons for governance in section four and conclude in section 
ﬁve with the implications for the international role of the euro.  
Conceptual Framework
Citizens generally do not expect their political leaders to exhibit the same 
qualities when the country is at peace and when it is at war. Similarly, one 
does not expect the same from economic governance in normal and in 
crisis times. 
16. Accounts of the ﬁrst ten years of the euro can be found in European Commission (2008) 
and Pisani-Ferry et al. (2008).  
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In normal times, the key properties are stability, predictability, and 
incentive compatibility:
  After  the  damages  of  inﬂation  and  the  stop-and-go  policies  of  the 
1970s, the vast majority of countries have converged on policy regimes 
that give high priority to macroeconomic stability. Clarity of objectives 
and transparent matching between policy objectives and policy instru-
ments, including through assigning price stability to an independent 
central bank, have proved to be key technologies in this respect. 
  In a world of forward-looking expectations, predictability of the policy 
course and of its responses to shocks has become regarded as an es-
sential property. Policy rules that inform the public about the policy-
makers’ reaction function have gained increasing support, either in the 
primitive form of instrument rules or in more sophisticated forms like 
ﬂexible inﬂation targeting. 
  Finally, incentive properties are of major importance in a system like 
the European one that heavily relies on decentralization. With mon-
etary policy centralized but budgetary and structural policies decided 
at the national level, it is important that actions taken at one level inﬂu-
ence those taken at another level in a way that is consistent with the 
overall objective. A key issue is whether or not actions taken centrally 
create incentives for stability-oriented actions by decentralized play-
ers. For example, important questions are whether the system is able 
to make budgetary policies consistent with the overall goal of price 
stability and whether labor- and product-market reforms introduced 
at the national level are conducive to swift adjustment in response to 
shocks.    
However, different properties are needed in crisis times. Stability re-
mains the objective in the medium term, but in the short term speed in 
countering the effects of the crisis is rather the overriding goal. Instead of 
predictability, policymakers aim at maximum discretion to address prob-
lems as they emerge and have recourse to innovative, previously untested 
solutions if needed. Finally, centralization with a view to ensuring swift 
implementation has precedence over incentives for good behavior at the 
decentralized level. Hence the qualities that are expected from a policy 
system in crisis times are clearly different from, and to some extent even 
contradictory to, those expected from the same system in normal times. 
Fiscal and monetary policies tellingly illustrate this tension. The con-
sensus view among economists is that in normal times the two instru-
ments should be managed separately and that interaction between the 
two should be minimized. But in crisis times there can be a need for con-
siderable interaction between monetary and budgetary policies.  
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need to be speciﬁc to the situation. Instead of analyzing performance in 
normal times and assuming that this record informs us about performance 
across the entire distribution of probable events, we draw a sharp distinc-
tion between the two situations and analyze performance accordingly.   
The Fair Weather Record
The record of the euro area was extensively assessed on the occasion of 
the tenth anniversary of the common European currency (see especially 
European Commission 2008 and Pisani-Ferry et al. 2008, on which this 
section draws). 
It is widely agreed that the transition to the euro was remarkably 
smooth and that in spite of the disparity of the participating countries’ 
previous inﬂation record, price stability has on the whole been achieved. 
Figure 2.3, which gives the break-even measure of inﬂation expectations 
for the United States and the euro area, indicates that they have remained 
low and stable over the 2004–08 period, including during the 2008 com-
modities-induced price hike. This has been a major contribution to mac-
roeconomic stability. 
Though still positive, the record is less satisfactory as regards budgetary 
discipline. Overall, the aggregate budgetary deﬁcit of the euro area was 
brought down from 2.3 percent of GDP in 1998 (the year before the euro was 
introduced) to 0.6 percent in 2007, and gross public debt as a percentage 
of GDP was reduced by ﬁve percentage points. This performance was 
better than in the United States, where the deﬁcit increased over the same 
period and where the debt ratio remained roughly constant. But there 
have been two shortcomings: First, in spite of the elaborate apparatus put 
in place to prevent and punish excessive deﬁcits, one country (Greece) 
still had a deﬁcit above 3 percent in 2007 and two (France and Portugal) 
were  perilously  close  to  the  threshold.  To  say  the  least,  this  indicates 
uneven effectiveness of the Stability and Growth Pact. Second and more 
importantly, the budgetary framework overlooked the potential for quickly 
transforming private debt into public debt through bailouts of insolvent 
private institutions and agents—and more generally through giving rise 
to sharp boom-and-bust cycles that can make the budgetary situation look 
artiﬁcially sound before it sharply deteriorates in a downturn. Ireland and 
Spain were regarded as paragons of ﬁscal virtue at end-2007, but their debt 
ratios are now projected by the European Commission to deteriorate by 20 
and 30 percentage points, respectively, between end-2007 and end-2009.
18 
This suggests that the focus on national account data, the absence of stress 
test, and the neglect of off–balance sheet liabilities have been signiﬁcant 
weaknesses of the European budgetary discipline framework.
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European surveillance was even less effective in addressing nonbud-
getary sources of instability. Article 99 of the EU Treaty mandates the Eu-
ropean Union to monitor economic developments in the member states 
and to ensure that they remain mutually consistent. Little effort was de-
voted to macroeconomic surveillance in part because the provisions of 
this article are markedly weaker than those regarding excessive budget-
ary deﬁcits and in part because of the misguided belief that there is little 
macroeconomic instability to fear when monetary policy is geared toward 
price stability and budgetary policy toward the avoidance of excessive 
deﬁcits. The validity of the assumption that by controlling budgetary deﬁ-
cits one is able to control risks of instability was already questioned in   
Pisani-Ferry et al. (2008) and European Commission (2008) reports. Espe-
cially, it was noted that enduring divergences in price developments could 
be observed within the euro area, which possibly resulted in real exchange 
rate misalignments (ﬁgure 2.4). In other words, the so-called competitive-
ness channel was too slow and too weak to prevent boom-and-bust cycles 
fueled by excessively low real interest rates (which themselves resulted 
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Note: The  gure shows three-month moving average of monthly break-even rates.
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two champions of the euro’s ﬁrst decade, plunged into deep and probably 
long recessions. 
With the beneﬁt of hindsight, the obsession with budgetary numerology 
and the failure of surveillance to trigger appropriate policy responses can 
be regarded as a major ﬂaw in the policy system. Even in the absence of 
a global crisis, they would likely have resulted in signiﬁcant adjustment 
difﬁculties. To undergo this adjustment in the context of a worldwide 
recession is a major challenge for the countries affected and the euro area 
as a whole.
In spite of the success of its currency, euro area governance has been 
disappointing in the ﬁeld of external monetary and ﬁnancial relations. The 
relationships  among  immediate  neighbors  and  potential  candidates  to 
membership have been marred with controversies about euro area entry 
criteria. While several countries in the region quickly adopted the euro as 
an external anchor and/or became largely euroized, the attitude of euro 
area authorities has been extremely guarded. The Commission, the Euro-
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Figure 2.4     Real exchange rate and export performance divergence in 
the euro area, cumulative change between 1999 and 2007
Source: Bruegel calculations based on Eurostat and DG ECFIN (European Commission).UNDERLYING DETERMINANTS OF GLOBAL CURRENCY STATUS  75
letter of entry criteria deﬁned at Maastricht and used in 1998 at the time 
of the creation of the euro area, even though to take as a benchmark the 
three EU countries with the lowest inﬂation rate for assessing the inﬂation 
performance of a candidate country amounted to ignoring the very exis-
tence of the euro area and the fact that the ECB has adopted a deﬁnition 
of price stability. There was a failure to adopt a criterion that preserves the 
spirit of the treaty while being adaptable to changing conditions, and this 
was widely interpreted as indicating reluctance toward a comprehensive 
enlargement. 
The  relation  with  international  partners  developed  positively  as  a 
growing number of countries recognized the emergence of the euro as a 
major change in the international landscape, but it has been made unduly 
complex by the fragmented nature of the area’s external representation. 
Table 2.6, from Pisani-Ferry et al. (2008), gives an overview of the external 
representation of the euro area. Even in normal times, such a degree of 
fragmentation and unevenness is bound to be a source of ineffectiveness.   
Stormy Weather Experience
The weather in the euro area, which had been mostly fair since 1999, 
quickly turned grey and windy in the summer of 2007, when Europe sud-
denly faced a liquidity crisis detonated by tensions in the US subprime 
mortgage market. Remarkably, the ECB was the ﬁrst central bank to react, 
with an injection of  95 billion ($130 billion) on August 9 aimed at ensur-
ing orderly conditions in the euro money market. Later the same day the 
Federal Reserve provided $24 billion of liquidity. The next day, the ECB 
and the Federal Reserve intervened again to the tune of  61 billion ($84 
billion) and $38 billion, respectively, with other central banks around the 
world injecting a total of roughly $20 billion.
During the next 13 months, the ECB continued to apply three mea-
sures to alleviate tensions in the euro money market. First, it continued 
to frontload the supply of liquidity over the reserve maintenance periods. 
Second, it maintained the increased share of longer-term operations in its 
reﬁnancing operations, which it had gradually built up since the start of 
the crisis. Third, the ECB continued to conduct US dollar-term auction fa-
cilities in cooperation with the US Federal Reserve and other central banks, 
thereby providing US dollar liquidity to euro area banks. Altogether these 
measures proved that the ECB was as capable as the US Federal Reserve 
to contain the liquidity crisis, thus reassuring the euro area that its policy 
framework was robust to stressful conditions.
Then, on September 14, 2008, another, signiﬁcantly more severe shock 
came from the United States: Lehman Brothers had gone bankrupt. The 
same day, credit default swaps ratcheted up, stock markets plummeted, 
central banks injected billions of dollars into money markets, and Bank of 76  THE EURO AT TEN
America agreed to buy Merrill Lynch. The liquidity situation deteriorated 
further on both sides of the Atlantic, and spreads between short-term in-
terbank interest rates and swap rates on government securities reached 
unprecedented levels. Two days later, AIG Corporation, the world’s big-
gest insurance company, was bailed out by the US Federal Reserve. The 
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IMF = International Monetary Fund
Note: Shaded cells denote no representation.
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next day, the banking crisis spread to the United Kingdom: Halifax Bank 
of Scotland (HBOS) merged with Lloyds TSB in an emergency rescue plan. 
On September 29 the Belgo-Dutch bank Fortis was bailed out by Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and the next day the Belgo-French 
bank Dexia was bailed out by Belgium, France, and Luxembourg.
The rapid rescue of Fortis and Dexia was hailed as a success and led 
nearly all observers to believe that the previously untested capacity of 
euro area governments to cooperate in times of crisis was real. However, 
the mood changed rapidly. On September 30 the Irish government unilat-
erally guaranteed safety of all deposits, bonds, and debts in Irish banks 
for the next two years. On October 3 the Dutch government nationalized 
the Dutch activities of Fortis, forcing the Belgian government to take over 
its Belgian activities. Rather than continuing to cooperate and splitting the 
bill to maintain the Belgo-Dutch bank, the two governments simply de-
cided to split the bank along national lines. On October 4 a meeting of the 
heads of state of the four major euro area countries ended in empty words 
as Germany refused to agree on a concerted bank rescue and stabilization 
plan. Finally, on October 5 the German government issued a unilateral 
guarantee of all deposits in German banks. The weather in the euro area 
had now deﬁnitely turned dark and stormy.    
For a while, it looked as if the European Union, or even the euro area, 
was unable to coordinate the response to the crisis. A group of prominent 
economists rightly worried that “The current approach of rescuing one 
institution after another with national funds will lead to a Balkanization of 
the European banking sector. Agreeing on a harmonized level for deposit 
insurance would also be important” (Alesina et al. 2008).  
At the Eurogroup and Ecoﬁn meetings on October 6–7, ﬁnance min-
isters agreed that the economic situation “calls for a coordinated response 
at the EU level” but failed to adopt anything beyond broad principles and 
did not even discuss the rescue plan that the UK government would an-
nounce the following day. On October 8, the ECB reduced its policy rate 
by 50 basis points and changed its tender procedure, moving to ﬁxed-rate 
reﬁnancing. However, this step failed to impress money markets. At the 
end of the week, ﬁnancial markets throughout the world suffered one of 
their worst days in history (“Black Friday”), which prompted the French 
president of the European Union to convene the ﬁrst-ever meeting of the 
heads of state or government of the euro area. This emergency summit, 
held in Paris on October 12, is viewed as the turning point in the efforts to 
bring about a concerted European response to the ﬁnancial crisis. 
The Paris summit was a success on many fronts. Firstly, it sent an im-
portant message to the markets. European governments abandoned the 
prevailing uncoordinated case-by-case approach in favor of a series of na-
tional plans based on a common template and pledged a total of nearly 
2 trillion euros to shore up their ﬁnancial sectors, sparking sharp rallies 
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Secondly, the summit demonstrated that the euro area is governed not 
only by the ECB but also by political leaders. The Eurogroup could not 
have sent that message for two reasons. One, ﬁnance ministers lack the 
public recognition that heads of state or government enjoy. Moreover, de-
spite being prime minister of his country, Jean-Claude Juncker, president 
of the Eurogroup, clearly lacks the kind of European public recognition 
that President Nicolas Sarkozy enjoys. Two, because the Eurogroup meets 
routinely and in the drab building of the EU Council, it could not have 
conveyed the sense of emergency and importance that was tacked to the 
ﬁrst meeting of euro area leaders held in the Elysée Palace.    
Thirdly, by inviting UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown to the Paris 
meeting, President Sarkozy succeeded in building a bridge between the 
euro area and not only the most important EU country outside the euro 
area, which is important politically, but also the area’s main ﬁnancial cen-
tre, which is equally important. Indeed, the ﬁnancial crisis has exposed a 
fundamental issue of economic governance for the euro area. While mem-
bers of the euro area clearly share common ﬁnancial interests owing to 
the fact that they share a common central bank, they also have common 
ﬁnancial interests with the other members of the European Union, and 
the United Kingdom in particular, by virtue of the Single Market in ﬁnan-
cial services. This fundamental issue also has implications for the United 
Kingdom, since any remedy to the euro area’s ﬁnancial governance that 
did not include the United Kingdom—for instance, a euro area banking 
supervision mechanism—would risk jeopardizing the role of London as 
the euro area’s de facto ﬁnancial center. 
Lastly, the show of unity among all EU leaders at the European Council 
meeting that was held a few days after the Paris summit enabled the Euro-
pean Union to assume a role of global leadership in the crisis at two levels. 
First, the United States adjusted its banking rescue plan to make room 
for capital injections, thereby bringing it closer to the European template, 
itself based on the UK plan. Second, and more crucially, immediately after 
the European Council meeting, President Sarkozy and European Com-
mission President José Manuel Barroso ﬂew to Washington to meet with 
President George W. Bush, carrying with them the proposal, originally put 
forward by Prime Minister Brown and adopted by the European Council, 
for a global summit to be held before the end of 2008 to reform the world 
ﬁnancial system. The European proposal laid the foundation for a series 
of G-20 leaders’ summits on ﬁnancial markets and the global economy, 
the ﬁrst of which was held in Washington on November 20, 2008, and the 
second to be held in London on April 2, 2009.
Despite the undeniable success of the Paris summit and the decisions 
taken at the ensuing European Council meeting, many problems have lin-
gered. Not only did a number of important policy issues remain unsolved 
but also an economic crisis soon came on top of the ﬁnancial one, bringing 
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Several major policy issues still remain unsettled. The ﬁrst concerns 
the treatment of pan-European banks. After Fortis and Dexia (whose bail-
outs by national governments were only a ﬁrst step and whose fates have 
not been settled at the time of writing), a number of other banks with pan-
European operations needed to be rescued. Fortunately, however, none 
of these institutions are quite as multinational in their governance struc-
ture as Fortis was and Dexia remains. Their bailouts were therefore purely 
national. Had a bank required bailing out by several states (or should it 
require it in the near future), the lack of burden-sharing rules among Eu-
ropean countries would inevitably have created a problem.
The second issue concerns the situation of small countries with rela-
tively large ﬁnancial institutions. Clearly small countries have suffered 
more than large countries. The bailouts in France and Germany account 
for less than 2 percent of each country’s GDP and even in the United 
Kingdom, they barely reach 3 percent. By contrast the bailouts represent 
around 4 percent of GDP for Ireland and Belgium and 6 percent for the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. Austria, a small country whose banks are 
heavily exposed in Central and Eastern Europe, has already committed 
some 5 percent of GDP. Judging from spreads and credit default swaps 
on government bonds, markets are already pricing the risk that public 
ﬁnances in small countries like Austria or Ireland could pay a high price 
for rescuing their banking sectors. With no common EU or euro area chest, 
some small countries may have to rethink their ﬁnancial-sector strategies 
and even question the very principle of specializing in the provision of 
ﬁnancial services.
The third issue is the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Until 
September 15 the crisis hardly affected countries in the region. There were 
difﬁculties in some countries but they were mostly national. However, af-
ter the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, all changed: Interbank markets 
have been strained, there have been capital ﬂow reversals, several cur-
rencies have depreciated sharply, and the recession has suddenly hit the 
region. Against this background, the euro area’s response has been slow. 
It ﬁrst overlooked the potential consequences of its decisions on the neigh-
boring countries—be they capital outﬂows in response to the issuance of 
better guarantees in Western Europe or credit curtailments in response to 
demands made to banks to extend credit further in their home countries. 
It was then reluctant to formulate an overall policy response, beyond the 
ﬁnancial assistance provided to countries under an International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) program, for fear of taking some form of responsibility 
for what was perceived as national policy issues. These hesitations have 
tended to overshadow the participation by the European Union in IMF 
ﬁnancial assistance programs for Hungary and Latvia.      
The fourth issue is the fragmentation of the Single Market. Despite the 
common framework put in place to facilitate the funding of banks, to pro-
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the recapitalization of distressed banks, it appears that uneven implemen-
tation of commonly agreed rules is the norm rather than the exception. 
Not a day goes by without a measure being taken by an EU country that 
seems to favor national ﬁnancial institutions and/or requires these insti-
tutions to provide credit to national customers.
The ﬁnal issue concerns the design and implementation of a ﬁscal 
stimulus.  While  governments  were  trying  to  respond  to  the  banking 
crisis,  it  became  clear  that  it  would  soon  unleash  an  economic  crisis 
that would risk further deteriorating the ﬁnancial situation and create a 
downward spiral resulting in economic depression. In order to avoid this 
eventuality, several voices on both sides of the Atlantic came out in favor 
of a stimulus package. On both sides, there were natural concerns about 
ﬁscal sustainability. 
Even among the vast majority who supported the idea of a ﬁscal stim-
ulus, two additional issues were raised in Europe, both relating to the ab-
sence of a euro area (or EU) federal state. The ﬁrst is the lack of a euro area 
ﬁscal instrument to support economic activity and the necessity to rely on 
national instruments without being able to rely on an effective coordina-
tion mechanism. The second is the fact that euro area members entered 
the crisis in very different ﬁscal conditions, rendering the decision to set 
in motion national ﬁscal instruments all the more difﬁcult. The European 
Recovery Programme put forward by us and Jakob von Weizsäcker in 
mid-November 2008 was precisely designed to counter these two issues. 
It envisaged a harmonized indirect tax (value-added tax) cut in all EU 
countries and the creation of a mechanism to ensure medium-term ﬁscal 
sustainability in countries with unfavorable starting conditions. 
The European Economic Recovery Plan proposed by the European 
Commission a couple of weeks later also recognized the difﬁculty of engi-
neering a European ﬁscal stimulus without a proper European instrument 
and with diverse national situations but fell short of proposing the use of 
common mechanisms. Instead, it simply called on EU member states to 
adopt national measures. The Commission proposal was adopted by the 
December 2008 European Council and has been implemented in various 
ways by EU members states. However, by essentially ignoring the two is-
sues ﬂagged above, the implementation of the European plan suffers from 
two problems. 
First, because countries were allowed wide discretion in the choice of 
ﬁscal instrument, many have adopted measures that tend to favor nation-
al producers at the expense of foreign producers, thereby reintroducing 
barriers in the Single Market. 
Second, because no new mechanism to ensure the sustainability of 
public ﬁnances was introduced, a number of euro area countries soon 
began suffering great difﬁculties. For many years, markets seemed not to 
pay attention to differences in public ﬁnance conditions across euro area 
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over German bunds was as low as 20 basis points for Greece despite a 
public debt of around 100 percent and persistent deﬁcits. One year later, 
in spite of the liquidity crisis, its spread was still reasonably low at 60 
basis points.
Since  then,  the  crisis  has  left  a  heavy  mark.  Greek  bond  spreads 
jumped to 150 basis points in October 2008 and reached 250 points in early 
January 2009. Other euro area countries whose spreads have dramatically 
increased since October 2008 and were above 100 basis points at the be-
ginning of 2009 are Ireland (212 points), Italy (128 points), Slovenia (126 
points), Portugal (123 points), and Spain (109 points). As a result, several 
of these countries have already seen their S&P ratings downgraded by one 
notch. In January 2009 Spain’s went down from AAA to AA+, Portugal’s 
from AA– to A+, and Greece’s from A to A–, the lowest of any euro area 
country. This situation is worrisome because the euro area has neither a 
common funding scheme nor a well-speciﬁed mechanism to assist mem-
bers facing a potential national funding problem.  
Lessons
In a report on the euro’s ﬁrst years, written and published before the crisis 
developed, Pisani-Ferry et al. (2008) warned: “A policy framework should 
not only be judged by its agility in fair weather conditions, but also by its 
resilience in storm conditions—not only ﬁnancial but also economic and 
political storms…. In this respect, it should be recalled that…the last eight 
years have been benign. The policy framework of the euro area has thus 
not yet been tested under stress. It remains to be seen how well EMU is set 
up to deal with events like disruptive global shocks or internal crises.”
The experience since the start of the crisis conﬁrms that the euro area 
governance system was well conceived to deal with normal conditions—
even though the scope, priorities, and methods of surveillance need to 
be improved—but lacks the properties required to operate in crisis times 
enumerated in the ﬁrst section, namely speed of reaction, policy discre-
tion, and centralized action. At the center of the problem is the absence 
of a euro area political body capable of making appropriate ﬁnancial and 
ﬁscal decisions in difﬁcult times. Ad hoc coordination has indeed substi-
tuted for institutional responses, and this was welcome. There are, how-
ever, limits to what this type of coordination can achieve. 
The Eurogroup could, one day, evolve into such a political body, but 
it is far from there at the moment. For the time being, the Eurogroup is 
simply an informal body without a deﬁned mission, whose role had de-
veloped in two directions prior to the crisis: as an enforcer of EMU rules 
and as the venue for addressing the collective action problems faced by 
euro area members. Although it was always better in the ﬁrst direction 
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the latter has simply disappeared since the beginning of the crisis, despite 
the fact that it should have assumed precisely this role.
19 Were it not for the 
October 2008 euro area summit in Paris, the governance of the euro area 
during the crisis would have been assumed by the ECB alone, thereby 
underscoring the fact that the euro is a currency not only without a state 
but also without political governance.  
The governance of the euro area has been, since the launch of the 
euro, the subject of difﬁcult discussions between its members, especially 
between France and Germany. Whether or not these countries will draw 
the lessons from the crisis will largely depend on their ability to agree on 
a diagnosis of the problem and on remedies. 
Conclusion
What are the implications of our analysis of euro area governance for the 
international role of the euro, as both a regional and a global currency?
As already indicated, the euro had become a successful international 
currency during the relatively calm years that preceded the crisis. Even 
though it had not rivaled the dollar’s world currency status, it had certain-
ly become a strong regional currency and has been adopted as an anchor, 
as a reference, or as a vehicle for ﬁnancial transactions in the countries 
neighboring the euro area. 
Is there reason to believe that the management of the crisis so far will 
dramatically alter this state of affairs? We feel that the governance of the 
euro area in the current stormy weather conditions has not enhanced the 
international status of the euro. 
Within the euro area, rising bond spreads and falling ratings in some 
members, and the absence of a common funding scheme and a well-speci-
ﬁed mechanism to assist those facing funding problems, have done noth-
ing to improve the image of the euro with global investors. Although we 
regard recent remarks on the possible exit or expulsion of those members 
from the euro area as pure fantasy, we acknowledge that the lack of clarity 
on how to resolve their debt problems is a source of worry.    
The treatment by the euro area of regional partners that are facing 
severe economic and ﬁnancial difﬁculties and rely on the euro as their 
reference currency has not been satisfactory either. Such partners include 
primarily new EU member states, but also countries outside the European 
Union, like Ukraine. These countries have typically suffered from the dry-
ing up of capital ﬂows from the euro area and from the lack of assistance by 
euro area institutions, including the ECB (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry 2008). 
19. The move in 2005 to a ﬁxed presidency of the Eurogroup, instead of a rotating one, was 
intended to give it the means to take initiative and exercise leadership, but initiatives and 
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Although this divide between countries inside and outside the euro area 
may accelerate the adoption of the euro by some outsiders, the vast major-
ity are unlikely to join before the end of the crisis. In the meantime, there-
fore, the weak crisis governance of the euro area is likely to be a burden on 
these countries, which may affect their choice of reference currency.         
In conclusion, the euro has proved to be attractive as a fair weather 
currency for countries and investors well beyond its borders. But it re-
mains to be seen whether it is equipped with strong enough governance 
to also succeed as a stormy weather currency.   
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ADAM S. POSEN
“Hillel used to say: If I am not for myself, who will be for me? Yet, if I am for 
myself only, what am I? And if not now, when?” 
   —Mishnah Pirke Avot (Ethics of the Fathers), 1:14.
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Rav Hillel could have been posing questions to the euro area’s leadership 
today about its vision for the euro in the world at ten. If the governments of 
the euro area are unwilling to combine forces and representation to shape 
the global environment in which they operate, will any other government 
feel compelled to take their views into account? If the euro area’s response 
to the ﬁnancial crisis hitting Eastern European economies, including some 
EU member states, is to make future euro area membership less attainable 
and to fearfully run from “bailouts,” can it be seen as broadly attractive 
to new potential members? If the euro is neither eagerly promoted by its 
issuers nor widely adopted by market participants as the alternative to 
the dollar at a time of the greatest postwar decline in the United States’ 
relative economic credibility, will the euro ever become a global currency? 
The answer to all three questions is clearly no. For all the euro’s indisput-
able success as a monetary regime for the euro area member economies, 
its institutions’ and member countries’ leadership has failed to advocate 
for the euro area’s long-term international interests, failed to extend its 
internal stability to their neighbors and supposed future euro area mem-
bers, and failed to seize the moment for the euro when US policy is widely 
perceived to have been destabilizing. 
These failures reﬂect an often overlooked fundamental determinant of 
a currency’s global role: the currency issuer’s geostrategic role. Economic 86  THE EURO AT TEN
factors alone, such as countries’ relative size and inﬂation rates and their 
trade patterns, are insufﬁcient to explain the pattern of reserve currency or 
exchange rate peg choices seen in the world—if these were together suf-
ﬁcient, the euro would already be a truly global currency in every sense. 
For obvious reasons of diplomacy among monetary ofﬁcials, and of spe-
cialization among economic researchers, there is little incentive to take the 
geostrategic factor into account. Yet, the national security capabilities and 
foreign policy projection more broadly of the government behind a po-
tentially global currency do heavily inﬂuence the extent to which other 
countries take up that currency. National security relationships between 
governments, especially but not only where explicit military guarantees 
are relevant, put pressure on both sides of the relationship to link their 
pursuit of stability, including monetary stability. 
The currency-issuing government that also provides foreign policy 
guarantees,  let  alone  stations  troops  in  and  provides  arms  to  another 
country, has the leverage to get some of its credit needs funded by that 
recipient country. This leverage results in the anchor country having its 
own currency–denominated debt kept as foreign reserves, and deepening 
of two-way ﬁnancial transactions, by the security-dependent economy. 
The recipient country generates in turn an interest for the currency anchor 
country to support integration of the recipient’s political and economic 
elites with its home economy. That integration of educational and busi-
ness relationships will tend to increase the share of trade invoiced in the 
home country’s currency, as well as the overall amount of bilateral invest-
ment and trade in the long run. In short, the various ways in which a cur-
rency is used globally by other countries are going to be more heavily and 
exclusively used where a national security relationship exists. Addition-
ally, as seen in the ﬂight to the dollar as a safe haven during the height of 
the 2008–09 ﬁnancial crisis, having a currency backed by a leading power 
provides a comfort to fearful capital, further reinforcing the feedback be-
tween geostrategic and monetary integration.
Thus, for all its economic virtues, there is a limit to the degree to which 
the euro can become a truly global currency. The euro area is certainly not 
a hard power. It includes countries whose stances on international affairs 
differ, and there is no common foreign and security policy as yet. So long 
as the United Kingdom keeps its national currency, the euro area does 
not include the country with the largest military projection capacity in the 
European Union. The few nonbordering countries that have pegged to 
the euro tend to be those with security ties to euro area members (notably 
African states to France, the one hard power in the euro area member-
ship to project force); in contrast, a number of countries pegged to the dol-
lar have geopolitical ties with the United States that outweigh their trade 
and ﬁnancial linkages to the euro. So there will continue to be an ongoing 
slow increase in euro usage in trade invoicing, ﬁnancial investment, and 
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deepening of real economic ties to Europe—but nothing to rival the dollar 
on any of these counts. Over time, this trend, too, will diminish as the size 
of the euro area economy shrinks relative to the rest of the world (Posen 
2004). In fact, recent developments obscure the reality that the euro is at 
a temporary peak of inﬂuence, while the dollar will continue to beneﬁt 
from the geopolitical sources of its global role, which the euro cannot yet 
or soon, if ever, match. 
The limited and defensive response of euro area policymakers to the 
impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on neighboring countries—including on some 
EU members and major trading partners with the euro area—brings home 
this geostrategic fundamental weakness, despite the euro’s success in eas-
ier times to date. Failure to respond adequately to the ﬁnancial crisis in 
Eastern Europe is itself the greatest threat to the future growth and stabil-
ity of the euro area. The strictly economic rules-based treatment of crisis-
hit Eastern European countries may actually weaken the euro’s global role 
by demonstrating the limits of political commitment, especially if growth 
in the East is persistently lowered following the crisis. Ironically, while 
most EU members outside the euro area have found the goal of euro adop-
tion becoming more attractive in light of the crisis, they have simultane-
ously had euro area membership pulling farther away from them because 
of the euro area leadership’s short-sighted response.
Geostrategic Relationships Drive Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Reserve Accumulation1
A  key  determinant  of  a  country’s  public-sector  demand  for  a  foreign 
currency is the existence or not of an exchange rate peg to that foreign 
currency. The existence or not of an explicit ofﬁcial currency peg, however, 
understates the inﬂuence of this relationship on the dollar’s global role 
along three dimensions. First, the vast majority of emerging markets and 
smaller economies run monetary policies that involve highly managed 
ﬂoats,  if  not  de  facto  pegs,  primarily  against  the  dollar  (Calvo  and 
Reinhart 2002, IMF 2007), so the list of ofﬁcial peggers understates the 
customer base for dollars from this source. Second, to the degree that 
currency  ties  endogenously  encourage  trade  links,  capital  ﬂows,  and 
economic  integration  between  economies  (in  the  spirit  of  Frankel  and 
Rose 1996), private-sector demand for the anchor currency and currency 
of intervention will also rise. Third, countries that take on exchange rate 
pegs, in part as a means of monetary stabilization or credible commitment 
to price stability, will be extremely reluctant to alter a peg arrangement for 
fear of inducing instability, even if that means turbulence in the course of 
1. This section is based on the research presented in Posen (2008).88  THE EURO AT TEN
anchor currency movements (Eichengreen and Masson 1998).
2 In short, 
the decision to orient a country’s currency and exchange rate policy to the 
dollar as an anchor accounts for a large and persistent share of the dollar’s 
global role.
But what determines a country’s choice of peg? The workhorse base-
line for evaluating currency afﬁliations remains the Mundell-McKinnon 
optimal currency area (OCA) criteria, which emphasize the direction of 
trade and the relative synchronization of shocks. Given the rise of the euro 
area and Asia as sources of international trade and global growth, and 
the still important role of geographical proximity in determining trade 
patterns, there would seem to be a strong argument for a large number of 
currencies to peg (or managed ﬂoat) against the euro or even the yen or 
renminbi, rather than against the dollar (as discussed in McKinnon 2004). 
These optimal criteria are offset in part by the aforementioned reluctance 
to change preexisting pegs and in part by increasing cyclical synchroniza-
tion and deepening trade ties over time arising from those pegs. Even so, 
the seemingly unavoidable occurrence of ﬁnancial crises and divergences 
that break such pegs, or force changes of their valuations, would be ex-
pected to overcome these inertial forces over time. The argument that the 
euro exists as an alternative to the dollar thus arises in a different form. 
If undervaluing the exchange rate for export success is important, then it 
is another argument for the target currency to shift to a basket or change 
anchor as export markets shift.
Thus, the question of the euro’s global role requires an assessment of 
what is keeping export-oriented emerging markets from switching their 
pegs to the euro, or, at least, to a euro-dollar basket, when many have 
greater proximity to and growth in trade volumes with the euro area than 
with the United States? Recent cyclical divergences have been insufﬁcient 
to prompt such a switch, even when the Federal Reserve has been rapidly 
cutting interest rates while many of the pegging countries face far less 
incentive and room for monetary accommodation.
3 The actual inﬂation 
differential of the euro area and the United States, current or expected, 
is a minor factor.
4 Nonetheless, if a number of countries did switch their 
2. Eichengreen (1999, 106) puts it well: “If the country, having brought down inﬂation, can 
then smoothly exit the currency peg before being forced to do so in a crisis, the peg will have 
been worth the candle. The problem is the same as with using heroin or morphine to treat a 
patient in pain; once the suffering subsides, the patient is still hooked…. Smooth exits from 
currency pegs, whatever the original rationale for the peg, are very much the exception to 
the rule.” 
3. For example, the decision of Kuwait to leave its dollar peg in May 2007 was explained in 
these terms; see also the discussion in Setser (2007). Mohsin Khan in chapter 3 of this volume 
points out that even after Kuwait left the peg, it still keeps its reserves primarily in dollars 
and of course its oil and gas exports are invoiced in dollars.
4. The maximum difference between US and euro area headline inﬂation rates since the end UNDERLYING DETERMINANTS OF GLOBAL CURRENCY STATUS  89
exchange rate pegs, ofﬁcial and de facto managed ﬂoats, away from the 
dollar toward the euro, many of the inertial forces mentioned above would 
tend to lock in the change. That, in turn, would increase the euro’s role in 
those countries’ private sectors as well.
Foreign policy and national security ties, however, play a signiﬁcant 
role in countries’ decisions about exchange rate relationships. On that 
count, the conditions continue to favor the dollar’s global use as an an-
chor currency over that of the euro. The ability of such relationships to 
overcome even strong economic pressures to change a peg can be seen 
in the response of Germany and Japan when their ﬁxed exchange rates 
against the dollar during the 1960s led to signiﬁcant imported inﬂation 
and macroeconomic overheating. As recounted in detail in Gavin (2003), 
West Germany repeatedly confronted the explicit linkage of its security 
commitment to maintain US troops in country as a deterrent to the War-
saw Pact to Germany’s commitment to maintain its part in the gold pool. 
The linkage of the German-US security relationship to use of the dollar 
culminated in the so-called Blessing Memo of 1963, which locked in the 
quid pro quo and which, even though politically repudiated by the subse-
quent West German government, was maintained in spirit. Despite the US 
relative inﬂation and economic failings of the 1970s, no meaningful ofﬁcial 
sales of German dollar holdings took place until 1979. That, in turn, was 
when the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) began, which involved a one-
time shift away from dollar reserves to other European currencies to en-
able intra-ERM interventions, and was not indicative of any ongoing shift 
out of dollars. Moreover, it was hardly a coincidence that concrete steps 
toward Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with German encourage-
ment began in earnest only in 1992, 13 years after the ERM began, once 
the Cold War had clearly ended, Germany had been successfully uniﬁed, 
and thus American troop withdrawals were imminent and the sense of 
security dependence diminished.
5 
Japan,  which  has  never  signiﬁcantly  reduced  its  sense  of  external 
threat from China and other regional powers and thus its perceived need 
for US troop presence on Japanese territory, has also never diversiﬁed its 
ofﬁcial reserves towards the euro to any meaningful degree. This reﬂects 
a dollar focus of yen policy, which continues 40 years after Japan began 
importing higher inﬂation from the United States, growth in trade with the 
euro area and Asia became faster than in trade with the United States, and 
of Bretton Woods was 1.3 percent at an annualized rate, and the latest data have come in well 
below that amount.
5. The in some places popular notion that EMU was a payoff of reduced German autonomy 
on monetary issues for French and other nations’ acceptance of reuniﬁcation is unsupported 
by the historical evidence on the motivations of the ofﬁcials involved. This geopolitical 
consideration, that Germany no longer needed to keep Europe from creating a potential 
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despite facing repeated bouts of asynchronous monetary policy from the 
Federal Reserve (see Volcker and Gyohten 1992). The security relationship 
between the United States and Japan has contributed to this conservatism 
in Japan’s exchange rate policy, though obviously export motivations also 
played a role to varying degrees in keeping the yen undervalued against 
the dollar. The security concerns, for example, overcame the Nixon Shock, 
when Japan was perhaps the hardest hit country in macroeconomic terms 
by the 1971 Nixon-Connally decision to close the gold window, and Japan 
did nothing then to diversify out of dollars or to target other currencies 
with its exchange rate. The recurring vague proposals by some ambitious 
Japanese ofﬁcials that the yen could be internationalized or become a rival 
currency  to  the  dollar  always  ran  aground  on  Japan’s  security-driven 
desire not to offend the United States, right up through the Asian Monetary 
Fund ﬁasco of the mid-1990s. 
Meanwhile, it was not a coincidence that Gaullist France, being far 
more interested than Germany or Japan in asserting its foreign policy in-
dependence from the United States and NATO, was the loudest and most 
demanding member in challenging the gold pool and the ﬁxed dollar 
price of gold during the 1960s—although France actually faced both a far 
smaller amount of imported inﬂation from the United States than West 
Germany or Japan, and a far greater domestic inﬂation risk from unan-
choring the franc than the deutsche mark and yen would have faced. 
The security motivations of France’s currency arrangements also were 
primary in its management of relations with the central African CFA Franc 
Zone, as detailed in Helleiner (2003) and Stasavage (2003a, 2003b). For ex-
ample, “Countries such as Guinea and Mali, which sought to break away 
from the CFA zone [in the early 1960s], found their broader security, trade, 
aid, and other economic links to France severed by the French government 
in ways that were very costly” (Helleiner 2003, 75).
6 Mali exited the CFA 
zone in 1962, when it sought closer ties with the Soviet Union and separa-
tion from France. It returned to the zone in 1984 as part of the package of 
returning to the Western fold and reestablishing ties with France, with full 
reintegration taking place only after a coup d’etat that credibly changed 
the leaning of the Malian regime. Similar political breaks regarding the 
orientation of foreign policy precipitated exits from the currency bloc by 
Madagascar and Mauritania in the 1970s. Thus, the security-driven ar-
rangement of French CFA relations—driven by postcolonial foreign policy 
ties rather than any economic determinants—led to the signiﬁcant share 
of euro peggers coming from that zone in Africa. In fact, the only non-EU 
6.  Stasavage  (2003a,  81)  similarly  “suggest[s]  that  calculations  of  Francophone  African 
leaders [regarding CFA zone membership] have had as much to do with the preserving the 
stability of their regimes…Fear of losing privileged aid and security arrangements has raised 
the cost of exit for a number of governments that otherwise would have sought to establish 
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membership candidate countries to have a euro peg are the CFA Franc 
Zone, the French Overseas Territories, Cape Verde, and Comoros (ECB 
2007, 41). 
Another substantial share of today’s euroized or euro-pegging coun-
tries are the successor states to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, which 
is, of course, the scene of postwar Europe’s largest and most geographi-
cally contiguous military intervention. So Kosovo and Montenegro have 
unilaterally  euroized,  Bosnia-Herzegovina  has  a  euro-based  currency 
board, and Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia all have managed ﬂoats with 
reference to the euro. Other candidate and would-be candidate countries 
for EU membership, notably Turkey, have chosen not to peg to the euro, 
even as integration has proceeded to deepen between the Turkish and 
euro area economies.
Looking at the list of current exchange rate arrangements in European 
economies (ECB 2007, IMF 2007), one sees a surprisingly large number 
of economies for whom the economic case for euro pegging seems to be 
clear—and who have the legal obligation from EU membership to enter 
into ERM2 en route to the euro area—but who choose to do otherwise. 
These include Poland, which followed Sweden and the United Kingdom 
in refusing to formally tie in to the euro; Hungary, which had maintained 
a wide-band ﬂoat tied to the euro outside of ERM2 and in late Febru-
ary 2008 exited that arrangement; and the Czech Republic and Romania, 
which ﬂoat with a euro reference but nowhere close to a peg by the Euro-
pean Central Bank’s own description. 
The question is, why has the euro area, which has delivered price sta-
bility, increasing ﬁnancial depth, and trade linkages with these economies, 
not been attractive for membership to economies that were already EU 
members before the crisis hit? It would appear that these countries’ pre-
crisis voluntary absence from the euro area or ERM2 is consistent with 
their strong desire for national autonomy and for foreign relations some-
what independent of the European Union—all of which was amply dem-
onstrated by these countries’ reluctance to ratify the Treaty of Nice and 
related constitutional measures for the European Union—rather than for 
lack of economic linkages. As European ofﬁcials have stressed for the last 
nine years, the euro area is not just an economic club, and so it should be 
no surprise that those EU members feeling the most politically rather than 
economically distant are the ones to remain outside of it.
Such decisions are hardly rare or limited to the euro area and its 
neighbors. Looking a little further back in time, it is worth considering 
the breakup of the ruble zone following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in December 1991. Initially, 15 post-Soviet states were sharing a common 
currency, and the leading experts at the time, including the IMF, advised 
members against leaving the ruble zone on economic grounds (Åslund 
1995). Given the trade ties between these economies, the spectre of hyper-
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ties of continued ruble usage—as well as the absence at that time of a local 
euro with hope of membership to latch on to—the advice was sensible. 
Yet, the ruble zone fell apart less than two years later. 
Abdelal (2001, 2003) provocatively points out that there was a clear 
cross-sectional difference in the monetary goals and strategies of the post-
Soviet states and thus in their readiness to exit the currency union, which 
ran opposite to what economic criteria would predict. The Baltic states 
had some of the highest intraregional shares of total commerce within the 
ruble zone, and would suffer the largest negative terms-of-trade shock by 
exiting the zone (Michalopoulos and Tarr 1992), and yet were the ﬁrst and 
most eager to exit. In contrast, the “Stans,” which had similar or lower 
trade shares within the zone than the Baltic states but (as resource export-
ers) had the most to gain in terms of trade from exiting—as well as (ex 
post) the biggest risk of inﬂation from losing a credible anchor—were the 
most reluctant to exit. They in fact tried to keep the zone going, because 
politically they were the most inclined to maintaining close relations with 
Russia and within the Commonwealth of Independent States.
So what does all this mean for the global role of the euro vis-à-vis the 
dollar? It means that given the limited desire and ability of the euro area 
members to project security relationships beyond their immediate neigh-
borhood, there is little incentive for other countries around the world to 
shift their pegging, formal but also informal, from the dollar to the euro. 
US military spending was double that of the euro area even prior to the 
Iraq war, and, of course, it has surged with ill use since that time. But the 
point is that while some economic arguments suggest that this defense 
spending differential would likely hasten the euro’s displacement of the 
dollar, through eroding savings and the current account balance, the geo-
strategic view suggests that at least some of that spending differential sup-
ports the dollar’s global role.
Of course, most of the places in Europe with large US troop deploy-
ments are now in the euro area, but they all saw signiﬁcant declines in US 
troops stationed there versus during the pre-euro days. There are coun-
tries in Latin America and especially in Northeast Asia and the Persian 
Gulf where US security presence leads to dollar pegging—in contrast to 
the euro, dollar peggers are not limited to contiguous areas. While Kuwait 
indeed abandoned its dollar peg in March 2007, despite the huge troop 
buildup there, it is difﬁcult to see Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states 
following suit—in the extreme, one can imagine them revaluing against 
the dollar and/or moving to a highly managed ﬂoat against the dollar, 
but the dollar would remain the reference currency for them. The contin-
ued prominent role of the dollar in Egypt and Turkey, when those coun-
tries’ trade and ﬁnancial ties have shifted so strongly toward the euro area 
relative to the United States, is also consistent with their security priori-
ties—represented by the large US troop deployments in those countries. 
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Japan or South Korea (or Taiwan) would move voluntarily to a renminbi 
peg, were such an option to be meaningful? Is there anyone outside of 
the potential members of the European Union and some Mediterranean 
neighbors who would consider initiating a euro peg?
7 No and no.
Even in the purely economic realm of foreign policy, the euro area 
leadership does not assert itself in a way that induces other countries to 
afﬁliate with its membership. The fragmented external representation of 
the euro area membership at the IMF and other international ﬁnancial in-
stitutions reveals the constraints on the euro area’s ability to respond to 
global developments—and thus to inﬂuence the environment of countries 
outside the euro area itself. This situation is likely driven by the percep-
tion of some member states that direct participation in the G-20 or rep-
resenting a constituency in the IMF serves their national interest better 
than yielding that individual role for a stronger promotion of common 
euro area positions. Whatever the reason, inability to present a forceful 
common position means that the euro area leadership acts to maintain the 
status quo rather than to exert inﬂuence over the global agenda. It also 
shows by revealed preference the heavy relative prioritization on internal 
economic issues over global ones. “If I am not for myself, who will be for 
me?” If the euro area countries do not stand up for themselves together 
in international economic decision, let alone in geopolitics more broadly, 
which outside countries will stand with them and be more inclined to take 
up their currency?
The Euro Area Response to Eastern Europe
The global ﬁnancial crisis has if anything clearly displayed the geopolitical 
limitations on the euro’s global role because the euro area authorities have 
failed to show leadership even as a regional anchor currency. A successful 
regional currency role for the euro would entail fulﬁlling responsibilities 
towards countries in the region that have adopted the euro as a monetary 
anchor or whose ﬁnancial systems are partially euroized. Doing so would 
require  correctly  treating  the  current  crisis  situation  as  different  from 
any one for which the Maastricht criteria were designed, and ﬂexibly 
interpreting those rules for the current challenges. Fulﬁlling the regional 
responsibilities towards Eastern Europe would also require actively trying 
to export stability from the euro area outwards to potential and future 
members, rather than solely concentrating on the maximum protection of 
current area members. 
In a nutshell, however, the instinctive reaction of euro area policymak-
7. Tunisia and Morocco do have basket pegs that de facto include both euro and dollar, where 
on an economic basis it would seem straightforward for them to peg solely to the euro if not 
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ers has been to go into a defensive crouch when a number of Eastern Eu-
ropean economies ran into signiﬁcant difﬁculties as a result of the crisis. 
While some adjustment funds have been provided via ﬁnancial support of 
IMF programs for particular countries, the main response of the euro area 
has been to make sure that no country could conceive of accelerating the 
process of attaining euro area membership, of swapping or repoing assets 
in national currencies for euros, or of receiving any transfer of a meaning-
ful amount of funds rather than a loan. The loud volume at which these 
self-imposed limits on euro area action were rapidly proclaimed conveyed 
clearly that euro area policymakers are insecure about the stability of the 
euro, and treat it as though that stability is hugely fragile. The impression 
given is hardly one to inspire conﬁdence in the currency, and overrides 
any expectations by potential euro members of European solidarity or that 
the euro might entail a broader political commitment.
Thus, ironically, while most EU members outside the euro area have 
found the goal of euro adoption becoming more attractive in light of the 
crisis, they have simultaneously had euro area membership move farther 
away from them because of the euro area leadership’s short-sighted re-
sponse. Counting the sudden huge depreciation of all Eastern European 
currencies  in  autumn  2008—irrespective  of  their  economic  fundamen-
tals—for strict observance of the ERM2 “waiting area” criterion for ex-
change rate stability is outright punitive. Similarly the literal enforcement 
of the debt and deﬁcit criteria for euro membership without some out for 
crisis mitigation or bank recapitalization expenditures will be horribly 
contractionary, above and beyond anything enforced on euro member 
countries under the Stability and Growth Pact. Szapary’s chapter docu-
ments the mounting difﬁculties for new member states of meeting the ﬁs-
cal deﬁcit and long-term interest rate criteria as a result of this exogenous 
shock from the crisis. As Pisani-Ferry and Posen argue in the introduction 
to this volume, new members should be given a “more sensible, not eas-
ier, path [to euro entry]. At a minimum the Commission and Eurogroup 
should offset the ways in which the crisis has made euro accession more 
distant even for countries with good policies.” 
Yes,  some  Eastern  European  EU  members—notably  Hungary,  Lat-
via, and Romania— pursued ill-advised policies leading to currency mis-
matched borrowing, unsustainable current account deﬁcits, and eroding 
ﬁscal balances, while others did not. Some would say that one of their pol-
icymakers’ reasons for misbehaving was the belief that they had a com-
mitment from the euro area, at least regarding monetary stability. Since 
other new member states had at least as much of a plausible commitment, 
though, most of them had relatively better chances of meeting the criteria 
for membership, and they did not go on such binges, that cannot be the 
whole story.
8 For purposes of this paper, the point is that disregard for the 
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losses suffered by the new member states in favor of what seems to maxi-
mize the stability for the current euro area only unravels the elite ties and 
decreases the leverage that build up incentives for currency afﬁliation. 
Add in deep disappointment of expectations about intra-EU solidarity, as 
well as ever receding goal posts for euro entry, and we should expect some 
Eastern European countries wanting to self-insure and diversify on the 
monetary front, much as East Asia did after feeling ill-served by the IMF 
in 1997–98.
9
The euro area’s narrowly economic and internally focused approach 
to the Eastern European situation actually raises a signiﬁcant geopolitical 
risk for the European Union. The emphasis on country by country pro-
grams (when the IMF is needed) and strict assessment by ﬁxed criteria 
(even for the exemplar governments) may be economically motivated, but 
it sets member state against member state in trying to distinguish them-
selves. The Czechs insist they are not the Hungarians, the Estonians that 
they are not the Latvians, the Bulgarians that they are not the Romanians, 
and that each must be treated accordingly. In a narrow rules-based mind-
set, such a separating equilibrium seems to make sense, for all that mat-
ters are the standards of the current euro area. In the current crisis, such 
inﬂexible discipline will inevitably lead to bad outcomes for some mem-
ber states. At worst, the euro area would be pushing a number of Eastern 
member states down a very dangerous path economically and politically. 
So doing cannot but hurt the competitiveness and stability of their perhaps 
more economically virtuous immediate neighbors as well. Eroding intra-
European solidarity thus will not be damaging just to the euro’s regional 
role, it could eventually be harmful to European economic and political 
stability over the medium term. 
If I am only for myself, who am I? The euro cannot become a global 
currency and an effective inﬂuence for stability, let alone one of the inter-
national ﬁnancial architects, if it does not live up to its responsibilities as 
the world’s most important regional currency.
degree Portugal all were brought into the euro area on the basis of some dubious measures 
and ﬂexible interpretation of the criteria. The run-up to the launch of the euro did not credibly 
deter them into more disciplined behavior any more than it induced irresponsible behavior 
by Ireland, Austria, or the Netherlands. So the premise that enforcing rules, even under the 
guise of IMF conditionality, will force Hungary or Romania to see the error of their ways is 
empirically suspect. 
9. It would be accurate to point out that, during the crises of the 1990s, the US government 
did little for its closely tied countries Mexico or South Korea beyond using the IMF, much as 
the euro area has done for Eastern Europe at present. It also misses the point. That neglect did 
result in some self-insurance and some distancing from the US by affected countries, even as 
the economic fundamentals of their currency orientation did not change. Furthermore, the 
concern here is how geopolitics determines global currency usage, and, unlike the United 
States, the euro area does not offer national security support or have the advantages of 
currency incumbency to offset US levels of self-absorption.96  THE EURO AT TEN
Is this Crisis the Last Opportunity for the Euro to Step Up 
Globally?
Many observers have logically expressed concern the recent turmoil may 
be the big event that pushes the dollar off its pedestal as the dominant in-
ternational currency. Given the euro’s apparent readiness on some purely 
economic criteria to be an alternative to the dollar, the euro’s ascent to at 
least comparable status with the dollar has a surface and popular plausi-
bility. Indeed, some observers predicted before the euro’s launch that the 
euro would some day rival the dollar as a reserve currency, if not also as 
a private store of value and means of account, producing a bipolar mon-
etary system.
10 
Some analysts (notably Bergsten 2005) have argued that for the euro 
to overcome the dollar’s incumbency and network advantages, and at-
tain codominance, the United States would have to commit a series of 
signiﬁcant policy mistakes or suffer a balance-of-payments crisis. These 
analysts assume such a process to have been operating when the pound 
sterling lost its role to the dollar in the 1930s, when the United Kingdom’s 
balance of payments and monetary discipline ﬂagged. According to this 
view, the dollar, however, was spared such a fate during the 1970s only 
because neither the deutsche mark nor the yen was a viable alternative 
at the time. The lack of an alternative reserve currency at that time was 
supposedly the key factor in the dollar’s ongoing global role. Again, if one 
looks solely at the basic economic factors like size and ﬁnancial liquidity 
being in place for the euro at present, then to these analysts recent events 
indicate that the time is ripe for an accelerated switch to the euro, if not a 
formal regime change. 
It is overdue and correct for American and other observers to shed 
any remnants of the excessive doubts about the euro’s viability, which 
prevailed in many quarters since the mid-1990s, and to recognize that the 
euro has been an ample success within the monetary realm (Posen 2005, 
DG ECFIN 2008). But to argue that this crisis is the turning point for the 
euro to equal the dollar in, or displace the dollar from, its global role would 
be misguided. The source of all of this euro optimism is too narrow and 
deterministic a focus on simple observable economic determinants of re-
serve currency holdings and on reserves to the exclusion of other issues.
11 
10. See Alogoskouﬁs and Portes (1992), Bergsten (1997a, 1997b), Portes and Rey (1998). Note 
that most of these economic analyses focus speciﬁcally on the reserve currency role, given 
availability (for the most part) of data on ofﬁcial currency holdings and the assumption that 
many other aspects of the dollar’s or euro’s usage would follow shifts in this usage. That is 
not to say that they dismiss other aspects such as pegging by third countries or private-sector 
invoicing, but they do not focus on them. They do not consider non-economic aspects of 
these dynamics.
11. While a large literature in political science has emerged in the last 20 years on the political UNDERLYING DETERMINANTS OF GLOBAL CURRENCY STATUS  97
The mainstream economics literature on currency status admits as much 
by its repeated frustration in theoretically accounting for the observed be-
havior of dollar holders in the public sector. It is just as troubling in the 
private sector, given the apparent willingness of foreign investors to give 
the United States an “exorbitant privilege” via accepting low-yielding US 
treasuries and other dollar-denominated investments.
12 
This is why Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006) were fully justiﬁed 
in invoking the physics analogy of unobservable “dark matter” to explain 
the gap in relative returns for dollar holders.
13 The United States’ global 
political leadership in security, commercial, and even cultural affairs has 
a critical impact on dollar usage in the monetary realm and constitutes a 
signiﬁcant share of this dark matter. The euro area does not have any of 
this dark matter with which to exert a gravitational pull on other countries 
beyond the basic economic factors. It is no coincidence that Russia, trying 
to tout independence from the United States and woo Europe politically, 
is the only one of the major emerging markets to actively move into the 
euro. This holds true today, even when all substantial reserve accumula-
tors—particularly China—face substantial ﬁnancial expense and risk from 
not reallocating their portfolios, given their dollar exposure on accumu-
lated reserves. 
The crisis itself will do nothing to increase the geopolitical signiﬁ-
cance or attraction of the euro area. In addition to the likely frustration of 
economy of monetary policy, the focus has tended to be on monetary statecraft, the tactical 
use of exchange rate policy in speciﬁc instances (e.g., Henning 1994, Kirshner 1993). The few 
who deal with currency choice end up emphasizing the same trio of economic determinants 
of reserve status as typical in economics. A partial exception are the essays collected in 
Andrews (2006) and Kirshner (2003) and the contributions therein. More provocative are 
the broader historical syntheses of Maier (2006) and Strange (1996) on sources of American 
power, which take currency usage as part of the package.
12. As argued in Posen (2008): “The missing mass problem in pure economic explanations 
of currency behavior is why Chinn and Frankel (2007) have to include such a large role for 
imputed “network” effects via lags, even though that labeling does little work…. [It] is also 
why Andrew Rose (2007) in his latest research on exits from currency unions reveals that 
what shapes currency unions around the world is not what the received theory predicts…the 
most striking facts are that aggregate macroeconomic features of the economy do a poor 
job in predicting currency union exits…. And this gap is why Gourinchas and Rey (2007) 
and Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2008) debate whether a differential ﬁnancial return 
actually exists for US holders of foreign assets versus foreign holders of US assets…. The fact 
that long-term holdings of US dollar assets by foreigners have been a losing proposition in 
relative as well as absolute terms has to be taken at face value at some point: These assets 
were and are held, at least in part, for nonﬁnancial reasons.” Those reasons primarily being 
the geopolitical factor set out in this paper.
13. Although closer analysis indicated that Hausmann and Sturzenegger’s speciﬁc contention 
about intangibles leading to high proﬁts from US foreign direct investment abroad did not 
hold up as the source of that dark matter. See Gros (2006), Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille 
(2005), and Setser (2006) for persuasive critiques of that contention.98  THE EURO AT TEN
the Eastern European economies already integrated into the euro region 
discussed in the preceding section, neither economic growth nor ﬁnancial 
stability in the euro area are going to be visibly better than that of the 
United States over the 2008–2010 period. In fact, for a number of reasons, 
the euro area is likely to be slower to recover, and in most countries will 
have debt overhangs and asset price declines more persistent than those 
of the United States. It is worth noting that the euro area’s performance 
as a real economy has not been so compelling, and was at least as inﬂated 
by unsustainable growth of late as the United States.
14 The best available 
sectoral analysis of productivity developments in the euro area economies 
suggests that an increase in productivity growth did not drive the recent 
boom in Europe.
15 In fact, the boom could be cloaking a continued down-
ward trend in productivity growth, since it came through increased input 
of low-skilled labor. In any event, absent improved productivity growth, 
the boom is not based on a sustainable source of growth. Baily (2008) 
comes to a similar assessment based on independent corporate studies 
and on the breakdown of Okun’s law relationships when the recent em-
ployment increase accompanied rather slow growth. 
Why does this matter for the present moment as the opportunity for 
the global role of the euro to rise? Because it indicates that the current 
relative parity in size of the euro area and the US economies is unlikely to 
last. The demographics continue to favor the United States, both on birth 
rate and on immigration. Even allowing for a decline in the US productiv-
ity growth trend, the gap between euro area and US productivity growth 
rates will remain sizable for the coming years as well. Thus, as in Posen 
(2004), the US economy will gain in size relative to the euro area, even as 
it shrinks relative to China and world GDP as a whole—and we know that 
relative size of economies is an important determinant of currency status. 
Add in demographic trends to that of relative economic size, and the po-
tential for the euro area to project power in geostrategic affairs is also on 
a downward trend, even were its members to commit to so doing. There 
may be even less appetite for consolidated external EU or euro area rep-
resentation now than before the crisis. This is the natural, if unfortunate, 
result of political pressures to look after a nation’s parochial interests in 
times of hardship.
14. Among  monetary  accomplishments  beyond  maintenance  of  price  stability  are  good 
management to date of the ﬁnancial turmoil, the exertion of greater unity and voice by the 
ECB Governing Council vis-à-vis the member central banks, the (slight) consolidation of 
chairs and shares in the international ﬁnancial institutions, and the successful support of 
continued ﬁnancial deepening in euro area bond markets. See DG ECFIN (2008), Posen 
(2005), and Pisani-Ferry et al. (2008) for summary positive assessments of the euro in its own 
terms.
15. See the ofﬁcial discussions of the EU-KLEMS database research in ECB (2008) and DG 
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If not now, when? If the euro cannot leverage through political ini-
tiative an expansion of its global role when the gap in economic factors 
and relative performance between the euro area and the United States has 
temporarily narrowed, and the demand for monetary leadership is high, 
it is unlikely to ever do so.
* * * * * *
To reiterate a point made by others in this volume, competition for mon-
etary leadership with the dollar should not be a motivation for euro area 
policies.
16 The message of this paper is not that the euro area policymak-
ers should pursue an expanded regional strategy, let alone more assertive 
behavior in foreign and security policy for the sake of having the euro 
become a more global currency. The message is an empirical one about 
the noneconomic fundamentals limiting the euro’s role internationally: 
because the euro area is not offering to the states behind potentially as-
sociated currencies a broader range of security relationships in general, 
it will not attract as many adherents as the economic factors would seem 
to suggest would come. The defensive rather than afﬁrmative response of 
the euro area leadership to the crisis in Eastern Europe, and the compara-
bly poor (or worse) economic performance of most of the euro area to that 
of the United States as a result of the crisis, will reinforce this limitation.
But this positive argument that the euro is unlikely to become a global 
currency and real alternative to the dollar, does not say that US monetary 
hegemony is automatic. In fact, I argue that the causality runs at least as 
much from security leadership to economic leadership as in the other di-
rection; there need not be a ready alternative currency for the dollar to lose 
its global leadership. Given the euro’s limitations, fragmentation of the 
global monetary system, rather than a smooth shift to a viable dollar rival, 
is more likely to emerge, should the US mistakes lead to dollar failure. 
In such a situation, there would be an erosion of easy currency convert-
ibility between currency zones, a shift of reserves toward gold and other 
“hard” commodities, and lesser cross-border ﬂows of capital, all inducing 
greater macroeconomic instability. This scenario is, of course, along the 
lines of Kindleberger’s (1986) interpretation of the 1930s, when there was 
no monetary leadership to be had and the world trading system collapsed 
as a result. While things are unlikely to get that bad, since we are emerg-
ing from the worst of the crisis already, no one should view the failure of 
the euro to rise to global currency status as costless— either for Europe or 
for the world. 
The ECB’s founding chief economist, Otmar Issing (2009) claims on 
the basis of the euro’s experience that you can have a currency without 
16. See the contributions to this volume by Bini Smaghi (chapter 1), Liikanen (chapter 4), 
Pisani-Ferry and Posen (introduction), and Summers (chapter 4).100  THE EURO AT TEN
a state. Perhaps, at least in good times. But the euro’s record also dem-
onstrates that you certainly cannot have a global currency without a state. 
And if no other nation-state is dominant enough in geopolitics to provide 
a global currency, and the international framework behind it, that stateless 
currency may not do very well even for its own region.
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to American Leadership. Pittsburgh, PA: Three Rivers Press.East Asia provides a crucial test of the euro’s attractiveness as an interna-
tional currency outside Europe’s own neighborhood. This paper compares 
the roles of the euro and dollar in the region and their prospects. Although 
I consider myself an early and consistent supporter of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), I do not predict a rapid increase in the role of 
the euro in East Asia. The international role of its currency is not the most 
important test of the success or failure of a monetary union. Such a role for 
the euro would not necessarily beneﬁt Europe, moreover, because it car-
ries costs as well as beneﬁts. However, examining the international role of 
the euro is important to understanding the operation and stability of the 
international monetary system. The following sections address the overall 
prospects for the euro, approaches to understanding currency use in East 
Asia, the recent empirical record, and the relevance of Asian regionalism. 
These treatments are followed by a brief conclusion.
Overall Prospects for the International Role of the Euro
The advent of the EMU created an alternative to the dollar that is poten-
tially more attractive than any of the European “legacy” currencies or the 
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then at the US Treasury Department, was fond of saying, “The fate of the 
dollar is still largely in our own hands” (US Senate 1997). This statement 
was reassuring, but in a diplomatically evasive way. In previous decades, 
the United States could make macroeconomic mistakes—which it did on 
monetary policy in the 1970s and ﬁscal policy in the 1980s—with relative 
impunity. Because the currency alternatives were limited to the Deutsche 
mark, Japanese yen, and Swiss franc—currencies backed by economies 
and capital markets that were nowhere near the size, diversity, and liquid-
ity of those of the United States—such mistakes produced diversiﬁcation 
out of the dollar only at the margin. I argued that the United States would 
pay a greater cost in terms of diversiﬁcation out of dollar assets if it made 
such mistakes after the creation of the euro (Henning 1997, 2000). At least 
until relatively recently, though, the United States has avoided high inﬂa-
tion or large ﬁscal deﬁcits since the advent of the euro. 
The euro’s encroachment on the international role of the dollar has 
so far been on the margin, rather than game-changing. This is true across 
most measures—foreign exchange reserves, trade invoicing, vehicle func-
tion in foreign exchange markets, and international ﬁnancial assets. In its 
most successful arena, as the currency of denomination of international 
bond issues, the euro plays a role that approaches but remains slightly 
less than that of the dollar. Rather than a continuous trend increase in 
the euro’s share by this measure, however, we have seen a leveling off in 
recent years (ECB 2008, box 1, 15–16). Extrapolating from prior experi-
ence, therefore, prospects for the euro seemed more hopeful at its ﬁfth 
anniversary (Posen 2005) than at its tenth. The euro has become widely 
used in its own regional neighborhood but not a global currency seriously 
challenging the dollar in other regions—a conclusion well documented by 
the European Central Bank’s annual report on the subject (ECB 2008; see 
also Cohen [forthcoming] and Cohen and Subacchi 2008). 
Asian countries hold most of the world’s foreign exchange reserves 
and are therefore especially relevant to the euro’s global future (table 3.1). 
Seven Asian countries, including India, rank among the top 10 holders of 
ofﬁcial foreign exchange reserves and 9 Asian countries rank among the 
top 15. The reserves of ASEAN+3+2 (that is, the member countries of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and Korea, and 
then adding Hong Kong and Taiwan) amount to almost $4 trillion, more 
than 54 percent of world foreign exchange reserves (as of April 2008). 
Moreover, East Asia represents almost 20 percent of world product, at 
current exchange rates—25 percent when calculated at purchasing pow-
er parity—and 27 percent of world exports. Philip Lane and Gian Maria 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) calculate that the region holds more than 12 percent 
of international ﬁnancial assets. Moreover, these percentages are growing. 
For the euro to break out of the European neighborhood into a global role, 
it would have to capture “currency market share” in East Asia.REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES  105
Alternative Approaches to Currency Use in Asia
Two alternative views provide a useful context in which to situate analysis 
of international currency usage in East Asia. Let us call them the “dollar 
standard” school and the “dollar pessimist” school. 
Ronald McKinnon (2006) has written most lucidly on the East Asian 
dollar standard and his book on the subject is a key point of reference. The 
concept of “conﬂicted virtue” plays a central role in his analysis. Asian 
countries with high domestic saving rates, capital outﬂow, and current 
account surpluses accumulate foreign assets but are not able to lend in their 
own currencies; they choose to accumulate dollar assets. Growing current 
account surpluses place them in a dilemma: They must appreciate their 
currencies to avoid foreign protectionism but suffer losses on their dollar 
portfolios if they do so. Conﬂicted virtue for creditor countries involves 
the same currency mismatch, but with opposite effects, as “original sin” 
for debtor countries. Given his assumptions and orientation, McKinnon 
concludes that East Asian reliance on the dollar is both desirable and likely 
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to continue.
1 The so-called revived Bretton Woods interpretation offered by 
Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber (2003) is closely 
related to the dollar standard view. Although they are less concerned about 
the role of the dollar as a nominal anchor for Asian countries, the revived 
Bretton  Woods  advocates  also  defend  heavy  Asian  foreign  exchange 
intervention, currency undervaluation, and accumulation of large piles of 
dollar reserves.
Counterpoised to the dollar standard view are many who believe this 
pattern  of  intervention  and  reserve  accumulation  to  be  unsustainable. 
Barry Eichengreen expects that, when faced with continued US current 
account deﬁcits, trend depreciation of the dollar, and an intractable col-
lective action dilemma among reserve holders, Asian central banks will at 
some point sell dollars for other currencies (Eichengreen 2006). That point 
could be the euro’s historic moment of opportunity to broaden its interna-
tional role to East Asia. 
Though their argument is not speciﬁc to East Asia, Menzie Chinn and 
Jeffrey Frankel (2008) are particularly bullish on the euro in the long term. 
The concept of a “tipping point” in currency usage is one of the contribu-
tions of their recent article. They argue that the underlying determinants 
can  change  incrementally  over  a  considerable  period  without  causing 
equivalent changes in reserve currency shares. But once these changes cu-
mulate to a certain threshold, the reserve portfolio can be redistributed 
relatively rapidly. Chinn and Frankel believe that such a threshold could 
be reached as early as 2015. While the concept is intriguing, the existence 
and location of the tipping point are, of course, hypotheses.
Present Role of the Dollar and Euro in East Asia
As of the tenth anniversary of the creation of the euro, the dollar continues 
to play the dominant role in East Asia. To get a sense of the relative stand-
ing of the two currencies—and the distance that the euro must cover to 
play a role equal to that of the dollar in the region—consider their shares 
in  foreign  exchange  reserves,  exchange  rate  regimes,  foreign  currency 
markets, bond markets, and trade invoicing, in that order. 
Foreign Exchange Reserves
With respect to shares in world foreign exchange reserves, the dollar’s 
share is about 62.5 percent in value terms and 68 percent in quantity terms.
2 
Most East Asian countries do not publicly disclose the currency composi-
1. McKinnon discusses alternatives to the dollar in his 2006 book, but the euro is not one of 
them. 
2. I thank Edwin M. Truman and Daniel Xie for providing this calculation.REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES  107
tion of reserves, so we have to be content with the estimates of various 
authors who have closely examined reserve management policies. Table 
3.2 compiles these estimates for seven countries in the region. Although 
the country coverage is incomplete, the largest reserve holders are repre-
sented. Some of these guesses are fairly well educated, and the numbers 
for Australia and New Zealand are known rather than estimated. Because 
the holdings of China, Japan, and Korea are large relative to their partners 
in Southeast Asia, the dollar share of the reserves for ASEAN+3 as a whole 
can be estimated at about 74 percent, with reasonable conﬁdence that the 
dollar’s true share lies within 5 percent of this ﬁgure. 
It thus appears that the role of the dollar is greater in East Asian hold-
ings than in world reserve holdings. Given that the Japanese yen would be 
expected to play its small remaining role (3.4 percent of world reserves) in 
its own regional neighborhood, the share of the euro must be correspond-
ingly smaller in this region than worldwide. 
Two observations about this measure are noteworthy. First, Edwin M. 
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erally been “passive” rather than “active”—that is, effected through the 
depreciation of the dollar relative to the euro and other reserve currencies 
rather than through conversions. To the extent that central banks actively 
change reserve levels, Truman and Wong ﬁnd such changes to be gener-
ally stabilizing rather than destabilizing of exchange rates but also that 
Japan’s “Great Intervention” of 2003–04 largely accounts for this ﬁnding. 
Over the next couple of years, it will be interesting to see whether these 
ﬁndings are symmetrical to movements of the dollar—that is, whether or 
not Asian central banks use episodes of dollar appreciation as an oppor-
tunity to actively diversify into the euro without accentuating downward 
movement of the US currency. 
The second observation is a caveat: The shift of reserves into sover-
eign wealth funds (SWFs) could mask currency diversiﬁcation. Monetary 
authorities that wish to diversify might well initiate that shift through 
the most opaque vehicle, especially if they are concerned that their move 
could prompt other dollar holders to sell their reserves—the collective 
action dilemma about which Eichengreen warns. The currency compo-
sition of foreign exchange reserves is disclosed on a global basis by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), whereas the composition of SWF 
portfolios is not—which might persuade dollar holders to use the latter 
as the vehicle.
Exchange Rate Regimes
The dollar also dominates as the reference currency for hard pegging, soft 
pegging, and managed ﬂoating in the region. Table 3.3 lists the exchange 
rate regimes in East Asia as classiﬁed both by the IMF and by Carmen 
Reinhart, Ethan Ilzetzki, and Kenneth Rogoff (2008), the latter presenting 
a more ﬁne-grained classiﬁcation scheme. Reinhart, Ilzetzki, and Rogoff 
incorporate  observations  through  2007,  thus  encompassing  the  shift 
within the region toward greater exchange rate ﬂexibility prior to the 
2007–09 ﬁnancial turmoil. The table shows the degree to which rates were 
still pegged and managed in the region.
But the composition of the baskets against which currencies are man-
aged is generally opaque, which has spawned a cottage industry among 
international monetary economists devoted to estimating them. Jeffrey 
Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei (1994, 2007) and Ronald McKinnon and Gün-
ther Schnabl (2006), among others, have estimated the implicit weight of 
the dollar to be very high, above 90 percent in the case of China after its 
switch to gradual appreciation in July 2005. The Malaysian ringgit shad-
ows the renminbi very closely, gradually moving in tandem with it up-
ward against the dollar. Hong Kong has a currency board based on the 
dollar. The Korean won, Singapore dollar, and Thai baht appear to give 
somewhat less weight to the dollar and modest weight to the yen. Masa-REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES  109
hiro Kawai (2007) observes a growing diversity of exchange rate regimes 
and argues that McKinnon overstates the dominance of the dollar, but 
nonetheless conﬁrms that substantial weight is placed on the US currency. 
The weight given to the euro in these implicit baskets is generally low, and 
the European Central Bank lists no East Asian country among those using 
the euro in baskets for pegs and managed ﬂoats.
3
Several  analysts  have  proposed  that  East  Asian  governments  peg 
jointly to a common basket, usually composed of the dollar, euro, and yen 
(see especially Williamson 1999 and 2005, Ogawa and Ito 2002; also de 
Brouwer 2002, Rajan 2002, Kawai 2004 and 2007). But monetary authorities 
in the region have declined this advice and shifted toward greater currency 
ﬂexibility in the last three years without adopting a common basket—or 
without  much  coordination  of  exchange  rates  in  other  respects  either. 
Asian authorities undertook this shift as the dollar depreciated against the 
euro. But it is not at all clear that these countries were seeking stability 
3. Frankel and Wei (2007) speciﬁcally emphasize in their results that China appears to have 
assigned no weight at all to the yen and euro. 
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against the euro rather than appreciation against the dollar. 
Recall that the 1997–98 crisis forced Asian currencies off their dollar 
pegs but that, as the crisis passed, Asian authorities reestablished those 
pegs in a softer form that appears to have been less vulnerable to specula-
tive attack. Several Asian currencies have exhibited a good deal of ﬂexibil-
ity during the present ﬁnancial turmoil as well. But the previous pattern 
of reversion to relative stability could well be repeated when this crisis 
eventually recedes. Whether Asian authorities choose to restabilize their 
currencies and, if so, whether they peg softly against the dollar or a broad-
er basket will serve as an indicator of the postcrisis direction of currency 
use in the region.
Vehicle Currency, Financial Assets, and Trade Invoicing
The general picture of dollar dominance and minimal euro encroachment 
is reﬂected in the other, remaining international roles for currencies. 
Table 3.4 presents the shares of key currencies in the foreign exchange 
markets of Asian countries. As a vehicle currency, the dollar dominates 
foreign exchange markets in East Asia as it does globally—being on one 
side of more than 90 percent of all trades in most markets and 84.6 and 
88.3 percent of all trades in Japan and Singapore, respectively. The euro is 
exchanged in 18.7 percent of all trades in East Asia, about half the ﬁgure 
for the Japanese yen. 
Figure 3.1 presents information provided by the European Central 
Bank on the role of the euro in the outstanding stock of international bonds 
across regions. The euro has a modest share, 23.9 percent, in international 
debt securities in East Asia. Most international bonds in the region are 
denominated in dollars, which have a 60.1 percent share; the Japanese yen 
holds a 3.9 percent share (ECB 2008, table 2).
Table 3.5 presents the shares of currencies in trade invoicing in se-
lected Asian countries. In this sample, the dollar again plays the domi-
nant role. The US currency plays the least role in Japanese trade, where 
55 percent of exports and 65.7 percent of imports are invoiced in dollars, 
and the yen naturally plays a substantial role. The dollar plays the largest 
role in Indonesian trade. The euro plays a correspondingly small role, in 
the single digits in percentage terms, for all countries listed. McKinnon 
and Schnabl (2006, 19–20) also report that trade speciﬁcally among Asian 
countries other than Japan is predominantly invoiced in dollars.
The shares for the euro in nearly all of these functions are smaller 
than  Europe’s  shares  in  world  GDP,  trade,  and  capital  markets.  Table 
3.6 presents a comparison of the size of the euro area and the European 
Union relative to the United States and Japan on several measures. The 
euro area’s GDP is comparable to that of the United States, its population 
larger, and per capita income over 80 percent that of the United States. The REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES  111
size of euro area imports is comparable to that of US imports, and euro 
area exports are much larger than US exports. Among these measures, the 
euro area is substantially smaller than the United States only in the size of 
its capital markets.
The  smaller  share  of  the  euro  in  East  Asian  trade  and  ﬁnance  is 
consistent with Europe’s share in East Asia’s exports, however. Figure 
3.2 shows that the euro area is the destination of about 12 percent of the 
exports of the ASEAN+3 region and the European Union as a whole is 
the destination of about 15 percent. The dollar’s share greatly exceeds the 
US share in the region’s exports, about 17 percent, which has declined 
from 32 percent in 1986. The reversal of the relative status of Japan and 
China—with Japan falling from 28 to 8 percent and China rising from 5 to 
31 percent between the early 1980s and 2007—is the most striking message 
of this ﬁgure. 
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Asian Regionalism
Since the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–98, the members of ASEAN+3 have 
pursued a number of initiatives to strengthen regional cooperation in in-
ternational ﬁnance (see, for example, Henning 2002, Eichengreen 2002, 
Bergsten and Park 2002, de Brouwer 2004, Kuroda and Kawai 2004, Ra-
jan and Sirigar 2004, Amyx 2005, and Grimes 2006). These have included 
the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), regional bond funds, bond market ini-
tiatives, and, most recently, discussion of the collectivization of the bilat-
eral swap arrangements of the CMI. Sustained use of the dollar stands in 
marked contrast to the discourse within East Asia on regionalism and the 
desirability of “self-help mechanisms” to reduce reliance on the IMF and, 
by extension, the United States and Europe. Nonetheless, by providing a 
common point of reference for soft pegs and managed ﬂoats, the dollar 
helped to facilitate regional cooperation. Consider the role of the dollar 
and the relative absence of the euro in these regional projects. 
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17 bilateral swap agreements, which are in various states of expiration, 
renegotiation, and renewal at any one time. Although ASEAN+3 ofﬁcials 
sometimes advertise the total size to be $80 billion, eliminating double 
counting  brings  this  ﬁgure  closer  to  $55  billion.  Thirteen  of  these  are 
swaps of local currency for US dollars; four are swaps of two local curren-
cies (see also Katada 2008). The US dollar is the only non-Asian currency 
that is involved. As this paper was ﬁnalized, East Asian governments 
were discussing transforming the CMI from a network of bilateral swap 
agreements into a collectively managed pool of reserves. If they decide to 
effectively pool a portion of their reserves in this way, East Asian govern-
ments will face decisions on, among other things, the amount of reserves 
to place under collective management and which currencies to pool. Giv-
en the prominence of the dollar in their foreign exchange reserve holdings, 
exchange rate regimes, trade, and external debt, it would be surprising if 
the dollar were not their main choice of currency to pool. 
The  bond  market  initiatives  were  launched  with  the  intention  of 
capturing  the  ﬁnancial  intermediation  that  is  being  done  in  London 
and New York and of possibly creating a pan-Asian bond market. The 
accomplishments  of  these  initiatives  are  patchy,  but  if  they  are  more 
successful in the future, these projects will more likely foster the use of 
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minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s October 2008 proposal in the Financial Times 
to create an Asian bond, while obscure on some crucial details, appears to 
be a case in point (Thaksin 2008). The regional bond funds are small but 
intended to catalyze the creation of the legal and institutional infrastructure 
for bond markets. As with the bond market initiatives, the bond funds 
are more likely to promote local currencies than outside currencies as 
alternatives to the dollar as the denominator of Asian bonds.
There are, of course, several proposals for common currencies in East 
Asia or a subgroup within the region. Among the more thoughtful is Peter 
Kenen and Ellen Meade’s analysis of proposals for a common currency for 
ASEAN (Kenen and Meade 2008, 147–78; see also Choo and Wang 2002 
and Chung and Eichengreen 2007). They argue that a monetary union 
among the original six ASEAN members would probably be more sus-
tainable than one that included China and/or Japan, provided that it were 
open to membership on the part of the other ASEAN members, Taiwan, 
and perhaps Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. To make a common cur-
rency viable, such a grouping would have to not only continue to liber-
alize trade but also unify its members’ ﬁnancial markets and strengthen 
supranational  political  institutions.  Kenen  and  Meade  anticipate  that 
strengthening regional institutions will be the more difﬁcult and lengthy 
of these two hurdles. In the meantime, the region might consider the pro-
posals for common currency baskets, discussed above, in which the euro 
could be represented. But consideration of the more modest alternatives 
also includes discussion of an Asian Currency Unit (ACU) to serve as the 
numeraire of an “Asian monetary system” or as a parallel currency (see, 
for example, Kawai 2007 and Eichengreen 2007). 
All this is not to suggest that various regional projects will necessarily 
come to fruition. Rather, it is to say that, when Asians consider reducing 
dependence on the United States and the dollar, their ﬁrst preference is to 
consider alternative currencies within the region, either existing or new, 
rather than outside currencies such as the euro. The widespread expecta-
tion that Europe’s share of world GDP will decline in the coming decades, 
followed a little more gradually by the United States (Wilson and Puru-
shothaman 2003), will reinforce the temptation of ofﬁcials and private ac-
tors in Asia to bypass the euro should they pursue any long-run shift away 
from the dollar. Of course, the problem in Asia is that the attractiveness of 
the Japanese yen has diminished and the Chinese renminbi is not yet suit-
able, for a host of reasons, and not likely to be so for a decade or two (see, 
respectively, Katada 2008 and Bowles and Wang 2008).
Conclusion 
This paper surveys the respective roles of the euro and dollar in East Asia, 
ﬁnding that the dollar continues to play a strong role in the region and 116  THE EURO AT TEN
that the challenge presented by the euro remains moderate. The dollar 
pessimist view cannot be dismissed, but the evidence to date is more 
consistent with dollar optimism. To the extent that East Asian monetary 
authorities and private markets wish to shift away from the dollar, they are 
more interested in using local currencies or new regional currencies than 
in using the euro more heavily. The prospects for the euro and the dollar 
hinge on the existence and proximity of a “tipping point.” Those wishing 
to increase the euro’s role as an international currency will want such a 
point to come soon rather than after the emergence of other currencies as 
alternatives to the dollar.
Could the present ﬁnancial crisis prove to be such a historic moment 
of opportunity for the euro? As this paper was completed, the ﬁnancial cri-
sis that began in mid-2007 precipitated a deep recession in the advanced 
economies and substantially reduced the growth outlook for emerging 
markets. This crisis and the response to it could well profoundly change 
economies and government institutions but in ways that were difﬁcult to 
foresee at that juncture. As of the second half of 2008, though, the crisis 
did not seem to be providing an advantage to the euro in its competition 
against the dollar. Although the crisis had originated in the US subprime 
mortgage market, and the George W. Bush administration’s response had 
been reactive and changing, it had not become a balance-of-payments 
crisis for the United States. To the contrary, investors around the globe 
sought safe haven in US Treasury securities and the exchange value of the 
dollar surged after July 2008. Foreign monetary authorities and ﬁnancial 
institutions sought dollar liquidity, opening swap lines with the US Fed-
eral Reserve System. East Asia, along with much of the rest of the world, 
appeared to be embracing rather than rejecting the dollar at that juncture. 
The 2007–09 crisis afﬂicted Europe as well as the United States, of 
course. European efforts to rescue failing banks contained damage to the 
ﬁnancial system, but ﬁnancial regulation remained fragmented in the Eu-
ropean Union and the ﬁscal response of the member states remained at 
best loosely coordinated. On the whole, therefore, the European response 
to the crisis did not appear substantially more decisive, proactive, or stra-
tegic than the US response. The crisis made euro area membership more 
attractive to several EU member states that were not yet part of the mon-
etary union. If the economic size of the euro area grows with its member-
ship in coming years, the euro could become generally more attractive. 
But this might simply offset the effects of the expected decline in the rela-
tive size of the European economy, incomplete integration of its ﬁnan-
cial markets, and fragmented governance of the euro area (Ahearne and 
Eichengreen 2007, Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry 2007). 
If the 2007–09 crisis does not give a decisive boost to the euro, what 
other scenarios might create a “rosy future” for the international role of 
the European currency and how probable might they be? One possibility 
would be the revival of the European economy, an increase in its potential REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES  117
growth rate through structural reform and full integration of the European 
ﬁnancial and capital markets. Another possibility would be a sustained 
rise in inﬂation in the United States, undermining the dollar’s roles as a 
nominal anchor and a reliable store of private wealth. These scenarios are 
not impossible, but they do not appear to be more likely in the face of the 
recession beginning in 2008. 
The scenario that offers the best chance for the euro probably rests 
on the historically low rate of private savings in the United States, large 
ﬁscal deﬁcits, continued current account deﬁcits, accumulation of external 
debt, and a trend depreciation of the dollar. If unchecked, this pattern 
could eventually reach a tipping point. However, the crisis will probably 
raise US private savings during the recession and might be just the sort 
of transformative event that changes saving behavior over the long term 
as  well.  If  US  private  savings  were  to  increase  permanently  and  the 
federal government were to solve the long-term ﬁscal problem posed by 
entitlement spending, the tipping point could be averted or postponed 
until after currencies within Asia emerge as alternatives to both the dollar 
and the euro.
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Euro Area Neighboring Countries
GYÖRGY SZAPÁRY
This paper assesses the rising role of the euro in euro area neighboring 
countries:  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  that  joined  the 
European Union in 2004 (new member states, or NMS),
4 the Southeastern 
European  countries,
5  Russia,  and  Ukraine.  The  international  role  of 
the euro has been analyzed and discussed extensively in the academic 
literature and is also the subject of an annual review by the European 
Central Bank (ECB). Ewe-Ghee Lim (2006) reviews the relevant literature 
and discusses the factors that facilitate international currency status, such 
as the issuing country’s large economic size, its well-developed ﬁnancial 
system, its political stability, conﬁdence in its currency as a store of value, 
and network externalities. 
While the euro has clearly overtaken the European legacy currencies 
as a reserve currency, at the global level the shares of the dollar and the 
euro in international reserves have stabilized since 2003 at roughly 64 and 
27 percent, respectively. It is difﬁcult to judge whether this is some sort of 
equilibrium diversiﬁcation, since conﬁdence and perceptions can change. 
The ECB itself maintains a neutral position with regard to the role of the 
euro as an international currency: It will neither seek to promote that role 
4. Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
5. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia.
György Szapáry is a visiting professor at the Central European University, Budapest, a member of 
the Board of Directors of OTP Bank Hungary, and former deputy governor of the National Bank of 
Hungary. He is grateful for assistance and comments from Zsolt Darvas, Gergely Tardos, and former 
colleagues at the National Bank of Hungary. 
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nor do anything to counteract it (Issing 2008). History teaches us that there 
is a natural tendency to keep the incumbent global reserve currency as the 
vehicle, hence for a newcomer to seriously challenge that role is a slow 
process at best. 
At the regional level, the situation is quite different from that at the 
global  level.  If  the  economies  of  countries  neighboring  a  large  single-
currency area—such as the euro area—are strongly integrated with the 
member countries forming that area, there are powerful incentives for the 
countries on the periphery to use the single currency as vehicle and nominal 
anchor. Since the euro area plays a dominant role in the trade, capital ﬂows, 
labor movements, and ﬁnancial systems of the NMS (Darvas and Szapáry 
2008), the role of the euro as a vehicle has naturally signiﬁcantly increased 
in the NMS. In the Southeastern European countries, similar trends have 
prevailed, but the economic ties of Russia and Ukraine with the euro area 
are not as strong. 
The rising role of the euro in the region can be assessed by looking 
at exchange rate arrangements (pegging relationships and the anchoring 
role of the euro for ﬂoaters); currency composition of foreign exchange 
reserves; and the euro’s use in bank lending and deposits, in settling and 
invoicing foreign trade, and in domestic contracts. The following sections 
review each of these elements of the use of the euro. 
Exchange Rate Arrangements
Pegging Relationships
An increasing number of countries have pegged their exchange rate to 
the euro over time. Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of the exchange rate 
regimes in the euro area neighboring countries. Four of the 12 NMS—
Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia—have already joined the euro area. 
Three countries peg their currencies to the euro under currency board 
arrangements—Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania—while Latvia maintains 
a conventional peg to the euro. Among non-EU members, Croatia and 
Macedonia  peg  their  currencies  de  facto  to  the  euro  under  managed 
ﬂoating,  Bosnia-Herzegovina  pegs  its  currency  to  the  euro  under  a 
currency board arrangement, while Montenegro has unilaterally adopted 
the euro as its currency and so has Kosovo. (Macedonia and Kosovo are 
not shown in ﬁgure 3.3.) 
Thus,  all  the  countries  in  Southeastern  Europe  except  the  ﬂoaters 
Albania  and  Serbia  have  either  adopted  the  euro  as  their  domestic 
currency or pegged their currencies to the euro. This is evidence of the 
role of the euro as a nominal anchor in the euro area neighboring countries 
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The Anchoring Role of the Euro for Floaters
The euro’s rise as nominal anchor is also evident among the ﬂoaters. Figure 
3.4 shows the minimum variance basket for domestic currencies, where 
an increase in the value indicates an increase of the weight of the euro in 
the minimum variance basket and hence a greater stability vis-à-vis the 
euro than against the dollar. Among the EU-member inﬂation targeters 
(ﬁgure 3.4, panel A), the weight of the euro has signiﬁcantly increased in 
all countries. In most countries, it has taken place more or less continu-
ously since 1995. In Poland, however, it has substantially increased only 
with some lag after the removal in 2000 of the exchange rate band within 
the framework of inﬂation targeting. It seems that this action was needed 
to change the markets’ perceptions about the behavior of the zloty’s ex-
change rate, which had been mostly perceived as anchored to the dollar. In 
Romania, too, the share of the euro in the minimum variance basket of the 
lei’s exchange rate suddenly increased only in 2003. This occurred under 
managed ﬂoating and continued following the adoption of inﬂation tar-
geting in 2005. In the non-EU members, a similar development occurred 
in Albania, a ﬂoater, and in Serbia after abandonment of the exchange rate 
peg to the Deutsche mark and the introduction of the managed ﬂoating 
system in 2001 (ﬁgure 3.4, panel B). 
The Russian ruble was de facto pegged to the US dollar until 2005, but 
since then it has been managed against a basket of currencies composed 
of the dollar and the euro. Hence the weight of the euro in the minimum 
variance basket has increased (panel B). Among the countries considered, 
only the Ukrainian hryvnia has been pegged to the dollar, but following 
the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the hryvnia depreciated by about 90 percent by 
mid-December 2008.
Implications of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
The above review of exchange rate arrangements and developments clear-
ly points to the increasing role of the euro as nominal anchor not only in 
the EU member countries but also among the non-EU countries in the 
region. Among the euro peggers and managed ﬂoaters, this is a deliber-
ate choice by the authorities, which reﬂects a recognition of the close eco-
nomic ties with the euro area economy and hence a desire to use the euro 
as a stabilizing nominal anchor. In the case of ﬂoaters, the greater stability 
of their currencies against the euro is the result of market forces and re-
ﬂects the high degree of trade and ﬁnancial integration with the euro area 
and the associated perceptions. These perceptions are anchored by the fact 
that the interest rate reactions of these countries’ monetary authorities are 
inﬂuenced and tend to be guided by the steps taken by the ECB, a natural 
behavior given the close ﬁnancial integration. Euro adoption expectations 
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At this point the full impact of the current global ﬁnancial crisis on 
the economies of the euro area neighboring countries is not yet known. 
It might well bring changes in the exchange rate arrangements of some 
countries, but such changes would not diminish the anchoring role of the 
euro, since the fundamentals underpinning that role—i.e., the trade and 
ﬁnancial integration with the euro area—will not change. The expected 
timing  of  euro  adoption  might  be  altered:  delayed  in  some  countries, 
expedited in others. However, joining the euro area is not only the stated 
goal of the countries’ authorities but also an obligation under the EU 
Treaty.  Therefore,  euro  adoption  expectations  will  continue  to  guide 
market perceptions in the medium to long run. 
The choice of exchange rate regime has implications for the likely in-
ﬂation performance and indebtedness in foreign currency. With a ﬁxed 
exchange rate, the price level convergence associated with the catching-up 
process can take place only via higher inﬂation, while in the ﬂoaters, it can 
also take place via nominal appreciation of the exchange rate. In the ﬁxers, 
therefore, inﬂation will tend to be high, and while borrowing in euros is 
encouraged because of the low perceived exchange rate risks, real inter-
est rates become very low or negative, leading to rapid growth of credit 
and to large current account deﬁcits and indebtedness in foreign currency. 
This has occurred in the Baltic States and Bulgaria. In the ﬂoaters, there is 
the possibility of letting the nominal exchange rate appreciate, which can 
help to keep down the inﬂation rate and domestic interest rate, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of large borrowing in foreign currency. This has 
been the experience in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
6 The risks for the 
banking systems associated with the large share of foreign-currency bor-
rowings in some of the euro area neighboring countries in the wake of the 
current global ﬁnancial crisis are discussed below.
Currency Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Most central banks consider the currency composition of foreign exchange 
reserves as conﬁdential data, so published data for individual countries 
are  scant.  Using  information  from  the  International  Monetary  Fund’s 
database  on  the  currency  composition  of  foreign  exchange  reserves 
(COFER) reported on a voluntary basis by some 115 countries, Lim (2006) 
publishes aggregate data for the currency composition of reserves for the 
“dollar area” and the “euro area.” The latter is deﬁned as “all the European 
countries immediately surrounding EMU and countries worldwide that 
largely peg to the euro.” This, of course, does not include the euro area 
6.  Darvas  and  Szapáry  (2008)  provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  effects  of  price  level 
convergence on inﬂation, interest rates, and credit growth under different exchange rate 
regimes in the catching-up economies of the new EU member states.REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES  127
proper,  where  the  euro  is  the  domestic  currency,  but  includes  several 
African countries that peg their currencies to the euro. 
Using Lim’s data, ﬁgure 3.5 shows the share of euro in foreign ex-
change reserves for the dollar area and the “euro area” (as deﬁned above) 
during the period 1999–2005. Two observations can be made about these 
data: ﬁrst, that the share of euro reached close to 60 percent in the “euro 
area” in 2005, while it was only about 25 percent for all reporting coun-
tries; and second, that the share of euro had increased fairly rapidly dur-
ing 1999–2002 (from about 40 percent) but stagnated between 2002 and 
2005. While these data point to the increasing role of the euro in the larger 
set of “euro area” countries that these data refer to, the share of euro in 
the euro area neighboring countries that we are looking at is likely to be 
signiﬁcantly higher than the 60 percent shown in the 2005 IMF data. This 
is conﬁrmed by those few individual countries that publish data on the 
currency composition of their reserve holdings (ﬁgure 3.6). In Bulgaria 
and Lithuania, the share is over 90 percent, while in Croatia, Romania, and 
Slovakia, it is 70 to 85 percent. 
The dominance of the euro in foreign exchange reserves in Central 
and Eastern Europe is a direct result of the euro’s role as a nominal anchor, 
either through the existing pegging relationships or simply due to the   
ﬁnancial integration with the euro area. This makes the euro the currency 
of choice for intervention by the monetary authorities. Countries gener-
ally also consider the currency composition of foreign debt when deciding 
on the composition of reserves. If a country holds a relatively high share of 
debt denominated in dollars, it will tend to hold a relatively high share of 
reserves in dollars. Table 3.7 shows the currency composition of external 
debt for a selected number of countries in the region that report such data. 
In Romania, for instance, only 68 percent of the external debt is denomi-
nated in euros, which may explain why it holds only about 70 percent of 
its reserves in euros, while in Lithuania, where 99 percent of the external 
debt is denominated in euros, close to 100 percent of its reserves are held 
in euros (ﬁgure 3.6). However, Lithuania has a currency board arrange-
ment pegged to the euro, which is probably the stronger reason to hold a 
high proportion of reserves in euros, as is the case for Bulgaria, where only 
67 percent of the external debt is denominated in euros but over 90 percent 
of reserves is held in euros.
Share of the Euro in Bank Loans and Deposits
A characteristic of the countries neighboring the euro area is the large 
share of foreign-currency loans in bank lending and, though to a lesser 
extent,  the  large  share  of  foreign-currency  deposits  (ﬁgures  3.7a  and 
3.7b). The euro dominates foreign-currency loans and deposits, except in 
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loans prevail. In 2007 the share of foreign-currency loans was generally 
50 percent or more of total outstanding loans and reached 80 percent or 
more in some countries operating currency boards where the perceived 
exchange rate risk had been low (Estonia and Lithuania). In countries with 
ﬂoating exchange rates, the shares were also high: 72 percent in Albania, 
59 percent in Hungary, and 55 percent in Romania. In these countries, 
foreign-currency  borrowing  was  encouraged  by  the  positive  spreads 
between the domestic and the relevant foreign interest rates. In the Czech 
Republic, where interest rate spreads are negative, the share was only 
9 percent in 2007. Foreign-currency borrowings were facilitated by the 
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dominant role of foreign-owned banks in Central and Eastern Europe. 
With the exception of Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia, the share of foreign-
owned banks in the total assets of the banking system ranges from 60 to 
90 percent in the NMS (Darvas and Szapáry 2008, 33–34). 
Lenders and borrowers underestimated the dangers in foreign ex-
change loans, as the risks had been masked by rapid real convergence 
in the countries under consideration and the expectation that this trend 
would continue uninterrupted, increasing the salaries toward euro area 
levels and keeping the exchange rates stable or on an appreciating trend. 
However,  the  high  share  of  foreign-currency  loans  has  exposed  these 
countries to serious exchange rate risks when there is a sudden change in 
market conditions, as became evident during the current global ﬁnancial 
crisis. Since mid-2008, the exchange rates of the currencies of Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine have depreciated considerably, in 
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den of debt servicing strains the payment capabilities of the borrowers, 
particularly of households. Combined with the sharp economic down-
turns in these countries, this situation is likely to lead to an increase in 
the volume of nonperforming loans and erode the banks’ capital. In re-
sponse, banks are cutting back on their lending, further exacerbating the 
economic downturn. 
The bank bailout packages introduced in Western Europe and the 
United States help the mother banks to continue to ﬁnance their subsidiar-
ies in Central and Eastern Europe, although many of them have reduced 
the ﬂow of ﬁnancing and have shortened the maturities. The IMF’s stand-
by credit arrangement for Hungary has two funds, one for recapitalizing 
banks and the other for providing liquidity to banks that wish to take 
advantage of these facilities. All these measures are useful, but the bank-

















































Source: C@>?51=5=B@1;1=:132  THE EURO AT TEN
exposed to signiﬁcant risks due to the high volume of foreign-currency 
obligations, and the situation needs to be monitored carefully.
A main lesson from this situation is that the authorities should take 
measures to slow down the growth of foreign-currency lending, particu-
larly to the unhedged household sector. Many measures have been used 
around the world with more or less effectiveness (World Bank 2007). The 
problem with most of them is that they distort the markets and can be cir-
cumvented. The most effective would be a tax on interest payment on for-
eign-currency credit (possibly combined with higher reserve requirements 
on the banks’ foreign currency liabilities), which would effectively raise 
the cost of borrowing in foreign currency and slow its growth. This can be 
reinforced by a mandatory maximum limit on the loan-to-value ratio for 
household mortgage loans, which has been growing especially fast.
7
Role of the Euro in Settling/Invoicing Foreign Trade
Another way to assess the role of the euro is to look at the euro’s share in 
settling/invoicing foreign trade. The share of the euro in trade invoicing 
and settlement has increased over the years (ECB 2008, 42–44), and as can 
be seen from ﬁgures 3.8a and 3.8b, it is higher than the share of exports to 
and imports from the euro area, which points to the importance of euro-
denominated trade transactions with third countries. 
Using data for 2000 and 2002, Linda S. Goldberg (2005) calculates an 
optimal invoicing choice for the EU accession countries (now new member 
states) based on the observation that invoicing practices depend largely on 
macroeconomic volatility (hedging) and on the vehicle currency in goods 
that are reference priced and traded on organized competitive markets 
(herding). She concludes that some of these countries might be pricing too 
much of their trade in euros rather than in dollars and thus might be tak-
ing on excessive risks in international markets. However, the pegging re-
lationships and the increased role of the euro as a nominal anchor in these 
countries since the time to which her data refer provide compelling rea-
sons for traders to invoice in euros, as the domestic currency will tend to 
be less volatile vis-à-vis the euro than the dollar, at least in normal times. 
Role of the Euro in Domestic Contracts and Cash Holdings
A feature for which there is no readily available data is the use of the 
euro in domestic contracts in the euro area neighboring countries. It can 
be observed, however, that the euro is frequently used in contracts for 
7. The shortcomings of the existing institutional architecture in Europe to deal with the 
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renting out ofﬁce space and residential property, mostly when the renters 
are foreign companies or individuals. Hotel room rates are also typically 
tied to the euro in several countries. The motivation for such practices 
may be the same as for invoicing in euros for trade. 
Euro  cash  holdings  outside  the  euro  area  can  be  gauged  by  euro 
banknote trade ﬁgures. The ECB (2008, 51) estimates that Eastern Europe 
accounted for 37 percent of euro banknote purchases from and 24 percent 
of sales to countries outside the euro area in 2007. A survey commissioned 
by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank in 2007 revealed that the holding 
of euro banknotes varies considerably across countries and tends to be 
higher in Southeastern European countries than in Central and Eastern 
European countries. This may be a reaction to the high inﬂation experience 
of the former Yugoslavia and of some of its successor countries (Backé, 
Ritzberger-Grünwald, and Stix 2007). The relatively high euro cash holdings 
in the euro area neighboring countries are also due to the proximity of 
these countries to the euro area, which is the main business, shopping, 
and tourism destination for people traveling from these countries. There 
is also some evidence that high-denomination euro banknotes are used in 
these countries for large cash transactions in the informal economy.
The Global Financial Crisis and Prospects for  
Euro Area Enlargement
Before the current ﬁnancial crisis, it looked like the greatest challenge for 
countries hoping to adopt the euro was to satisfy the Maastricht inﬂation 
criterion. In December 2008 only Slovakia met this criterion (table 3.8). 
Inﬂation was especially high, far exceeding the criterion, in the NMS with 
ﬁxed exchange rates. While inﬂation is now abating in the NMS due to the 
sharp economic downturn, the pressures on the ﬁscal deﬁcits and govern-
ment debt due to the slowdown in growth and the rise in interest rates are 
rising. Furthermore, with the inﬂow of foreign portfolio investments that 
had previously kept the long-term interest rates low now drying up, some 
countries will also have difﬁculties in meeting the interest rate criterion. 
Indeed, among the non–euro area members, only the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia met the criterion for long-term interest rates in December 2008, 
while in July 2008, only Hungary and Romania had not met that crite-
rion. With regard to the ﬁscal deﬁcit, at least four countries will not meet 
the criterion, based on the EU Commission’s January 2009 forecast. More 
countries might fail to meet the criterion by the end of 2009. It now looks 
like satisfying the criteria for ﬁscal deﬁcit and long-term interest rate will 
be equally challenging and perhaps even more difﬁcult than meeting the 
inﬂation criterion. 
Recent events on global ﬁnancial markets have convincingly dem-
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exchange rate risks at times of ﬁnancial crisis. As a result, the authori-
ties of many NMS now want to accelerate the process of joining the euro 
area. Paradoxically, the challenges may now be more difﬁcult than they 
were before the crisis. The unambiguous lesson to be drawn from this is 
that countries should make progress toward preparing for euro adop-
tion and satisfying the Maastricht criteria in a sustainable manner during   
good times. 
Conclusion
All indicators point to the very important role of the euro as a vehicle cur-
rency and nominal anchor in the euro area neighboring countries. At this 
regional level, the role of the euro far exceeds its role at the global level. 
This is true not only for the new EU member states but also for the non-EU 
member countries in Southeastern Europe. The driving forces behind this 
rising role are the close trade and ﬁnancial integration of these countries 
with the euro area and the expectations that these countries will one day 
join the currency union, even if not all of them are members of the Euro-
pean Union yet. These considerations do not apply to Russia and Ukraine, 
although the former has included the euro next to the dollar in the cur-
rency basket against which it manages the exchange rate of the ruble. 
The close integration with the euro area also presents challenges. The 
widespread borrowing in euros or other foreign currencies at low interest 
rates by domestic residents has led to rapid growth of credit, fueling inﬂa-
tion and leading to large current account deﬁcits and exposure to foreign 
exchange risks in many countries of the region. The rapid depreciations 
of the currencies in a number of these countries in the wake of the global 
ﬁnancial crisis has brought to the fore the dangers that this situation can 
present for the domestic ﬁnancial systems. The authorities will have to 
pay more attention to this problem in the future and take effective actions 
to rein in foreign-currency lending. The current ﬁnancial crisis is not ex-
pected to alter the anchoring role of the euro in these countries, because 
the fundamentals underpinning that role will not change.
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Middle East and Oil Exporters
MOHSIN S. KHAN
The Middle East region is a US dollar zone. The euro’s role remains very 
much secondary to that of the dollar in foreign trade, holdings of reserve 
assets, and exchange rate regimes. Indeed, on the trade side the role of 
the euro is now less than that of the pre-euro European currencies. At the 
same time, however, there is considerable discussion in the region about 
reducing the dominance of the dollar and increasing the relative impor-
tance of the euro.
This paper describes the euro’s current role in the Middle East and 
North  Africa  (MENA)  region
8  and  in  the  Middle  East  oil  exporters, 
speciﬁcally the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
9 I focus on 
three main areas: the direction of imports and exports; the growth in 
ofﬁcial reserve assets; and the exchange rate regime. The discussion on 
the MENA region essentially serves as a backdrop to a more detailed 
look  at  the  GCC  countries,  which  now  represent  more  than  one-half 
of MENA’s GDP, over 60 percent of exports and over 50 percent of the 
8. MENA comprises Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen.
9. The GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates.
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region’s imports. Over the last decade or so, the economic epicenter of 
the region has clearly shifted from Eastern Mediterranean countries to 
the GCC countries; what happens in the Persian Gulf countries has an 
important bearing on what happens in the region, and because they are 
major oil exporters and large ﬁnancial investors, they also play a systemic 
role in the world economy.
10
Since the debate on the dollar versus the euro has been most active 
in the GCC, any changes in favor of the euro will have been led by the 
choices made in these countries. In fact, with the GCC Monetary Union 
planned for 2010, the choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime for 
the single currency is going to be one of the most critical decisions for 
the GCC and the MENA region. As mentioned, the paper starts with the 
MENA region as a whole and then looks more closely at the GCC coun-
tries. The ﬁnal section draws some conclusions about the future role of the 
US dollar and the euro.
Role of the Euro in MENA
Trade Patterns
Overall, US dollar transactions dominate MENA exports and imports. Al-
though MENA exports to the United States represent only about 9 percent 
of total exports, less than half of the exports going to the European Union 
(ﬁgure 3.9), it is estimated that over 60 percent of exports are denomi-
nated in US dollars for two primary reasons. First, about 70 percent of 
MENA exports are oil, which is priced in dollars in international mar-
kets. And second, exports to Asia, which in 2007 represented 44 percent of 
MENA exports, are also largely denominated in US dollars. Interestingly, 
the share of exports going to Europe has been on the decline, falling from 
26 percent in 2000 to 21 percent in 2007, while the share of exports to the 
United States has remained virtually constant. Even if oil exporters are 
excluded, the share of exports to Europe has fallen from 50 percent in 2000 
to less than 40 percent in 2007.
On the import side, the role of Europe, and therefore the euro, is much 
greater. Imports from the European Union account for the largest share of 
MENA imports (33 percent), with Asia at 30 percent and the United States 
around 8 percent (ﬁgure 3.9). But here again, as with exports, the share of 
Europe in MENA imports has fallen from 39 percent in 2000 to 33 percent 
in 2007. This decline has been mostly offset by the increase in the share 
of imports from Asia, which rose from 22 percent in 2000 to 30 percent in 
2007.
10. A useful description of the GCC by the European Central Bank is available in Sturm et 
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O cial Reserve Assets
The large current account surpluses generated by oil-exporting countries 
have dramatically increased MENA’s ofﬁcial international reserves. Gross 
ofﬁcial reserves of the region averaged about $180 billion during 2000–2004 
and rose more than fourfold to $830 billion by 2007 (ﬁgure 3.10). Despite 
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ternational reserves of MENA were well over $1 trillion by end-2008. The 
foreign assets managed by special-purpose government funds, commonly 
known as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), are not included in ofﬁcial cen-
tral bank reserves. SWFs in MENA are estimated to hold over $1 trillion.
11
The currency distribution of MENA ofﬁcial reserves is undisclosed. 
While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) does receive the currency 
composition of reserves from some MENA central banks, it publishes the 
data only in aggregate form. Anecdotal evidence suggests that while euro 
holdings are growing, particularly in the oil exporters, the bulk of ofﬁcial 
reserve assets are held in US dollar ﬁnancial assets.
Exchange Rate Regimes
Virtually all MENA countries maintain a pegged exchange rate regime, 
with the exception of Algeria, Sudan, and Tunisia. Twelve countries are 
pegged to the US dollar, four are pegged to a basket, and three operate a 
managed ﬂoat (ﬁgure 3.11). However, two of those countries that classify 
11. Accurate ﬁgures on the assets of SWFs, in particular the larger ones in MENA, such as 
the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), are 
difﬁcult to obtain as they are not made publicly available. A variety of unofﬁcial estimates 
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themselves as managed ﬂoaters—Algeria and Tunisia—operate as if they 
were pegged to a basket.
In the countries that are pegged to a basket, the euro has a higher weight 
than the US dollar in North Africa. For example, in Morocco the relative 
weights are 80 percent euro and 20 percent US dollar; in Tunisia the euro 
has a weight of 55 percent and the dollar 45 percent. This is not surprising 
because North African countries, and particularly Morocco and Tunisia, 
have close historical trade links with Europe. Algeria’s basket is made up 
of 60 percent dollar and 40 percent euro, basically in line with exports and 
imports. Libya and Syria are pegged to special drawing rights (SDR), in 
which the US dollar has a 45 percent weight and the euro 29 percent. 
Overall, therefore, MENA countries currently maintain a peg to the 
US dollar, although there is growing interest in some of them to move to 
a basket peg. Any move to peg to a basket will undoubtedly lead to a sig-
niﬁcantly greater role for the euro, particularly if the basket is constructed 
using trade shares. On the export side, aside from the fact that oil is priced 
in US dollars, the euro would have a weight of about 20 to 25 percent. Us-
ing imports gives the euro about a 30 to 35 percent share in the basket.
Oil Exporters’ Perspectives
The MENA region has 11 oil exporters, of which the GCC is the largest 
as a group.
12 It is primarily in the six GCC countries that there has been a 
very active discussion on diversifying away from the US dollar and hav-
ing the euro take on a greater role in foreign asset holdings and exchange 
rate policy.
13
The GCC was established in May 1981 with the explicit aim of forging 
closer ties and stronger links among the six member states.
14 A few months 
later (in November 1981) member states signed an agreement to establish 
the GCC Free Trade Area and outlined the steps for closer economic co-
operation. On December 31, 2001, the GCC members agreed to a revised 
economic agreement to advance economic integration and lead to a com-
mon market by 2008 and a monetary union by 2010.
The GCC is a relatively homogeneous group of countries, sharing a 
common cultural and political history,
15 and are mainly exporters of oil, 
12. Other large oil producers in MENA include Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. In Syria oil 
production is declining rapidly.
13. As mentioned in the previous section, Algeria and Libya are pegged to a basket that includes 
the euro. Iraq has a managed ﬂoating regime, although de facto it is a crawling peg. Iran’s 
diversiﬁcation away from the US dollar has been dictated by political factors and sanctions.
14. Initially, Iraq was also involved in the discussions to establish the GCC but in the end 
decided not to join.
15. Edmund O’Sullivan (2008) has a very extensive discussion of the history of the Gulf 144  THE EURO AT TEN
gas, and reﬁned products. They jointly account for over 40 percent of global 
oil reserves and 23 percent of natural gas reserves. Oil and gas production 
contributes over half of total GDP and three-quarters of total exports and 
government revenues. The combined GDP of the GCC countries in 2008 
was over $1 trillion, and they have an average per capita income of $25,000, 
making them the wealthiest group in the developing world.
Much progress has been made toward the goal of a full-ﬂedged GCC 
Monetary Union.
16 GCC countries have virtually unrestricted intraregion-
al mobility of goods, national labor, and capital and full convertibility; 
regulations and supervision of the banking sectors are being gradually 
harmonized. The GCC common market was established in January 2008 
and provides GCC citizens equal treatment in all economic activities. All 
members (except Kuwait since May 2007) have pegged their currencies to 
the US dollar since 2003, and a common external tariff was introduced that 
same year. Although the GCC currencies were de facto pegged to the US 
dollar for decades,
17 a single GCC currency is expected to encourage trade 
and ﬁnancial integration and facilitate foreign direct investment.
International interest in the GCC has been increasing recently mainly 
because of the dramatic rise in oil prices since 2004. This led to larger 
current  account  surpluses  and  a  massive  build-up  of  foreign  assets. 
Maintaining a peg to the US dollar started to be questioned on grounds 
that it was contributing to global imbalances. The GCC (and, of course, 
China) were running large current account surpluses, while the United 
States was experiencing large current account deﬁcits. For example, the 
current account surplus of GCC countries rose from $88 billion in 2004 to 
$200 billion in 2007 (and nearly $300 billion in 2008), and ofﬁcial foreign 
reserves (excluding foreign assets held by SWFs) reached $420 billion. 
Therefore, to reduce global imbalances, the GCC current account surpluses 
needed to be reduced, and changing the exchange rate was considered one 
solution. The GCC countries were urged to abandon the US dollar in favor 
of a more ﬂexible regime—either a basket peg or managed ﬂoating.
18 An 
appreciation of the currency against the US dollar would increase imports 
(exports would not be affected since oil is priced in US dollars), thereby 
reducing the current account surplus.
states. Marcus Noland and Howard Pack (2007) cover some of the Gulf countries in their 
study of the Arab economies.
16. Willem Buiter (2008) questions whether the political requirements for the GCC Monetary 
Union are met. The political commitment, however, appears ﬁrm.
17. During 1980–2002, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
were pegged with bands to the SDR but de facto pegged to the US dollar. Oman was pegged 
to the US dollar and Kuwait to an undisclosed basket.
18. Maintaining the US dollar peg but changing the parity (i.e., a revaluation) was also 
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With  the  recent  drop  in  oil  prices  and  the  appreciation  of  the  US 
dollar, calls for changing the GCC exchange rate regimes to correct global 
imbalances have died down. But the general question still remains—should 
the GCC countries continue pegging to the US dollar or move to another 
regime such as pegging to a basket, which would naturally include the 
euro, or even managed ﬂoating? While for now, the member states, except 
Kuwait, have stated their commitment to the dollar peg, they have also 
stated that all options are open for the single currency when the GCC 
Monetary Union is established in 2010.
19
Following the analysis in the previous section on MENA, I now turn 
to GCC trade patterns, the currency composition of reserve assets, and 
then address the main question of the exchange rate regime.
Trade Patterns
The GCC economies have traditionally been very open to international 
trade in goods and services (and labor). As ﬁgure 3.12 shows, Asia has the 
largest share of GCC exports (58 percent in 2007), with the United States 
and the European Union accounting for around 9 percent each. However, 
since oil is priced in US dollars, even the exports to the European Union 
are denominated in US dollars. On the import side, the European Union 
accounts for about 31 percent, so the rest of the imports are priced in US 
dollars. As in the case of MENA, it is worth noting that the share of imports 
19. The Kuwait government has stated that it is committed to joining the monetary union. 
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coming from the European Union has been declining—from 34 percent in 
2000 to the current 31 percent. The share of the United States has also 
been declining while that of Asia has been growing steadily. Intra-GCC 
trade has been low, reﬂecting the dominant role of oil in these economies, 
but with economic diversiﬁcation increasing, trade among them has been 
rising, albeit from a very low base.
O cial Reserve Assets
The spectacular rise in oil prices from 2004 to mid-2008 led to large cur-
rent account surpluses in the GCC and a corresponding increase in ofﬁcial 
foreign exchange reserves. The cumulated current account balance of the 
GCC from 2003 through 2007 amounted to about $725 billion (and is esti-
mated to be over $1 trillion at end-2008). Ofﬁcial reserves of the GCC coun-
tries, which hold over half of MENA reserves, rose to $420 billion in 2007 
(ﬁgure 3.13). Most of these reserves are held in US dollar ﬁnancial assets. 
In 2007 the US dollar share was over 90 percent (see, for example, Setser 
and Ziemba 2008). Two arguments have been made to justify the holding 
of over 90 percent of GCC reserves in US dollars. First, the peg with the US 
dollar makes the United States an obvious destination for investing. Sec-
ond, and related to the ﬁrst point, US ﬁnancial markets are able to handle 
very large volumes of foreign inﬂows without much trouble.
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holdings.
20 At present, there is no ofﬁcial information on the total value, 
distribution, or currency composition of their assets. Since there are no 
accurate  numbers  on  holdings  of  SWFs,  trying  to  obtain  the  currency 
composition of their assets is a somewhat futile task. It is quite likely that 
the US dollar share is lower than for ofﬁcial reserves and the euro share 
correspondingly higher because of the long-term nature of SWF assets. 
But SWFs also have a lot of foreign direct investment in the MENA region. 
In most cases, their investments and the returns on those investments are 
in US dollars. All in all, how much they hold in US dollars or in euros 
is almost impossible to say, although anecdotal evidence—mainly press 
reports—suggests  that  the  share  of  US  dollar-denominated  assets  far 
exceeds euro-denominated ﬁnancial assets in their portfolios. Brad Setser 
and Rachel Ziemba (2008) assume that about 50 percent are in US dollars, 
largely on the basis of press reports that the Kuwait Investment Authority’s 
(KIA) dollar assets are around 40 percent of its total ﬁnancial assets.
21
Exchange Rate Regimes
GCC member countries ofﬁcially pegged their currencies to the US dol-
lar on January 1, 2003, as an explicit step toward monetary integration. 
Although at that time the countries (except Kuwait) were already pegged 
to the US dollar, the decision was based on the expectation that the dollar 
peg would maintain stability and strengthen conﬁdence in the economies, 
and the countries would go into the monetary union at those parities. As 
such,  GCC  countries  have  pursued  macroeconomic  policies  consistent 
with ﬁxed rates to the US dollar. The ﬂexible factor markets in these coun-
tries, particularly the labor market, have helped them in this regard. Also, 
GCC members have accumulated large foreign exchange reserves, sup-
porting the credibility of the peg and discouraging speculation against 
their currencies.
By and large a good case can be made for the GCC countries pegging 
to the dollar. Macroeconomic conditions in the GCC have been stable for 
the last two decades, even during periods of dollar ﬂuctuations, and over 
time the cyclical synchronicity between the GCC and the United States has 
been increasing, despite the apparent divergence in 2008. The peg to the 
US dollar has helped the region avoid nominal shocks from geopolitical 
20. An international working group of sovereign wealth funds—comprising 26 countries, 
including some from the GCC—has reached agreement on a draft set of voluntary, generally 
accepted principles and practices (GAPP) that reﬂects the current practices of SWFs or actions 
to which they aspire. The GAPP is intended to guide the conduct of investment practices 
of SWFs, including revealing more information on the legal framework, governance and 
institutional structures, risk management, and investment policies.
21. Neither the KIA nor the Kuwait government has veriﬁed this estimate of the share of 
US dollar assets, which appears to be on the low side.148  THE EURO AT TEN
events feeding into the economy. These geopolitical risks are likely to 
continue, placing a premium on the US dollar peg.
The dollar peg provides a well-understood and credible anchor for 
monetary policy (Abed, Erbas, and Guerami 2003). The peg has clearly 
anchored inﬂationary expectations at low levels and provides certainty 
about future exchange rate movements. For example, notwhithstanding 
the jump in inﬂation in 2007–08 in the GCC, forward markets continue to 
reﬂect conﬁdence in the dollar peg. The peg is obviously easy to admin-
ister and does not require the institutions necessary for implementing an 
independent monetary policy. Such institutions would need to be built, 
become effective, and establish credibility. Also, since the monetary trans-
mission mechanism is weak in the GCC countries, given the absence of 
developed domestic capital markets, the shallowness of credit markets, 
and the limited effectiveness of interest rates, a peg seems to be the only 
realistic option as a monetary policy anchor.
The exchange rate peg simpliﬁes trade and ﬁnancial transactions, ac-
counting, and business planning, as well as monetary coordination among 
the member countries. Exchange rate risk can be easily hedged, even in 
the absence of a well-developed domestic private forward exchange mar-
ket, as agents can work through US dollar markets. With cross rates ﬁxed, 
intra-GCC transactions beneﬁt as traders and investors do not have to 
take on any exchange rate risk, thereby encouraging further integration of 
the individual GCC economies. Absent developed ﬁnancial markets, and 
particularly forward markets in which to hedge, the central banks would 
have to provide forward cover, as is the case in most developing countries 
with ﬂexible exchange rates.
Labor-market  ﬂexibility  can  support  international  competitiveness 
under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. GCC countries face a relatively elas-
tic supply of labor (mostly unskilled) from low-income countries in the 
Middle East and South Asia. Non-nationals make up some two-thirds of 
employment in the GCC members. These countries have been applying 
the policy of nationalization of the labor force in a very ﬂexible manner, to 
avoid labor shortages and minimize output disruptions.
Major oil exporters generally prefer pegged exchange rates. Of the 
26 countries whose oil exports account for over 50 percent of their total 
exports, 18 (including the GCC countries) have conventional ﬁxed pegs. 
Even some countries that are classiﬁed as managed ﬂoaters (for example, 
Algeria and Kazakhstan) keep the volatility of their exchange rates within 
a tight band, making them appear akin to peggers. This implies that in 
countries  with  foreign  exchange  coming  primarily  from  the  dominant 
export commodity, and subject to considerable price volatility, it is more 
difﬁcult to operate a free foreign exchange market, particularly if the insti-
tutions to support it are not well developed.
22
22. This is one of the main reasons that Jeffrey Frankel and Ayako Saiki (2002) argue for REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES  149
Of course, the dollar peg has a number of disadvantages too. First, it 
imports US monetary policy, which may at times not be appropriate for 
local needs.
23 With an open capital account, the dollar peg requires the 
GCC countries to follow US interest rate policy, which has the potential 
to result in policies unsuited to their business cycles.
24 If the divergences 
between business cycles are likely to be temporary, policy tools other than 
interest rates or exchange rates would have to be used to inﬂuence domestic 
activity. In particular, ﬁscal policy would bear the burden of controlling 
aggregate demand, and to a lesser extent quantitative credit controls (for 
example, loan-to-deposit ratios) and tighter prudential regulations would 
need to be used to curb credit expansion. The peg also means that GCC 
countries cannot defend against imported inﬂation, although in the long 
run, higher inﬂation in trading partners would be offset by depreciation 
of  their  currencies  against  the  US  dollar.  Furthermore,  the  peg  forces 
adjustment of the real exchange rate to a new equilibrium to go through 
prices rather than the nominal exchange rate. Adjustment through prices is 
slower than through the exchange rate and may trigger price-wage spirals, 
generate low real interest rates, and increase the risk of asset bubbles as 
investors move into real estate and equity markets.
25
Even if pegging is an appropriate choice for GCC countries, pegging 
to the US dollar is not the only option. Adopting a basket peg may be a 
useful way to introduce some ﬂexibility in the exchange rate. The example 
of Kuwait is a case in point. In May 2007 Kuwait abandoned the peg to the 
US dollar in favor of a peg to a currency basket, reverting to the exchange 
rate system that existed prior to January 2003.
26 With a basket peg, the 
main anchor properties of an exchange rate peg could be retained but at 
the same time gaining some adaptability to the adverse swings among the 
values of the major reserve currencies. For example, with oil priced in US 
dollars, volatility in the price of oil is reﬂected, under a dollar peg, directly 
in volatility in oil export receipts. Under, say, an SDR peg the volatility 
of oil export receipts would have been much less in the past few years. 
pegging the currency to the export price of the main export commodity for small open 
economies that are relatively specialized in the production and export of a particular mineral 
or agricultural commodity.
23. Setser (2007) has made this argument. But this can happen with a basket peg as well. For 
example, in the case of an SDR peg, the monetary policy needs of the GCC may be different 
from the monetary policy stances of the United States, Europe, and Japan.
24. For example, US monetary policy of low interest rates in 2007–08 was at odds with the 
booming GCC economies, as was the US policy of high interest rates in the late 1990s when 
oil prices and growth in the GCC were low.
25. Such bubbles have been evident in all the GCC countries over the past few years.
26. While the basket is undisclosed, the currency weights in the new basket were initially 
estimated to be: 50 percent US dollar, 40 percent euro, and 10 percent pound sterling. It 
appears now that the weight of the US dollar is much higher in the basket.150  THE EURO AT TEN
The volatility of the nominal effective rate would be reduced, beneﬁting 
foreign trade, investment, and balance sheet stability. In the short run, a 
basket peg can help contain imported inﬂation by shielding the currency 
against cross-rate movements among the major currencies.
But at the same time, basket pegs reduce the informational beneﬁts 
of  maintaining  constant  one  bilateral  exchange  rate  relevant  for  price 
comparisons and economic transactions. Also, they are less transparent 
and more difﬁcult to explain to the public. And they tend to be less cred-
ible than single-currency pegs, especially if the currency weights are not 
known or are changed over time.
27 A failure to disclose the relative weights 
and composition of the currencies used in the basket could complicate the 
assessment of exchange rate risk and lead to undesirable consequences. 
In Kuwait, for example, the basket was undisclosed and its adoption led 
to a strong demand for the dinar, large capital inﬂows, and an increase 
in liquidity. This speculation complicated monetary policy management 
rather than simplifying it as was hoped.
More  generally,  pegging  to  a  basket  of  currencies  does  not  buy  a 
country  monetary  independence.  Under  capital  convertibility,  interest 
rates would likewise have to follow a “basket” of interest rates. This will 
reduce somewhat the problems arising from extreme desynchronization 
between the monetary policy needs in the GCC and the United States, 
but in quantitative terms the gain is not likely to be that much. Take, for 
example, the case of Saudi Arabia illustrated in ﬁgure 3.14. Suppose that 
instead of being pegged to the US dollar, the Saudi riyal had been pegged 
to the SDR and the domestic interest rate had mirrored the SDR interest 
rate. During 2006, the Saudi rate would have been about 100 to 150 basis 
points lower and in 2008, about 50 to 100 basis points higher. Whether 
such small changes would have a signiﬁcant impact on aggregate demand 
and inﬂation is questionable.
Under a basket regime, the central bank would have to actively manage 
foreign exchange operations and risk. The relatively low levels of ﬁnancial 
intermediation and lack of available ﬁnancial instruments would limit the 
scope of these operations (Roger, Restrepo, and Garcia 2008). And pegging 
to a basket would not fully address the management of oil price volatility 
or the rise in liquidity from increases in oil prices. A basket that included 
the price of oil, as has sometimes been suggested, would respond to the 
relatively higher volatility of oil prices (by the weight given to the oil price 
in the basket). This could have serious adverse effects on other sectors of the 
economy. For example, higher oil prices would lead to a real appreciation, 
which would raise the cost of other exports and dampen diversiﬁcation 
efforts—the classic “Dutch disease” problem. It is also unclear that a fall 
27. The effect is minimized in the case of pegging to the SDR, where the composition and 
weights of the currencies that make up the basket are public knowledge. But the SDR are not 
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in oil prices would depreciate the currency sufﬁciently to accommodate 
the adverse terms-of-trade change and stabilize export earnings. Also, one 
can argue that oil itself is an international currency. So for the GCC, as a 
major oil-exporting bloc, pegging to the price of oil would be like pegging 
the nominal (ﬁat) currencies to their own (commodity) currency. It would 
obviously not anchor the GCC countries’ currencies to something truly 
exogenous.
Looking Ahead
The euro will likely become more prominent in the MENA region as trade 
with Europe increases and reserves are correspondingly shifted into euro-
denominated assets. However, judging by history, this process will be 
slow, and it is difﬁcult to see the euro overtaking the US dollar anytime 
soon. In the North African countries—Morocco and Tunisia—it has, but 
this example is unlikely to be replicated in the region. MENA will remain 
for the time being largely a dollar zone. The currencies will generally re-
main pegged, but not necessarily just to the US dollar. While switching 
completely to pegging to the euro is not really in the cards, except again 
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weight, the move to a basket in which the euro has a signiﬁcant weight is 
a more likely possibility.
Since the GCC countries are such important players in the region, a 
more pertinent question is what they will or should do. If pegging is an 
optimal strategy for the GCC countries, especially since managed ﬂoating 
is neither a viable nor a desirable option, what should they peg to? As long 
as oil continues to be priced in US dollars, switching to a euro peg is sim-
ply not going to happen. For the time being, on balance, maintaining the 
dollar peg is the right exchange rate policy for the GCC countries.
What about the future, and particularly when the GCC Monetary 
Union is established, still slated for 2010? What should be the exchange 
regime for the single currency? GCC governments have stated often that 
they intend to stay with the US dollar for now, and the choice of exchange 
rate arrangements under the planned monetary union has not been made. 
The choice comes down basically to keeping the dollar peg regime, perhaps 
with a change in parity if necessary, or pegging to a basket in which the US 
dollar would have a relatively high weight, followed by the euro.
28
The familiarity of GCC governments, central banks, and private eco-
nomic agents with the US dollar peg, as well as the preference of the GCC 
countries to date for a ﬁxed exchange rate, argue in favor of maintaining 
the current arrangement even after the monetary union comes into being. 
In fact, in 2003 GCC member countries opted to ﬁx their bilateral parities 
and to peg their currencies to the US dollar in the run-up to the GCC Mon-
etary Union in 2010 precisely to beneﬁt from the greater certainty about 
the parities at which they would enter the monetary union. Keeping the 
single GCC currency pegged to the US dollar for some time would leave 
the public and policymakers on already very familiar ground.
On  the  other  hand,  with  increasing  integration  in  international 
trade, services, and asset markets, the GCC countries can be more prone 
to external shocks, and a higher degree of exchange rate ﬂexibility may 
become more desirable in the medium term to ensure external stability and 
international competitiveness. In particular, as oil reserves are depleted 
in some member countries, such as Bahrain and Oman, and the nonoil 
tradable sectors expand, the private sector will need to be competitive to 
function as the main source of employment opportunities for the rapidly 
growing national labor forces. Furthermore, policies aimed at increasing 
participation rates by nationals in GCC labor markets will erode over 
time the partial insulation ﬂexible labor markets have provided to the peg 
regime.
All in all, there are strong arguments in favor of the GCC countries 
retaining the ﬁxed exchange rate regime. The dollar peg seems to be the 
best option leading up to, and also in the short run after, the establishment 
28. For an extensive discussion of the choice of exchange rate regime for the GCC Monetary 
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of the monetary union. In the future, ﬂexibility could be introduced by 
implementing a basket peg, following the example of Kuwait and other 
major oil exporters like Algeria and Libya. While capable of dampening 
volatility from swings among the major currencies, and avoiding mon-
etary policy from being tied exclusively to the United States, a basket peg 
would not eliminate the effects of imported inﬂation nor would it allow 
the GCC countries to operate an independent monetary policy.
If a basket peg regime is chosen, what should the basket look like? 
Pegging to the SDR is one option. Another option could be a basket con-
sisting only of the US dollar and the euro. Such a basket has many advan-
tages. First, it would be simple to interpret. Second, it would cover the 
bulk of transactions in goods, services, and ﬁnancial instruments (now in 
the dollar and euro area). Third, it would reduce monetary dependence of 
the GCC on the US Federal Reserve. And ﬁnally, it would allow for the use 
of dollar or euro hedging instruments to efﬁciently manage ﬁnancial risks. 
A move to such a basket would help ensure the role of the euro as it would 
encourage trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows between the GCC and Europe. 
To sum up:
  MENA and the GCC are dollar zones; while the use of the euro is grow-
ing, it is not yet posing any competition to the US dollar.
  GCC countries should remain pegged to the US dollar for now and 
even after adopting a single currency following the establishment of 
the GCC Monetary Union in 2010.
  If increased ﬂexibility of the exchange rate turns out to be necessary or 
desirable in the future, pegging to a basket is more appropriate than 
managed ﬂoating.
  A basket consisting of the US dollar and the euro, with publicly an-
nounced weights, would be a good option since it would be relevant 
for most trade and ﬁnancial transactions; using such a basket would 
undoubtedly enhance the role of the euro in the Middle East region.
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Over the ﬁrst ten years of its existence, the euro has proved to be more 
than a powerful symbol of collective identity. It has proven its global im-
portance both as a medium of exchange and as a store of value. However, 
its importance as a unit of account and as an anchor for pegging local cur-
rencies is yet to be established. The emergence of an internationally used 
currency is a very slow process. During the last decade, the euro’s interna-
tional role has grown gradually but steadily, which is related to the central 
role of the euro area in the global economy and international trade. 
In fact, the euro meets a number of criteria to function as a key inter-
national currency, including its use in one of the world’s largest economic 
entities, supported by a monetary authority committed to price stability 
and the emergence of euro-denominated ﬁnancial instruments. Accord-
ing to the European Central Bank (ECB 2008), the most prominent driver 
of the international role of the euro remains the geographical, economic, 
ﬁnancial, and institutional proximity to the euro area. 
The euro has become the second most important international cur-
rency after the US dollar if global foreign exchange markets are included. 
According to the ECB, the share of the euro in international loans and de-
posits, merchandise trade, and global foreign exchange markets is very 
signiﬁcant. In addition, the share of the euro in bond issuing and its use 
in international reserves is just as impressive. The euro accounted for 26.5 
percent of the global ofﬁcial reserves in 2007, according to International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) data. Another example of the euro as an interna-
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tional currency is the fact that, according to the Bank for International 
Settlements,  banks  have  been  signiﬁcantly  increasing  their  issuance  of 
euro-denominated debt.
In Latin America, the use of the euro is growing despite inertia and 
the dollar’s incumbency advantages. Moreover, the main variables that 
determine the international use of a currency—economic size, signiﬁcance 
of foreign trade ﬂows, ﬁnancial-market development, and the degree of 
price and exchange rate stability—indicate that the euro has potential 
to become more prominent as an international currency used by Latin 
American countries.
Euro’s Role in Latin American Trade and Investment
From a regional perspective, the US dollar is the most used reference cur-
rency. Nevertheless, the growing weight of economic and commercial ties 
between Latin America and Europe is having a direct impact on the use of 
the euro, as well as on the overall economic performance of the region. 
Although  the  United  States  is  still  the  region’s  major  commercial 
partner, Latin American countries are strengthening their ties with other 
regions, including the European Union. The euro area is an important 
commercial partner of Latin America and an important source of borrow-
ing and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region.
The role of the euro as a price-setting and invoicing currency in Latin 
America depends on international practices for invoicing and settlement 
of foreign trade. Commodities are traded mainly in US dollars. Change 
will be slow due to the high degree of standardization of the markets. For 
noncommodity exports, the level of competition in the market for a prod-
uct should be taken into account. Nevertheless, as trade between Europe 
and Latin America grows, so will the use of the euro in trade invoicing 
and settlement.
Latin America’s imports from the European Union increased from   
45 billion euros in 2003 to 78 billion euros in 2007. Exports to the European 
Union continue to climb, rising from 40 billion euros in 2003 to 80 billion 
euros in 2007. Figure 3.15 shows EU shares in percent.
Among  selected  Latin  American  countries,  the  average  share  of 
trade ﬂow with the euro area is about 13 percent of the total ﬂow. If one 
excludes Mexico, this share goes up to 18 percent (table 3.9). Brazil is the 
major commercial partner of the euro area, being the biggest importer in 
relative terms and the second-largest exporter after Chile. Mexico directs 
a comparatively small part of its exports to euro area countries. While 
the share of euro area imports is higher in the bigger Latin American 
economies, the share of exports to euro area countries is higher in the 
smaller economies. These ﬁgures show there is room for improvement in 
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According  to  the  latest  data  from  the  Economic  Commission  for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2008), in 2007 global FDI ﬂows 
reached US$1.8 trillion, with Latin America and the Caribbean receiving 
7 percent of these global ﬂows. Latin America’s largest FDI recipients in 
2007 were Brazil, which received US$34.5 billion, Mexico (US$23.2 billion), 
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The euro area has been a very important source of borrowing and FDI 
to Latin American countries. For these countries, there is a clear beneﬁt 
from access to EU markets and from EU investments. Closer ties with the 
European Union are beneﬁcial because they are a useful diversiﬁcation. 
Many European companies operate either on their own or in joint ven-
tures in Latin America. In particular, the presence of European banks in 
the region has increased considerably.
According to the latest data from the European Commission (2008), 
EU outward FDI stocks increased over the 2002–06 period by 42 percent 
and by 11 percent between 2005 and 2006. The geographical distribution 
of EU FDI outﬂows in 2006 also shows the American continent as the main 
destination with a share of 55 percent.
EU FDI outﬂows to Latin America averaged 12 billion euros during 
the 2002–06 period. The year 2004 saw a surge in EU FDI ﬂows to Latin 
America, reaching an unprecedented level of 20 billion euros, but then 
falling to 12 billion euros in 2005 and 2006. 
In the last decades, the outward investment ﬂows generated by Latin 
American ﬁrms have increased as a result of their intensiﬁed international 
expansion efforts. Direct investment from the South and Central Ameri-
can countries in the European Union accounted for 12.5 percent of the 
global investment there in 2006 (table 3.10).
From 2001 to 2008, euro area countries were the source of an average 
of 21.5 percent of total external borrowing and about 44.6 percent of FDI 
inﬂows to Brazil (ﬁgure 3.16). However, the share of Brazilian FDI direct-
ed to the euro area is small, well below the share of other important areas. 
From 2007 to July 2008, Brazil’s direct investment in the euro area reached 
7.7 percent of total Brazilian direct investment abroad, approximately half 
of the Latin American average of 15 percent.
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Euro in Latin American External Assets and Liabilities
With respect to the euro’s share in international debt markets, net issuance 
of euro-denominated debt securities, according to the narrow measure, 
increased from the equivalent of US$261.8 billion in 2004 to US$340 billion 
in 2007, based on data from the ECB (2008). In the third quarter of 2008, net 
issuance of euro-denominated bonds and notes reached US$464 billion.
It is well known that countries have to decide their own levels, com-
position, and maturity structure of foreign debt. In general, the currency 
composition of foreign debt should be related to the composition of earn-
ings from foreign trade. Agnes Bénassy-Quéré, Lionel Fontagne, and Am-
ina Lahreche-Revil (1999) argue that the question that should be asked is 
what would be the optimum anchor basket that would make it possible to 
minimize the losses arising from ﬂuctuations between international cur-
rencies, given a geographic structure of foreign trade and a borrowing 
structure inherited from past decisions. Thus, as trade between Europe 
and Latin America grows, euro-denominated debt may account for a larg-
er share of Latin America’s total foreign debt. Table 3.11 shows current 
share of euro-denominated debt in selected Latin American countries.
In  recent  years,  the  amount  of  international  bond  issues  in  Latin 
America has increased. However, the average size of euro-denominated 
issues is still smaller than that of US dollar-denominated issues. None-
theless, the share of euro-denominated issues in total sovereign external 
bonds is signiﬁcant, with Argentina and Mexico representing the highest 
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The external debt of Latin American countries is issued mainly in the 
US dollar. These countries are little exposed to the euro, as less than 10 
percent of the regional debt on average is denominated in euros. How-
ever, the share of the euro in the structure of external bonds may increase 
with more international borrowing instruments denominated in euros.
On the asset side, the currency composition of foreign exchange re-
serves depends on several factors such as market liquidity, country’s ex-
change rate regime, diversiﬁcation strategies, and matching trade partners. 
Exchange rate volatility could lead as well to portfolio shifts both into and 
out of a currency. The policies and credibility of the ECB have an impor-
tant inﬂuence on the euro’s international value and its use in international 
price setting and as anchor for monetary and exchange rate policies.
A recent ECB study and data from the IMF suggest that the share 
of the euro in global foreign exchange reserves has reached 26.5 percent 
(table 3.13). The share has gradually increased over the years but recently 
stabilized.
The magnitude of the euro’s use as a reserve of value currency by 
#'(2+3		     E:75*+453/4'9+*+=9+74'2*+(9/48+2+)9+*'9/43+7/)'4
)5:497/+8



































#(% 9<<:/2?4REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES  161
Latin American countries is not so clear. According to the ECB, developing 
countries have relatively more international reserves in euros than the 
global average, but the overall composition of Latin American countries’ 
reserves remains largely unknown. Only three countries in the region 
make public the currency allocation of their international reserves: Chile, 
Peru, and Uruguay. Chile’s case is worth noticing since almost one-quarter 
of its reserves is invested in euro-denominated assets. In July 2008, the 
Brazilian government introduced a bill in congress proposing the creation 
of a sovereign wealth fund. The proposal’s two main features are funding 
by budget resources (not involving use of international reserves under 
Banco Central do Brasil management) and investing in both external and 
internal ﬁnancial assets. The fund when implemented will probably have 
different benchmarks from those of international reserves. On currency 
composition,  a  new  scenario  should  arise  in  the  Brazilian  case  for 
international sovereign assets as a whole, favoring the euro.
Euro as a Peg
The US dollar still keeps its place as the world’s preferred currency for 
pegging and exchange rate arrangements. This is mostly because the use 
of a currency as anchor is linked with issues such as trade and ﬁnancial 
integration level. Most of the countries that have some arrangement with 
the euro also have historical or geographical relationships with the euro 
area. In this sense, no Latin American economies currently have any kind 
of exchange rate arrangements using the euro as a peg (ﬁgure 3.17).
The choice of the exchange rate regime is very important for the mon-
etary policy of a country. It involves the implementation and monitoring 
of instruments to maintain the stability of the currency value and, simulta-
neously, keep enough ﬂexibility in order to absorb external shocks. Nowa-
days, many factors contribute to the search for alternatives for exchange 
rate regimes, notably larger ﬁnancial-market integration and growth of 
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international trade. One of the alternatives is monetary integration, and 
the symbol of this mechanism is the European continent’s adoption of a 
single currency.
Conclusion
Despite the increase in trade and ﬁnancial linkages between Latin Amer-
ica and the euro area during the last decade, Latin America’s strongest 
relationship is still with the US dollar. It is also important to note that in 
the past decade new players have emerged in the global economy. Thus, 
these linkages have diversiﬁed as a result of the growing importance of 
trade between Latin America and Asia and of national policies favoring 
intraregional trade agreements.
The rise of the euro is a unique, outstanding event and is an unparalleled 
model  for  Latin  American  countries’  monetary  integration  ambitions. 
The  European  Payments  Union  inspired  the  creation  in  the  1960s  of 
the Convênio de Pagamentos e Créditos Recíprocos (CCR), a regional 
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the aegis of the Latin American Integration Association. More recently, 
the central banks of Argentina and Brazil put in place on October 3, 2008, 
the Payment System on Local Currency (SML). This system allows the 
invoicing and settlement of exports by each country in its own currency. 
Both systems can continue to beneﬁt from European lessons on monetary 
integration.
On interregional cooperation, the Strategic Partnership between the 
European Union and Brazil is an example of how the two continents can 
work together. The partnership was established at the ﬁrst EU-Brazil Sum-
mit in July 2007. It constitutes a political commitment of the European 
Union and Brazil to engage in political, regional, economic, and social de-
velopments. The next step toward improved commercial and ﬁnancial ties 
clearly seems to be to close an agreement between the European Union 
and the Mercosur already under discussion. 
Given the current economic scenario, the dollar’s dominance does not 
seem to be threatened, but there is room for a larger role for the euro as 
now it does not reﬂect the strength of the economic ties between the two 
regions. In this sense, the performance of the European economy will be 
a key factor. 
In a nutshell, the Latin American commercial and ﬁnancial relation-
ship with euro area countries seems to be much more signiﬁcant than the 
relationship with the euro itself. The euro is an alternative currency for 
Latin America and is both instrumental and essential to increase invest-
ment ﬂows to the region. The importance of the euro for Latin America 
will depend on the intensiﬁcation of trade and ﬁnancial links between 
Latin America and the euro area and on the global economic structure that 
will emerge after the current global ﬁnancial crisis is resolved.
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During the 10 years of its existence, the euro has turned into a resounding 
success. Price stability, deﬁned by the European Central Bank (ECB) as 
inﬂation of “less than but close to 2 percent” over the medium term, 
was largely maintained, and increasing ﬁnancial integration promoted 
economic integration and supported economic growth. Between 1999 and 
2008, euro area GDP growth averaged a little more than 2 percent per 
year compared with just about 1  percent in 1992–98. Success at home 
was accompanied by success abroad. Over the years, the euro has gained 
in importance in international securities markets and as an international 
reserve currency. Somewhat surprisingly, the present ﬁnancial crisis seems 
to have even added to the attractiveness of the euro as many countries 
have come to see the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as a shield 
against  the  economic  damage  caused  by  the  plunge  in  conﬁdence  in 
stand-alone ﬁnancial systems and currencies of smaller countries. Thus, 
several EU accession countries have raised early EMU entry in their list of 
economic policy priorities, and previously EMU-skeptical long-time EU 
member countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, appear to be warming 
up to the euro.
However,  it  would  be  misleading  to  simply  extrapolate  into  the 
future the success of the euro during its ﬁrst decade. Looking ahead, the 
euro is likely to face at least two important challenges: real economic 
adjustment within the euro area and maintenance of ﬁscal and ﬁnancial 
stability without a central ﬁscal authority. Hence, while the euro enjoyed a 
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happy childhood during the last 10 years, it may well turn into a troubled 
teenager,  suffering  from  considerable  stress  and  perhaps  even  from 
existential crises.
Euro’s Happy Childhood
The economic literature has identiﬁed a number of characteristics that a 
currency needs to play an important role at the global level.
29 Prominent 
among those features are (1) the issuing country’s share in world output 
and trade; (2) macroeconomic and price stability in the issuing country; 
(3) the size, state of development, depth, and regulatory framework of 
ﬁnancial markets there; and (4) network externalities. The euro has ben-
eﬁted from all these factors. As table 3.14 shows, in 2007 the euro area was 
the largest economy in the world after the United States (when GDP is 
converted into common currency using purchasing power parities); it was 
the largest global trader (measured as share of exports in world exports) 
and had lower inﬂation and a lower government budget deﬁcit than the 
United States (indicating a high degree of macroeconomic stability). As 
a result of this and the increasingly heavy use of the euro in neighboring 
countries, users of the European common currency seem to beneﬁt from 
substantial positive network externalities (although the US dollar is still 
likely to offer even more of these externalities given its greater use in Asia 
and Latin America).
Reﬂecting the economic size of the euro area, deepening European ﬁ-
nancial integration, and the heavy use of the euro internationally, the sizes 
of euro-denominated money market instruments, securities, and cross-
border bank liabilities all have increased signiﬁcantly and even overtaken 
the respective sizes of US dollar instruments since the introduction of the 
common European currency (ﬁgures 3.18 to 3.20).
Moreover, the euro also gained in attractiveness as a store of value for 
ofﬁcial international reserve holders. However, as ﬁgures 3.21 and 3.22 
show, despite the rise of the euro in the portfolios of both industrial- and 
developing-country central banks, the US dollar’s dominant position as 
the preeminent international ofﬁcial reserve currency has so far remained 
unchallenged. Similarly, the US dollar has remained the most important 
international medium of exchange, as evidenced by its share in the cash 
foreign exchange market (ﬁgure 3.23) and in foreign exchange derivatives 
(ﬁgure 3.24).
At the same time, however, the euro has exerted a stronger inﬂuence 
on other currencies than the Deutsche mark did when it was the second 
most  important  international  currency.  This  can  be  see  in  ﬁgure  3.25, 
29. See, for instance, G. Galati and P. Woolridge, The Euro as a Reserve Currency: A Challenge 
to the Pre-eminence of the US Dollar? BIS Working Paper 218, October 2006. Basel: Bank for 
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which gives the coefﬁcients of regressions of the dollar exchange rate of a 
currency on the dollar-mark and dollar-euro exchange rates, respectively, 
before and after the introduction of the euro. A coefﬁcient of one indicates 
that the respective currency moves entirely with the Deutsche mark or 
euro while a coefﬁcient of zero suggests that the currency moves com-
pletely independently from the exchange rate of the Deutsche mark or the 
euro. The ﬁgure plots the coefﬁcients of the regressions for the Deutsche 
mark on the horizontal axis and those of the regressions for the euro on 
the vertical axis. Points in the diagram that lie exactly on the 45 degree 
line imply that there was no change in the coefﬁcients from the period 
before to that after the introduction of the euro. Most coefﬁcients moved 
north of the 45 degree line, suggesting that regression coefﬁcients—and 
hence the euro’s inﬂuence on exchange rate movements of these curren-
cies against the US dollar—increased with the introduction of the com-
mon European currency. 
	 )*'$))#
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Euro Weathers the Financial Crisis
Skeptics have argued that the lack of a strong political component in the 
EMU would prevent effective supervision and regulation of the euro area 
ﬁnancial sector and make the sharing of the costs from ﬁnancial crises dif-
ﬁcult if not impossible. Hence, ﬁnancial stability has been seen at severe 
risk in the euro area during ﬁnancial crises. However, the events so far 
during the present ﬁnancial crisis have proven the skeptics wrong.
At the national level, regulation and supervision of the ﬁnancial sec-
tor in euro area countries were found to have been no worse than in other 
key countries, including the United States, and in some cases much better 
(e.g., Spain, where the central bank helped to prevent murky practices of 
putting business off-balance sheet and forced banks to build their reserves 
anticyclically). Moreover, governments have shown that they were able to 
handle failures of banks with large cross-border activities. Perhaps more 
importantly, euro area (and EU) governments quickly found a common 
approach to dealing with the banking crisis (giving guarantees for bank 
debt and providing funds for the recapitalization of banks), even though 
schemes were implemented on a national level. The ECB and the Europe-
an Commission have played an important role in bringing governments 
together in a cooperative approach to resolve the crisis.
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euro turned into a shield especially for smaller EMU member countries 
against currency and capital-market turbulences triggered by the ﬁnancial 
crisis. The relative tranquility in euro area ﬁnancial markets contrasted 
sharply with the severe difﬁculties experienced by other smaller European 
countries, most spectacularly by Iceland, where the entire banking sector 
defaulted, but even by generally very stable countries, such as Denmark, 
which had to defend its currency through interest rate increases. Against 
the background of this experience, euro skeptics in several EU countries 
outside the EMU are having second thoughts about EMU entry, and a 
number of new EU member countries in Central Europe have intensiﬁed 
efforts to bring forward their eventual EMU membership.
Euro’s Future as a Teenager
The euro’s happy childhood between 1999 and 2009 is likely to be fol-
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life, existential crises during this phase cannot be excluded. Key challeng-
es for the euro include real economic adjustment within the euro area and 
the maintenance of ﬁscal and ﬁnancial stability without a central ﬁscal 
authority.
In the ﬁrst decade of its existence, the euro area beneﬁted from low 
inﬂation and falling interest rates, ﬁrst as a result of the convergence of 
national rates to the low level of Germany and then on the back of global 
rate reductions in the wake of the bursting of the dotcom bubble. The low 
level of interest rates stimulated demand ﬁnanced by credit. As a result, 
real estate prices, construction investment, and private household con-
sumption grew strongly, especially in those countries where interest rates 
reached lows never seen before. Divergence in house price developments 
played an important role in divergence in economic growth. As ﬁgure 
3.26 shows, house prices in all major countries except Germany (and all 
smaller countries) rose substantially in real terms during the ﬁrst 10 years 
of the EMU. Against this, prices stayed weak in Germany after the burst-
ing of the uniﬁcation house price bubble in the mid-1990s. The difference 
in house price developments exerted a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on domestic 
demand growth. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 3.27, which plots real house 
price changes in a number of euro area countries between 1998 and 2006 
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An unhealthy “division of labor” developed, where some EMU coun-
tries borrowed heavily to consume and invest while a few others, notably 
Germany, produced to satisfy the foreign demand. Thus, the international 
current account imbalances that developed during the last decade at the 
global level were mirrored by similar imbalances within the EMU. In 2007 
Germany recorded a current account surplus of 7.6 percent of GDP, or 183 
billion euros (ﬁgure 3.28). With the euro area running a surplus of 36 bil-
lion euros, this implies an aggregate deﬁcit of other EMU member coun-
tries of 147 billion euros, or 2.3 percent of GDP. Within this group, some 
countries had very large and unsustainable deﬁcits (notably Greece with 
14.1 percent of GDP, Spain with 10.1 percent, Portugal with 9.8 percent, 
and Ireland with 5 percent). 
Reﬂecting divergent developments of domestic demand through the 
ﬁrst decade of the EMU, large differences in unit labor cost—and hence 
relative external competitiveness—developed. By the third quarter of 2008 
unit labor costs in Germany and France stood at about 13 and 11 percent, 
respectively, below their levels at the beginning of the EMU. Against this, 
unit labor costs in Spain and Italy stood at 44 and 23 percent, respectively, 
above the starting levels (ﬁgure 3.29).
As risk aversion in ﬁnancial markets increased in the course of the 
credit crisis, sovereign credit spreads of EMU deﬁcit countries widened 
relative to Germany, making the funding of large current account posi-
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need to bring their current account balances to more sustainable levels to 
avoid excessive risk premia on both public and private debt or even fund-
ing crises. This requires both reducing domestic expenditure and allocat-
ing resources from the nontraded to the traded goods sector.
The downturn in housing markets in Spain, Greece, Ireland, and sev-
eral other EMU member countries with large current account deﬁcits will 
certainly dampen domestic demand growth. However, in order to avoid 
an excessive increase in unemployment due to layoffs in the nontraded 
goods sector, competitiveness of the traded goods sector needs to increase. 
Without the ability to devalue the exchange rate, this has to be achieved by 
nominal cost reduction.
After having joined the EMU at a relatively high real exchange rate, 
Germany managed to do just this during the ﬁrst decade of the currency 
union  (see  ﬁgure  3.29).  But  whether  the  countries  presently  suffering 
from a lack of competitiveness are able to follow the German example 
is an open question. Before the EMU, these countries normally recouped 
lost competitiveness through nominal exchange rate devaluations. It will 
require a profound institutional and cultural change to enable them to 
bring their relative costs down without the help of devaluations. Moreover, 
to allow them to adjust successfully, the surplus countries, and notably 
Germany, have to be prepared to let their costs and prices rise at a faster 
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the higher the cost and price inﬂation required in the surplus countries to 
make adjustment possible. But deﬂationary pressures in deﬁcit countries 
and  inﬂationary  pressures  in  surplus  countries  may  cause  popular 
dissatisfaction with the workings of the EMU in both country groups. 
Although a break-up of the EMU remains very unlikely, given the huge 
political costs of such an event, political tensions among EMU member 
governments and between governments and the ECB are likely to rise as 
all parties involved struggle to ﬁnd a feasible adjustment path to more 
sustainable internal current account balances.
30
The other challenge for the euro in coming years is maintaining ﬁscal 
and ﬁnancial stability without a central government authority. Before the 
EMU, many economists—including some who later held senior positions 
at the ECB—argued that a monetary union without a political union is a 
risky undertaking. How could ﬁscal policy discipline be maintained and 
ﬁnancial stability ensured when there was no central government author-
ity supporting the central bank’s stability policy in a consistent way? The 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)—an agreement establishing constraints 
for government budget deﬁcits and debt—was developed to give part of 
the answer. The other part relating to ﬁnancial stability was given in the 
course of the ﬁnancial crisis in the form of close and successful coopera-
tion of national governments in crisis management. Yet, despite these ef-
forts, questions on how to secure ﬁscal and ﬁnancial stability on a lasting 
basis remain.
The present recession is testing governments’ resolve to respect the 
(already mellowed) rules of the SGP. According to this pact, only coun-
tries with sufﬁcient room for ﬁscal policy maneuver ought to take ﬁscal 
policy measures to support growth. However, pressure on the rules of the 
pact is mounting. Germany, a country with fairly sound government ﬁ-
nances, a large current account surplus, and therefore some room for ﬁscal 
policy maneuver, has shown limited appetite for a ﬁscal stimulus to boost 
growth. In the view of German authorities, the additional debt incurred 
as a result of ﬁscal expansion will fall on future German taxpayers, while 
other EMU members, due to signiﬁcant spillover effects of a ﬁscal expan-
sion in Germany, would beneﬁt from it. Without a major German ﬁscal im-
pulse they could beneﬁt from, other countries with much less solid public 
30. Scenarios for a breakup of the EMU, which were popular in the ﬁrst few years of the 
euro’s  existence,  have  made  a  comeback  with  the  ﬁnancial  crisis.  Sufﬁce  it  to  say  that 
leaving the EMU is a bad option for a country seeking a weaker currency to boost growth 
in the short term. Its debt would be denominated in an appreciating foreign currency, and 
it would be entirely at the mercy of international capital markets, which would probably 
impose a hefty default premium on this debt. Things would be easier if a country wanting a 
stronger currency left the EMU: Its debt would be denominated in a falling foreign currency. 
However, the exchange rate appreciation would pose a serious threat to its competitiveness 
and growth. This and the political costs of leaving the EMU would most likely be more than 
enough to deter any EMU participant from seriously considering exit.178  THE EURO AT TEN
ﬁnances and hence little room for ﬁscal policy maneuver, such as Italy, are 
mulling signiﬁcant ﬁscal policy measures to support growth.
At the same time, the ﬁnancial crisis has revealed some defects in the 
arrangements for ﬁnancial stability in the EMU. Initially, banking and 
ﬁnancial-market supervision was left in national hands. Over time, and 
certainly with the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, cooperation among national 
supervisors and between them and the European System of Central Banks 
intensiﬁed. The crisis management has been praised widely and indeed 
with some justiﬁcation. But an Achilles’ heel remains in the arrangements 
due to the lack of a central ﬁscal authority. To appreciate this, consider 
the question of how the national authorities of a smaller euro area coun-
try could cope with bank failures that exceed the authorities’ capacity to 
mobilize funds for a public rescue. According to its statutes, the ECB must 
not “bail out” any EMU member government. But what if such a gov-
ernment would be overwhelmed by the costs of bank failures within its 
jurisdiction? Would the ECB accept the bonds issued by this country to 
support its banks as collateral when they are submitted for repurchase by 
the very same banks that urgently need the funds? Would other countries 
regard such an operation as monetization of government debt by the ECB 
and block the transaction, possibly causing the default of the distressed 
government?
A move toward joint issuance of government bonds by EMU mem-
ber countries would make these questions irrelevant. Bonds issued this 
way would be backed by the ﬁnancial standing of all EMU governments 
combined (and eventually, of course, also by the ECB, which is an agency 
of these governments), like traditional sovereign issues. Joint issuance 
of government debt would also establish a common sovereign euro area 
bond market, which many international investors in the euro would most 
likely ﬁnd much more attractive than the present smaller national bond 
markets. But would countries with a high credit rating (e.g., Germany) 
be willing to dilute their rating by issuing debt jointly with governments 
with weaker ratings? This and the earlier questions reveal gaps in an EMU 
that is not backed by political union, gaps that may introduce a risk pre-
mium on the euro as an international reserve currency, which does not 
apply to the US dollar.
Conclusion
In its ﬁrst decade of existence, the euro has been an impressive success. 
However, challenges are likely to arise during the next decade. First, the 
present ﬁnancial crisis and economic recession are likely to mark a struc-
tural break for the development of ﬁnance and credit-driven growth not 
only at the global level but also for the euro area. But while adjustment to 
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national current account imbalances can be facilitated by exchange rate 
changes at the global level, this is not possible within the euro area. There, 
adjustment in the deﬁcit countries needs to be engineered through expen-
diture reduction and relative cost deﬂation. This is likely to be very pain-
ful and may test the resolve of politicians to maintain the EMU as a hard 
currency area (or even the EMU itself). 
Second, the recession and ﬁnancial crisis are threatening ﬁscal and 
ﬁnancial stability in a currency union without a central political authority. 
Fiscal discipline is likely to come under pressure as the recession deep-
ens, and ﬁnancial stability may be threatened when smaller or weaker 
euro area governments are overwhelmed by the cost of the ﬁnancial crisis. 
As a result, markets are beginning to differentiate more clearly among 
government and ﬁnancial debt of individual EMU countries. Differentia-
tion will be reinforced in the future when more EU member countries join 
the euro—as seems now increasingly likely—and economic divergence 
among EMU countries will increase further. While a widening of bond 
yield spreads among EMU member countries may be welcomed by those 
who thought that the earlier narrowing would undermine ﬁscal policy dis-
cipline, it is also a step toward reducing the ﬁnancial integration achieved 
during the last decade. 
The implications for the international role of the euro are mixed. On 
the one hand, as the EMU expands, the euro’s role as an anchor and in-
ternational transaction currency will grow. On the other hand, the role 
of the euro as a store of wealth for global investors may be undermined 
by the lack of an integrated euro area ﬁnancial system and market. Com-
pared with the US dollar, the euro may come to look like a king without 
a country. Perhaps it was not entirely coincidental that the euro weak-
ened against the dollar as the ﬁnancial crisis deepened. It may well have 
reminded investors that history has not been too kind to kings without 
countries.4
Is the Present Crisis the Moment 
for the Euro’s Global Emergence?
A Panel Discussion with Antonio  
de Lecea, Leszek Balcerowicz,  
C. Fred Bergsten, Erkki Liikanen,  
and Lawrence H. Summers
ANTONIO DE LECEA
Antonio  de  Lecea  Flores  de  Lemus  has  been  director  for  international  affairs  in  the  European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs since November 2004. Leszek 
Balcerowicz, former deputy prime minister and minister of ﬁnance of Poland and former president of 
the National Bank of Poland, is a professor of economics at the Warsaw School of Economics. C. Fred 
Bergsten has been director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics since its creation 
in 1981. Erkki Liikanen, former ﬁnance minister of Finland (1987–90), has been the governor and 
chairman of the Board of the Bank of Finland since July 12, 2004. Lawrence H. Summers, US secretary 
of the treasury from 1999 to 2000, is the director of the National Economic Council. He was the 27th 
president of Harvard University (2001–06) and the Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Political Economy 
there. Until January 2009, he was the Charles W. Eliot University Professor at Harvard University.
I  am  somewhat  uncomfortable  with  the  title  or  the  main  question  of 
this panel. It has two implicit assumptions that I ﬁnd questionable. The 
ﬁrst one concerns the reference to global emergence, which needs some 
explanation.  The  euro  has  already  acquired  an  international  currency 
status and therefore, in my opinion, it is inappropriate to refer to a possible 
future global emergence of the euro when it is already the second largest 
currency in the world.
The  second  issue  is  the  link  between  the  current  crisis  and  the 
future  of  the  euro-dollar  balance  because  the  underlying  assumption 
seems to be that there can be only one dominant international currency. 
This assumption is based partly on history and partly on the concept of 
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network  externalities. Again,  network  externalities  may  play  a  role  in 
some functions of international currency but not all of them. They may 
play a role for the currency as a unit of account and as a vehicle currency 
but not so much as a currency of investment (including foreign exchange 
reserves) because there are other considerations, as put forward by other 
speakers, particularly that of currency diversiﬁcation.
If we look at one of the main determinants of the use of a currency 
as an international currency—size of capital markets—we ﬁnd that capi-
tal markets in the European Union match the size of those in the United 
States. It is true that the composition differs. Equity capitalization is half 
that of the United States, but EU capital markets have been catching up in 
terms of efﬁciency, liquidity, and breadth. Therefore, rather than having 
a single dominant currency in the global monetary system, we can have 
two—I mean a bipolar system—and there may be room for more than two 
in the future.
This takes me back to the second issue: the relevance of the current 
crisis to bring about a bipolar monetary system. In a bipolar world, I do 
not think a single crisis will determine the shift or the tipping one way or 
another; change will probably be incremental. Crises are certainly destabi-
lizing but are unlikely to shift from one currency to the other.
Having said that, what will be the impact of the current crisis on the 
role of the euro? Until now, the idea of crisis triggering a possible shift 
from one currency to another was based on a very different type of cri-
sis, that resulting from disorderly unwinding of global current account 
imbalances. The argument went like this: The adjustment of current ac-
counts would involve the depreciation of the dollar, which would expose 
the dilemma of countries holding a large amount of dollar-denominated 
reserves. By moving out of the dollar, they would stem their own evalu-
ation losses. But eventually, they might lose conﬁdence in the dollar and 
trigger its decline.
The current crisis started off as an adjustment to an imbalance but a 
different imbalance—reversal of the housing boom in the United States—
and this is the only similarity. Since the crisis started, ﬁnancial contagion, 
uncertainty about the allocation of the losses stemming from those bad 
assets, and the loss of trust have been the trigger.
And once contagion has spread, it does not matter whether the crisis 
originated on this side or the other side of the Atlantic. The original idea 
that the euro area ﬁnancial sector might be immune to this crisis, unfor-
tunately, did not prevail. Therefore, I would claim that the current crisis 
will not tilt the balance of power in one or the other direction. And even if 
the ﬁnancial industry experiences profound transformations as a result of 
this crisis, the relative attractiveness of the ﬁnancial markets in the United 
States and the euro will not dramatically change as a consequence of this 
crisis. The response of policymakers to this crisis and to other challenges 
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Provided  no  massive  policy  mistakes  are  made  on  either  side  of 
the Atlantic, this crisis will not have a signiﬁcant impact on the relative 
international status of the dollar or the euro. 
LESZEK BALCEROWICZ
Before I address the relative role of the euro, let me comment on the present 
situation. I will skip the most difﬁcult question of crisis resolution and 
mention what seems to be absent from today’s discussion: the diagnosis 
and long-term lessons.
There is a tendency to discuss the reasons for the present crisis in terms 
of insufﬁcient or wrong regulations and errors of speciﬁc institutions. These 
are very important reasons but probably only partial and approximate. 
The underlying reason is the excessive growth of credit in some countries, 
especially the United States. The faster credit grows, the more errors you 
accumulate, sooner or later leading to asset bubbles, which will eventually 
burst.
I belong to the group that thinks one should look at macroeconomic 
policies, especially monetary policy in the United States. This brings us 
a lesson for the future. To what extent should future monetary policy of 
the Federal Reserve—because, to some extent, the Fed dictates monetary 
policy to the world—consider asset price developments? This issue is 
highly disputed, but we cannot avoid its discussion. In fact, the discussion 
has already started.
The argument that you cannot ﬁne-tune asset price developments is 
not sufﬁcient to reject the general case that monetary policy should, at a 
minimum, not contribute to asset bubbles. So this is the ﬁrst point.
On the second point, I have participated in many heated debates about 
global imbalances. And the question was how it was going to end, soft 
landing or hard landing? We are in a ﬁnancial crisis that has no connection 
to the previous discussion about global policy imbalances. Perhaps we 
are witnessing an unhappy ending to the previous discussion on global 
imbalances. And perhaps we should bring some of those issues to the 
debates about the present ﬁnancial crisis. Some very interesting issues 
have  not  been  sufﬁciently  discussed.  What  were  the  interconnections 
between the so-called global saving graph and excessive soft monetary 
policy? What were the dynamics of these two factors?
I agree with my predecessors that the most likely outcome of the 
present crisis, however it ends, would be neutral for the respective global 
roles of the euro and the dollar. One should not rush to the conclusion that 
the euro is going to beneﬁt because the world is interconnected. Besides, 
the euro area’s own economies are not as ﬂexible as that of the United 
States. In the long run, certain factors prevent the euro from becoming   184  THE EURO AT TEN
a  more  important  global  currency,  including  faster  rate  of  long-term 
growth and greater political cohesion in the United States than in the 
European Union.
C. FRED BERGSTEN
The dollar has been the world’s dominant currency for about a century for 
a simple reason: It had no competition. No other economy was anywhere 
near the size of the American economy. No ﬁnancial markets underlying any 
currency were anywhere near the size of the US ﬁnancial markets. Through 
bad times and good for the US economy, the dollar was dominant.
This was true even in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the United 
States ran three consecutive years of double-digit inﬂation; interest rates 
went to 20 percent plus; and we had the deepest recession since the 1930s. 
The dollar lost a little market share in that period but not much because 
there was no competition. The Deutsche mark was the closest competitor, 
and it never achieved a market share more than about one-quarter that of 
the dollar, mirroring the fact that the West German economy was about 
one-fourth the size of the US economy and, as Helmut Schmidt always 
reminded us, West Germany was “the size of Oregon, so don’t expect us 
to play a global role.”
All that changed with the advent of the euro because now we do have 
a currency based on an economy as large as or larger than the United 
States and ﬁnancial markets that, while not equal in every respect even 
prior to the crisis, are certainly a competitor and are superior on some 
metrics. So the whole international competitive position for global cur-
rency status changed with the creation of the euro. 
However, it is unlikely that the euro will seamlessly ascend to an 
equivalent role to the dollar for another simple reason that comes out of 
the study of the history of global currencies: inertia and incumbency ad-
vantages. We do not have very many observations to study this topic, but 
the history of the pound sterling suggests that incumbency advantages 
and inertia are very important. Sterling retained a major international role 
for more than 50 years beyond any conceivable notion that the United 
Kingdom was a major world economy, let alone the dominant world econ-
omy that it was when sterling ﬁrst achieved its global dominance when it 
had no real competitor a century earlier.
So the crucial question is whether the inertia and incumbency advan-
tages will be overcome by some signiﬁcant event that would permit the 
newly eligible international currency, the euro, to move up alongside the 
dollar. In short, the United States has to make a mistake. The incumbent 
has to mess up badly when there is a competitor in place for the situation 
to change.
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Later, productivity growth was very slow. But there was no competitor. 
Now there is a competitor, and so the immediate question, to link to the 
short term, is whether the current crisis originating in the United States is 
going to represent the mistake that would open the door for the competi-
tor to ascend to a more or less equivalent position.
There are two responses to the question if one wants to conclude that 
this will not change it very much. One is that the United States could re-
coup rapidly. Yes, there is a crisis but the United States responds quickly 
and successfully. Recovering from the crisis in a sufﬁciently effective way 
not to lose global credibility, reputation, conﬁdence, and the like has hap-
pened quickly, but we do not know yet if it has happened successfully.
The other possible savior from a dollar standpoint is that the Europe-
ans do as badly as, or worse than, the United States in responding to the 
crisis. As Leszek Balcerowicz suggested, there would then be no net effect 
at all. I think the honest answer is we cannot know yet.
The interesting point is that the United States and Europe must co-
operate to get the world out of the crisis. The issuers of the two key cur-
rencies have got to intensively cooperate to enable the world to come out 
of the problem. But at the same time, within that cooperation, there is in-
herently some competition because whichever one does better, whichever 
one resolves its own problems more successfully, whichever one comes 
out of the current difﬁculties more rapidly, will produce some important 
inferences about what the long-term market reaction is going to be to 
“euro versus dollar” and whether this situation will bring about the his-
toric change required for a global currency relationship to change in the 
way it did in the past when the dollar replaced sterling, and now, when at 
least the potential exists for the euro not to replace the dollar but to move 
up alongside it into a true bipolar monetary system.
The other interesting question from the US standpoint is whether the 
ascendance of the euro to a more or less equivalent position would be a 
good or bad thing. Adam Posen earlier implied that it would be a bad 
thing. He noted that if Taiwan or Korea or some big dollar holder ever 
thought about moving off the dollar, the National Security Council guy 
would be out there to tell them to hold on. That might well be an accurate 
prediction, and we certainly saw it in the case of Saudi Arabia from time to 
time over the years. But the question is whether that is right and whether 
the United States should resist or welcome the advent of the euro as a 
more or less equivalent currency.
The United States must obviously do everything it can to restore the 
strength and stability for the dollar in terms of its own economy and in 
terms of the world economy as well. But the key currency role is more 
ambiguous from a US standpoint. In the short term, it is great to ﬁnance 
those big imbalances and live beyond your means as long as you can. But, 
as Leszek just said, that set of imbalances and persistent overvaluation 
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that kept interest rates low and enabled the United States to live beyond 
its means, which at least in signiﬁcant part is an underlying cause of the 
current crisis.
I believe it would be healthy for the United States to move to a bipolar 
monetary system where there is competition. We all believe in competition 
in goods markets, ﬁnancial markets, indeed practically all markets, so why 
not on the international currency front as well? History shows that you 
can run bipolar monetary systems (and Barry Eichengreen’s recent work 
has reafﬁrmed that). There is no reason why the United States and Europe 
could not cooperate effectively to manage a bipolar monetary system. The 
competition it would promote might be a healthy element as we reﬂect 
on the causes of the current crisis and how to avoid them in the future. It 
might be a healthy element in reducing the prospect that we have to go 
through this dreary cycle again, having more bubbles that are bound to 
burst, and trying to keep the United States as well as others from living 
too far beyond their means.
ERKKI LIIKANEN
The European Central Bank (ECB) decided on October 8, 2008 to participate 
in a coordinated rate cut and later the same day decided to implement a 
new monetary policy. We should have announced the two simultaneously, 
but the rate cut decision was a coordinated one and the implementation 
decision only our own. Euro area banks will, henceforth, be able to get 
liquidity to the full amount of their bids at our policy rate. This is a major 
change in liquidity policy.
On the international role of the euro, Fred said that he sees the possi-
bility of a bipolar world here. I am quite agnostic on this issue. I think we, 
as European central bankers, should not promote the euro and that the 
euro’s international role should rather reﬂect the economic development 
of the euro area.
Although we are in the middle of the storm in the United States, after 
it is over, I expect the dollar to remain the safe haven or the last resort. I 
do not know whether Adam Posen’s point is correct that this is a nation-
al security issue for the United States, because I am not in that business. 
Actually, my country is more known for peace and reconciliation. Martti 
Ahtisaari has got the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize, and I use this opportunity 
to pay tribute to him.
What are the critical issues for the international role of the euro? I 
think they are the size and dynamism of the European economy, ﬁnancial-
market development, and supervision of our evolving ﬁnancial markets.
First, regarding the European economy, the critical issue is how we can 
promote growth, implement structural reforms, and increase competition 
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tives, are implemented, there will be more growth, more productivity, and 
more dynamism. And there will be more interest in investing in European 
equity markets, this return chasing element, which was mentioned earlier. 
So that is the ﬁrst and most critical issue.
Second  is  ﬁnancial-market  development.  The  European  ﬁnancial 
markets  have  advanced  quite  a  bit  but  are  still  not  ready.  We  need 
deeper,  more  integrated,  and  more  liquid  ﬁnancial  markets.  The  ECB 
has  contributed  to  that  development  by  trying  to  create  a  uniform 
infrastructure for securities settlement in Europe. It sounds very technical, 
but the key issue in securities markets is that across-the-border transactions 
in Europe are expensive, about four to seven times more expensive than 
similar US securities transactions. To unblock that bottleneck we need to 
have common infrastructures and more competition. So when European 
ﬁnancial markets become deeper and more liquid, and the assets made 
available to investors are also developed, I am sure the role of the euro will 
also become stronger internationally.
The third challenge is how to efﬁciently supervise these ﬁnancial mar-
kets. André Sapir spoke about it at this conference. I think that these past 
months have taught us well that liquidity and solvency are twins. If you 
have trouble in liquidity, you may later have a problem with solvency. For 
that reason, I am a proponent of the position that supervision should be 
close to central banking but independent. And countries where they are 
in the same infrastructure, even though independent, have acted rather 
quickly.
Of course, we have a particular challenge because the European Union 
has 27 countries and the euro area has 15. The solution must be such that 
the basis is national supervision, which operates within national borders. 
But home- and host-country supervisors must cooperate if the bank be-
ing looked at is systemically important in more than one country. And for 
those truly European players—we may have 10 or 15 of these—we need to 
go even further in the future. They should have one supervisory counter-
party at the European level. We cannot, in the long term, imagine that one 
of your major banks will have to operate with 25 different administrative 
practices in as many countries. Some of these issues are actually under 
consideration in the European Union because the European Commission 
has made proposals on how to move forward. We just need to use this op-
portunity to get it right.
Finally, on ﬁnancial crises, Kenneth Rogoff and others wrote a paper 
some time ago about the ﬁve big crises. That was the ﬁrst time I heard 
that Finland, Sweden, and Norway are big countries because these three 
had crises in the late 1980s and early 1990s. All the current issues are 
well documented in our literature on the last crisis. In order to get out 
of the problem, we need solutions for bank recapitalization and equity, 
“bad banks” need more time to realize bad assets, and we need bank 
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Some people ask why we are not dealing with the current problem at 
the European level. When I served at the European Commission with Sir 
Leon Brittan, I was the commissioner for the budget. The ceiling for the 
EU budget is 1.275 percent of the total GDP of EU countries. It is small 
but still extremely controversial. Margaret Thatcher became famous when 
she wanted “her money back” from that small budget. So, there are no 
ﬁnancial resources to solve this with the EU budget. 
Second, if you need to put in taxpayers’ money to save a bank, it is 
difﬁcult to justify to the electorate across national borders. The taxpayers 
must know that it is targeted at the territory for which they are liable. For 
that reason, I do not expect that the EU budget is the solution for injecting 
equity or granting guarantees. 
But the question of harmonizing practices remains. The best way to 
do this would be to deﬁne basic criteria for action beforehand and have 
all countries follow the same rules. It has not happened quite this way, 
but we are not terribly far. The EU scheme has three elements: guarantees, 
recapitalization, and takeover provisions. We have all more or less signed 
on to the so-called British plan. But in the European Union, member states 
must submit all these measures to the European Commission for scrutiny 
because we have strict rules on state aid. Sir Leon Brittan was running that 
area. State aid rules allow the Commission to prohibit any state aid that 
distorts competition within the EU market. So there is no precise ex ante 
harmonization of rescue operations but ex post.
To conclude, I cannot imagine meeting this crisis with independent 
currencies in Europe. I was in Brussels in the 1990s when huge tensions 
broke out between the European currencies. People could not accept that 
15 to 20 percent changes in exchange rate could take place overnight. Re-
gardless of what people think about the European project, there is wide 
agreement today that the Economic and Monetary Union, the euro, has 
been a major pillar of stability in our economy. 
LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS
Old habits die hard, so let me begin by remarking that a strong dollar is in 
the interest of the United States. My view is that the United States is best 
served by not conceptualizing itself as in competition with the euro. If the 
United States runs its economy and manages its currency well, life will 
work out okay, and in general, I do not favor a US strategy of seeking to 
assert with great force the primacy of the dollar. So in that sense, I agree 
with Fred.
Where I have difﬁculty with his argument is the notion that the United 
States should actively encourage currency competition so as to discipline 
itself, which reminds me of a particularly exotic doctrine in automobile 
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their interest to drive much slower and there would be fewer automobile 
accidents.
This notion has a certain logic to it but is not usually accepted. In 
the same way, to seek to create a situation where we will do damage to 
ourselves by doing the wrong thing and, therefore, we will do the right 
thing seems to me to expose us more to ill consequences than to potential 
gain. Currencies, like languages, involve extremely important elements of 
coordination. That is the reason for the incumbency advantage a number 
of people have talked about at this conference. To have two currencies 
trying to be in complete equipoise risks substantial instability, as things 
rush from one direction to the other. None of this is to say that the United 
States should seek to thwart the euro.
The world will tend to maintain the strength of the dollar, the primal 
role of the dollar, unless we mess up quite badly, and that is a ﬁne outcome. 
If we make a mistake, that will be unfortunate. We should certainly support 
the Economic and Monetary Union, but the notion that we actively proﬁt 
from a kind of knife’s edge to deter us from bad conduct doesn’t strike 
me as being a healthy one. We will know much more 18 months from 
now about a question that seems to be central to thinking about many 
monetary and ﬁnancial questions, not least the view of the euro. 
One can have two views with respect to the current crisis. The ﬁrst, 
which I call the made-in-America view, is that America rammed large 
deﬁcits  that  created  substantial  imbalances,  elected  an  administration 
that did not believe in regulation, fomented in retrospect a crazy set of 
mortgage practices, built up a phenomenal bubble, and created for itself 
a  tremendous  ﬁnancial  crisis  that,  being  the  world’s  focal  economy, 
inevitably had spillovers because others purchased its assets substantially. 
And so America is the epicenter of this ﬁnancial crisis. The ﬁnancial crisis 
has  an  unfortunate  fallout.  The  lessons  to  be  learned  concern  various 
dysfunctional  features  of  American  ﬁnancial  practices  and  ﬁnancial 
regulation. The event is a substantial boon to those who favor the view 
that the American model of capitalism, or more generally the Anglo-Saxon 
model of capitalism, is somehow inferior to alternative, more corporatist, 
and dirigiste models. This is one view with respect to the ﬁnancial crisis.
The second is that in a period of high global liquidity and globally lax 
supervision encouraged by the enormous complexity of ﬁnancial instru-
ments, a ﬁnancial crisis developed with respect to imprudent practices 
of ﬁnancial institutions everywhere and the ﬁrst incarnation of the crisis 
happened to be American subprime lending. But that was largely coin-
cidental;  because America  has  more  mark-to-market  accounting,  more 
institutions that operate on a hair-trigger because they are outside the 
system of large state-embraced banks, the crisis was felt ﬁrst in America, 
was dimensioned ﬁrst in America, was reﬂected ﬁrst in America. But the 
magnitude of the ﬁnancial system rot in Europe is not so much smaller 
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Europe is behind because of slightly different exigencies of the real estate 
cycle and because of slower revelation of ﬁnancial pain. But the crisis is 
fundamentally global or at least transatlantic and should be interpreted in 
transatlantic terms.
I do not know which of these views is right. I was always educated 
by Ted Truman when we worked together that my habit of posing things 
as dichotomies was wrong because the truth always lay somewhere in 
between. Perhaps the right way to frame the question is less as which 
of these views is right and more as where along the spectrum between 
“made in America” and “ﬁrst discovered in America” should one see this 
crisis.
If you live in Europe, you tend very much to the ﬁrst view: that it 
was more made in America. Many in the United States, particularly those 
associated with institutions that would be thought of more as part of the 
shadow banking system than of the ofﬁcial banking system, would tend 
more to the second view, that it was ﬁrst discovered in the United States.
I am genuinely not sure where the truth lies. But the question will 
be enormously important because the more the reality is in the ﬁrst cat-
egory, the more these events threaten the dollar and the model for which 
it stands and the more likely they are to portend a change in currency ar-
rangements. But if the reality is more in the second category, the less likely 
these events would point to the euro gaining share relative to the dollar.
It is certainly not the case that European stock markets have vastly 
outperformed American stock markets over the last nine months. De-
pending on how you choose your dates, they may have outperformed 
American stock markets or underperformed a little bit. But the same is 
much closer. Suppose one had said a year ago, “America’s going to have 
a huge ﬁnancial crisis. Bear Stearns is going to go down. Lehman is going 
to go down. AIG is going down. Merrill Lynch is going to be sold, and ﬁve 
Latin American countries are going to be able to borrow money cheaper 
than Goldman Sachs,” and then asked, “How will the US stock market do 
relative to the European stock market?” The answer would seem obvious. 
But the fact that it is not does make one wonder how much of this is an 
export situation and how much of this is a global situation. Certainly, the 
dramatic movements in the dollar vis-à-vis the euro recently also point 
in the same direction. I will leave the question on where the truth lies be-
tween the two views for others more knowledgeable than me to answer. 
The answer to that question will bear on the future of the dollar and the 
euro and also on how different economic systems are assessed.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
C. Fred Bergsten: I was delighted, Larry, to tee things up for you to come 
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back to you by simply noting that when you said that the United States 
should not seek to subject itself to currency competition, it did sound a bit 
like a former and perhaps future secretary of the Treasury speaking.
But I was basically pleased because, I think, we agreed. You said the 
United States should not seek primacy for the dollar and should not seek 
to thwart an increased international role for the euro. We should, indeed, 
support the euro project. That is what I was saying. And, in a sense, let the 
best currency win.
I certainly did not say that we should do damage to ourselves in order 
to promote a bigger role for the euro, nor did I advocate for a complete 
equipoise, in your elegant term. But rather to say that within this frame-
work of necessary cooperation, which we had for many years, will have 
for the indeﬁnite future, and certainly have had to come out of this crisis, 
there will be an element of competition. And you said, in posing your 
dichotomy, it is really going to be a judgment matter that the markets and 
world opinion as a whole will develop over the next several years, as to 
how Europe and the United States do coming out of this and therefore, in 
part, in understanding how we got into it.
So, I think fundamentally we agree on it. We are both agnostic as to 
how it is going to come out. I guess the difference would be that I have 
greater equanimity about the prospect that, on this particular criterion of 
international currency roles, a bigger role for the euro might actually be a 
healthy thing, especially for future secretaries of the Treasury.
Erkki Liikanen: Just two comments. On the exchange rate, I feel uncom-
fortable when people explain everything with short-term changes in ex-
change rates. There have been changes recently, but let us look at them in 
the long term.
On the ﬁnancial markets, Larry said that we have a problem in Europe 
that we know exists but has not yet been revealed. Europe is not isolated. 
But let us not take extremely strong positions before we know for certain. Of 
course, the banks that depend on wholesale funding have had a very tough 
time because markets are tight, the risk premia are high, and so forth.
George Soros: The current crisis has revealed a fundamental ﬂaw in the 
design of the euro. In such a crisis, the central bank can do certain things, 
and the treasury has to do certain things. In the case of the euro, you have 
a common central bank but no common treasury. This issue has come to 
the forefront now when there is a need to effectively underwrite or rescue 
banks. France and Germany prefer to do it on a national basis. Smaller 
countries that are weaker would like to do it on a European basis. How 
this issue is going to be resolved will have a major inﬂuence on whether 
the euro is qualiﬁed to be an international reserve currency.
This factor has played into the ﬂuctuation in the value of the euro 
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do. Certainly, the more pressing issue is the shortage of dollars. The euro, 
in fact, was overbought in the early stages of the recession, which started 
in the United States. In fact, the economic slowdown was transmitted to 
Europe via the declining dollar. And now that the ﬁnancial crisis has be-
come more severe, there is a pressing shortage of dollars among European 
banks. They have to pay tremendous premiums for it. That is the other 
factor that has accounted for the move to the euro.
Leon Brittan: On George Soros’ point that the European side of the crisis 
cannot be dealt with exclusively by the European Central Bank but has to 
be dealt with by treasuries, this may not be an acceptable pragmatic Brit-
ish approach, but as far as I see it, it does not matter whether it is done 
by European institutions, so long as it is done by Europe. By this I mean 
that if, for historical institutional reasons, it is impossible for Europe to 
agree on a big plan to be implemented, it does not matter so long as the 
European ﬁnance ministers agree on the principles that should be applied 
by individual countries, which have a degree of ﬂexibility as to how they 
apply them but at the same time are dealing with the same problems with 
the same broad objectives.
Not everyone on this panel entirely shares the theme about the euro 
replacing the dollar or not. But the framework of discussion implies that it 
is a good thing. Your side wins, as it were.
Larry said he was in favor of a strong dollar, in a slightly mantra-like 
fashion at the beginning of his remarks. I was going to agree with Fred, 
but then he said in his concluding remarks, “Let the best currency win,” 
implying that this is a contest and that winning is a good thing. Erkki, 
with whom I agree, said that it is not a European objective to make the 
European currency, the euro, an international reserve currency.
I want to bring to bear a little bit of the experience of the United 
Kingdom. I remember the time when Britain was struggling to retain the 
international role for sterling. It became very clear to the younger among 
us that having this international role as a reserve currency was not only 
not a big prize but also a major handicap to dealing with the British econ-
omy.
One thing is clear, if the cap ﬁts, wear it. If you are a major country 
where economic fundamentals are pushing your currency away from its 
central role in the world, there is nothing more disastrous than to try and 
follow policies that are designed to cling on to that role because those poli-
cies are going to be seriously disadvantageous. 
Erkki Liikanen: On the role of subsidiaries, there is a difference between 
a subsidiary of a bank and a branch of a bank. The subsidiary is legally 
independent. So in these crisis resolutions that we have had, countries 
were able to take action in the case of subsidiaries because the national 
supervisor of the subsidiary supervised the bank. They knew the situation IS THE PRESENT CRISIS THE MOMENT FOR THE EURO’S GLOBAL EMERGENCE?  193
and had the ability to act nationally. A branch, however, is outside the full 
national supervision of the host country. So if it is a question of a branch, 
it will be more difﬁcult. In the subsidiary case, it has worked.
To George Soros, one comment on the European treasury issue. The 
last two or three years have been rather positive in that area even though 
we do not have a big European budget. But certain good, sound, basic 
principles have been applied due to the Stability and Growth Pact, which 
aims at cutting excessive deﬁcits and which has been working. The pact 
has been respected in Germany and also in France; we have given a great-
er role to automatic stabilizers. Everybody has to accept that excessive 
deﬁcits are harmful to economic development. 
C. Fred Bergsten: Just to clarify Sir Leon Brittan’s last point. When I said 
let the best currency win, I meant in a market sense. Let the market de-
termine whose policies are better, whose performance is better. That will, 
as Larry and I both said, probably determine which currencies will play 
which relative roles in the future.
I distinguish market choice from national interest or certainly any 
driven by national policy to promote either currency as the dominant one. 
I thought I was clear in my remarks that I had a preference, which Larry 
did not care for. But my preference for that kind of competitive interna-
tional currency role is based in part on its disciplinary grounds. And I 
hope I will, therefore, retain your support for my view in this debate.
Leszek  Balcerowicz:  On  banking  supervision  in  Europe,  whatever 
arrangement that emerges should be country-speciﬁc because countries 
differ. For example, some small European banks are of systemic importance 
in some new EU members. And second, it would not be advisable to have 
complete  harmonization  of  supervision. And  I  give  you  one  example 
from my own experience as a former central bank governor: The rate of 
growth of housing credit denominated in Swiss francs has been excessive, 
speciﬁcally in Poland and some other new EU members. We introduced 
special regulations that have slowed this growth. One can call it a reverse 
of subprime because it makes it more expensive and more difﬁcult for 
poor people to get housing credit. I think it was working in the sense that 
it slowed the rate of previously excessive growth of credit. Such solutions 
cannot be European; they have to be country-speciﬁc.
Lawrence Summers: The issue of European crisis governance is profound-
ly important. We will know better how well the system works a year from 
now than we do today. I’m inclined to agree with Leon Brittan, that what-
ever defenses can be offered for it are more in the pragmatic domain than 
in the theoretical domain. We will know just how pragmatically effective 
and successful it is.
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me understand, suppose the third largest bank in Spain is about to fail, 
who are the players and who is responsible for what. What is up to the 
Spanish Treasury? What is up to the Spanish central bank, which no longer 
has a currency? What is up to the ECB? What is up to Brussels? Just tell me 
what the protocol is.”
And again, this was 10 years ago. At that point, half a dozen European 
hands were raised. It was like any group of economists: Half a dozen an-
swers were offered to the question by half a dozen Europeans. I assume 
that matters have been rationalized since then, but I do think it is an im-
portant issue, particularly when you have to move rapidly. 
Erkki Liikanen: Larry asked 10 years ago about a Spanish bank. But I 
would like to take a more complicated question, that of Fortis, a Belgian 
bank that got into trouble. Its balance sheet is 225 percent of the Belgian 
GDP. How was the crisis handled?
As far as emergency lending is concerned, the rules are clear. The cen-
tral bank has the responsibility after authorization of the ECB Governing 
Council.
As far as equity is concerned, Fortis has headquarters in Belgium 
and subsidiaries in two other countries. The treasuries got together on 
that particular Sunday and decided how they would inject equity. All 
the decisions were announced at the same time, 10 o’clock on Sunday. 
The Spanish case is simpler because there are fewer participants in the 
discussion.
Alexander Swoboda: In the mid-1960s there were already discussions in 
the United States on whether it was worth keeping the link to gold and 
the international role of the dollar and so on. And there was the case of 
Britain, which Sir Leon Brittan mentioned. It is not a question of actively 
promoting the international role of one’s currency for the sake of actively 
promoting the role of the currency and winning a competition on interna-
tional markets. It is a matter of the costs and beneﬁts of having a currency 
that is an international currency.
A number of small countries—Germany was mentioned and Switzer-
land, my own country—actively discouraged the international use of their 
currencies because it had many disadvantages. So, I think, you decide you 
want a strong currency or you want a good, deep, resilient market for 
assets denominated in your currency, which encourages use of your cur-
rency in markets. And that contributes quite naturally to your currency 
being more used as an international currency. But it is not a political deci-
sion: “I want my currency to be the dominant one.” If Britain was trying to 
retain its currency’s dominance, it was partly because it was afraid of what 
would happen to the British economy if the Commonwealth dumped Brit-
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Edwin (Ted) Truman: I have a slightly broader question that goes beyond 
the European discussion, and it was raised in part by the discussion about 
bank subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. I’m not quite sure it makes a differ-
ence whether an entity is a subsidiary or branch. I mean it makes a legal 
difference, but as we have learned from this crisis, there are reputational 
risks. And once your reputation is at risk, it does not matter why.
My broader issue is: A country has a national supervisor, and the 
national treasury is responsible for solvency support. But some countries 
have ﬁnancial institutions that are large relative to the country’s GDP, 
for example, Iceland, Malta, Belgium, and Switzerland. It is a tragedy for 
Iceland, but if the country were the size of Germany and had comparable 
institutions as a multiple of GDP, it would be a problem for everybody. So 
if we are going to insist on principally national supervision and principally 
national treasuries to do the solvency operation, or if they cannot do it, 
then there are implications for everybody else. You have a question for 
the global system and whether others in the system will say, “Your bank 
cannot get that large.” That would be one answer. I am not sure what the 
right answer is, but this crisis has raised this question.
Peter B. Kenen: What is important to a country is not that its currency is 
the reserve currency. What is important to a country—and this implies 
that two or three currencies can play international roles at the same time 
and not compete for dominance—is that its nationals, for example, en-
joy the advantages of its currency being used widely abroad (invoicing of 
trade, private-sector uses, and so on) and not the fact that the Chinese, for 
example, may be holding X billion US dollars in their reserves.
Too much attention is being given to the role of the currency in the 
ofﬁcial sector or in the monetary system narrowly deﬁned. We should be 
looking at the role of currencies in the international business sector. And 
there it is obvious that more than one country or entity, such as the mon-
etary union, can promote the international use of its currency or assist 
its nationals in doing so without necessarily competing with some other 
government.
Of course, exchange rate movements are of some proposition. You 
do want a modicum of exchange rate stability. But that speaks to the 
kind of monetary policies you follow, not policies designed to encourage 
reserve accumulation by foreigners but rather policies to assure domestic 
ﬁnancials and price stability. This debate is cast too narrowly in terms of 
competition between currencies as reserve currencies and insufﬁciently 
in terms of a role for your currency that is commensurate with your role 
in the world economy and that promotes or assists this role rather than 
trying to displace another currency in the system.
Lawrence Summers: I will comment on a couple of issues. First, how good 
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reserve currency? Second, how good is it to be a transaction currency, 
which is Peter’s issue. And there is a third issue, which is awkward to talk 
about but I suspect may be quantitatively more important: How attractive 
is your paper money as an asset for hoarders outside the law to hold? And 
what does that mean for seigniorage? I suspect the numbers from extra 
seigniorage loom fairly large relative to some of the other numbers you 
calculate in this area. It is obviously not the most consequential issue in 
the world, but we in the Treasury in the 1990s were of the view that it was 
a modestly internationally uncivil act for the Europeans to introduce the 
 500 note when we had made a very conscious decision to resist issuing 
the $500 note so as to make our currency less attractive for drug dealers 
and black marketers. If you calculate the seigniorage gain that results 
from the European act—it is essentially an interest-free loan forever of that 
amount of money—$50 billion to $100 billion can plausibly be attributed 
to it. Let me leave it at that.
Erkki Liikanen: I just want to comment on Ted Truman’s two critical 
questions. He asked about the size of the country and size of the balance 
sheet of the bank. I think it is a serious issue. We have been very closely 
following Iceland. Icelandic banks have branches and subsidiaries in Fin-
land also.
The balance sheet of Icelandic banks was 10 times bigger than the 
GDP of that country. So we should always remember—and everybody is 
learning it—that the central bank should be strong enough with its balance 
sheet so that it is able to do its job as the lender of last resort. That is the 
ﬁrst point. The second is that the treasury of each country must be able to 
assess its capacity to act in case of a problem with solvency. And that is 
where the Fortis case is interesting because it was relatively big. Belgium 
was able to act, together with the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
The difference between a subsidiary and a branch is not only theoretical. 
I am in the middle of a problem at home (Finland) because three Icelandic 
banks are now in receivership. Two of them have subsidiaries and one 
has a branch in my country. I have been following Norway and Sweden. 
They have considered it possible to give liquidity assistance—emergency 
lending—to a subsidiary because that is independently supervised by the 
host country. But to give emergency lending to a branch is a different case. 
So there are concrete differences between those two structures in a crisis.
C. Fred Bergsten: Let me close with two empirical and hopefully not very 
provocative points. Peter rightly noted the distinction between the private 
or vehicle use of a currency and its reserve currency use. Historically, there 
has been a pretty high correlation between those two uses. I do not think 
there is a strong theoretical reason for that, although some logic links the 
two. But they have always been parallel. So whereas I think you are con-
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judgment on the impact of the international role of your currency—if you 
get one, you get the other, and you have to look at them as a package.
The other is on Larry’s point about the gains from seigniorage. If you 
are right, Larry, that the gains are as much as $50 billion to $100 billion for 
the European Union by issuing those maﬁa-friendly notes, it still does not 
necessarily swamp the other effects of the international role of your cur-
rency. It depends on the answer to the question Leszek and I posed earlier, 
the extent to which the international role of your currency has an impor-
tant measurable impact on your domestic economic outcomes.
And again, that comes back to the provocative point. If the interna-
tional role of the dollar was an important factor in promoting the imbal-
ances, promoting the huge capital inﬂow, promoting the low interest rates, 
excessively easy monetary policy, and promoting the mispricing of risk, 
then the quantitative implications could swamp any seigniorage gain or 
loss. Now that is an if, because we have a lot of controversy over that 
analytical linkage. But those kinds of comparisons would have to be made 
because there is no deﬁnitive answer. It would have to be part of the equa-
tion as to whether you thought it was a good thing or not such a good 
thing for your currency to play a big global role.
Adam S. Posen: Five years ago, we held a conference at the Institute and 
I edited the volume on the euro at ﬁve, then also with the support of the 
European Commission. Euro skepticism in the United States remained a 
signiﬁcant factor at the time, and we had to sell the idea that the euro was 
succeeding. Five years later, that is no longer the issue.
Our conference today considered whether and how the euro could 
play  a  more  global  role.  A  number  of  empirically  grounded  reasons 
were presented for skepticism that such a much-expanded role, let alone 
displacement of the dollar, would be soon achieved. Yet, all participants 
viewed both the continued domestic success and continually increasing 
global usage of the euro as nearly inevitable, as well as in the world’s 
common interest. The euro at 10 is regional, stable, and a legitimate source 
of pride in European achievement.About the Contributors
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Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics
The Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics is a private, 
nonproﬁt, nonpartisan research institution devoted to the study of inter-
national economic policy. Since 1981 the Institute has provided timely and 
objective analysis of, and concrete solutions to, a wide range of interna-
tional economic problems. It is one of the very few economics think tanks 
that are widely regarded as “nonpartisan” by the press and “neutral” by 
the US Congress, it is cited by the quality media more than any other such 
institution, and it was recently selected as Top Think Tank in the World in 
the ﬁrst comprehensive survey of over 5,000 such institutions.
The Institute, which has been directed by C. Fred Bergsten throughout 
its existence, attempts to anticipate emerging issues and to be ready with 
practical ideas, presented in user-friendly formats, to inform and shape 
public debate. Its audience includes government ofﬁcials and legislators, 
business  and  labor  leaders,  management  and  staff  at  international 
organizations, university-based scholars and their students, other research 
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world.
The Institute’s staff of about 50 includes more than two dozen experts, 
who are conducting about 30 studies at any given time and are widely 
viewed as one of the top group of economists at any research center. Its 
agenda emphasizes global macroeconomic topics, international money 
and ﬁnance, trade and related social issues, energy and the environment, 
investment,  and  domestic  adjustment  measures.  Current  priority  is 
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(including its ﬁnancial aspects) and the backlash against it, global trade 
imbalances and currency relationships, the creation of an international 
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dimension,  the  competitiveness  of  the  United  States  and  other  major 
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emerging-market  economies,  policies  toward  the  dollar,  the  euro,  and 
other important currencies, and responses to debt and currency crises. The 
Institute has made important contributions to key trade policy decisions 
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States,  the  Uruguay  Round  and  the  development  of  the  World  Trade 
Organization, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
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only think tank partly funded by European Union member states. It is 
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